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ABSTRACT
Home medical care for medically complex and intellectually disabled children is 
frequently prescribed by providers, but the consequences for the family of such care are 
rarely considered in full. It is recognized that at times the care required might become 
physically demanding and emotionally burdensome. However, I believe that this sort of 
caregiving often reaches extreme levels, making our continued reliance on family 
caregiving ethically problematic. 
This paper analyzes several novel-length narratives by parents of intellectually disabled 
children to look deeper into the lives effected by this complex form of home care. 
Building on the care ethics framework developed by Joan Tronto, I examine particularly 
the ways in which the parents perceive their caregiving duties and demonstrate Tronto’s 
caregiving virtues of attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness. This 
work begins to theorize caregiving in a new way, revealing previously unrecognized 
ethical concerns raised by this sort of extreme caregiving. 
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, no one . . . was willing to admit that a child could be loved 
and still be too difficult to be cared for by his or her parents. Because until 
twenty years ago, children this medically complex didn’t exist. They didn’t 
survive. High-tech medicine has created a new strain of human beings who 
require superhuman care. Society has yet to acknowledge this reality, 
especially at a practical level (Brown, 2011, p. 95-96).
This quote is from a memoir called The Boy in the Moon: A Father’s Journey to 
Understand His Extraordinary Son. The author, Ian Brown, is the father of one of those 
medically complex children whose survival is made possible only by recent advances in 
medicine. As medical providers, or consumers, of the benefits of modern medicine, it is 
too easy to stop with this extraordinary survival, and congratulate ourselves on our 
collective scientific prowess. We usually don’t acknowledge that, for many of these 
children, survival does not guarantee normal health and development. We forget that, 
sometimes, continued life is maintained on a day to day basis, by constant vigilance and 
complex home care. The families of the children who represent that “new strain of 
human beings,” often pay a high price for that survival. Brown is all too aware of the 
amount of care required, having provided it for his son for thirteen years of physically 
intense days and sleepless nights. It is indeed a superhuman undertaking.
! I first became aware of the problem posed by this extraordinary caregiving as a 
child, watching my parents’ efforts to raise my mentally retarded brother Paul at home. In 
the early sixties, the complex medical care needed by Ian Brown’s son was not 
available. There were no gastrostomy feedings, which Brown describes in the first 
chapter of his book, so my mother spent eight hours a day during Paul’s first two years 
feeding him a few drops at at time. Nor were there such things as appropriate classes in 
the schools, or therapy techniques to help delayed motor skills. My mother invented her 
own version of physical therapy to stretch his tight muscles, with my father building 
devices to help him crawl and, much later, walk. She did her best to help him learn to 
talk, and use the bathroom, and dress himself, with slow progress over years. 
Meanwhile, she and my father became activists for the disability movement, which 
quietly paralleled the civil rights movement, championing special education, founding a 
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local chapter of the Association for Retarded Children, and forcing closure of inhumane 
institutions. 
! Their work never really ended. When it became obvious that Paul would never be 
able to hold a job, my father founded the sheltered workshop where he still works today. 
And as they began to age, with my brother still unable to live independently, they 
returned to activism to find him placement in a group home. He was 47 years old when 
he moved out. Until that time, my siblings and I went about our lives aware that we might 
need to take on his care ourselves at any time.
! When I chose to go to medical school, I was not really hoping to find a cure for 
my brother, though I did want, and eventually found, and explanation for his problems; 
birth anoxia with brain injury and mild cerebral palsy. But perhaps because of my family 
experiences, I began to connect with the families of medically complex and intellectually 
delayed children who arrived in my practice. Though much of their complex medical 
management by necessity falls to pediatric sub-specialists, it is not uncommon to see 
them in a general pediatric practice. Their arrival in the office even for a routine check-up 
or minor illness is usually enough to put my schedule behind for the rest of the day. 
Nothing about these kids is routine. But even expanding the usual ten minute visit to 20 
minutes or an hour or even two hours cannot begin to address all the problems that 
need to be raised. 
! It is easy for medical providers to forget, when these children are being cared for 
at home and effectively out of sight, just how much care they need. It is rare to stop to 
think about the parents who administer all the medications that might be prescribed, 
arrange for recommended visits to therapists and specialists, and live with those 
problems around the clock. But over my years of pediatric practice, three “special needs” 
families let our relationships change from doctor/patient to friendship. I saw that my 
family, growing with Paul, was neither alone nor in a uniquely difficult caregiving 
situation. And I began to suspect that the consequences of this care were potentially 
deeper and more problematic than realized. 
! The parents of these children, like my parents, often become vocal advocates for 
their children, but they rarely stop to pay attention to their own needs. They are too busy 
with the endless round of caregiving to think about the superhuman work they are doing. 
Their own lives are often put aside by the urgent necessity of meeting their child’s 
needs. They rarely have time to think about, let alone tell, their own stories. Yet, over the 
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past few decades, a very few parents have dared to expose their feelings in published 
books. Their stories need to be heard. 
! The goal of this paper is, first of all, to describe the lives of these parents and the 
extra burdens that fall to them in raising these children with complex medical needs or 
intellectual disabilities. I will draw from personal experience, both with my own family and 
the lives of the families I encountered in pediatric practice, and those narratives by 
parents that are available. The providers of medical care need to be aware of the 
burdens imposed by the care they are prescribing, and aware that there is sometimes a 
high price being paid, out of their sight, for the miracle cures of which we are 
understandably proud. To highlight the problems, I have begun calling what they are 
doing for their children “extreme caregiving.”
! A second goal in outlining the difficulties encountered in caring for these complex 
children, is to elucidate the consequences of caregiving for the parent/caregivers, as well 
as their often permanently dependent child. I believe that the difficulty and complexity of 
the tasks that have fallen to them raise ethical concerns that are not currently being 
addressed. I argue that the unique ethical problems arising from extreme caregiving, 
may impact relationships between parents and health care providers. I believe that 
understanding these parents’ attitudes and difficulties is essential when making medical 
decisions, particularly decisions around discharge planning or end of life discussions. 
! In order to penetrate the lives of these parents and their children, however, I have 
found that it is necessary to understand more about the act of caregiving itself. Many of 
the ethical consequences of the extraordinary duties that fall to these parents are best 
understood as caregiving problems. In order to understand them, we must advance our 
understanding of an ethic of care. So, as a final goal, I hope that an exploration of this 
complex form of caregiving will provide a conceptual framework that can extended to 
other care situations, and used to elucidate the nature of caregiving itself.
! I will begin by defining “extreme caregiving,” how I derived the term and how we 
might be able to recognize it. I will not attempt an exact definition, as arguing about who 
is and is not doing extreme caregiving is pointless, but I will explain how the children 
requiring extreme caregiving have been overlooked, and attempt to quantify their 
numbers. In the secondh chapter, I will also review past research that has been done on 
specific groups of children, some of whom undoubtedly require extreme caregiving. 
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Because those studies have generally concentrated on things other than meeting a 
child’s needs, they do not form a complete picture of the necessary caregiving. 
! It is in narrative where I believe an accurate descriptions of the hidden emotional 
consequences of the extreme caregiving relationship can be found. Since I intend to 
attempt to uncover ethical concerns by analysis of narratives written by parents about 
raising these children, in Chapter Three I will provide a description of narrative ethics 
and its uses, concentrating on its use to analyze stories written as witness to sickness. 
In these narratives, the parent is witness to illness in their children’s bodies, and not 
physically sick himself, but the relevance and importance of the stories are similar. I will 
then describe the various narratives and defend my choice of a few of them for deeper 
reading.  
! Next, we need a way to understand care, not as an emotion which all parents 
have for their children, but as an act to fulfill a need. In Chapter Four I will expand on 
theories of care proposed by political scientist Joan Tronto (1993). She has broken the 
act of caring into four phases, each of which move an actor closer to participating in the 
work of the meeting of needs. For each phase, she has proposed a virtue which can be 
used to ethically evaluate the action at that phase. I will expand upon her theories, 
perhaps in way their author never intended, by using the virtues as a framework from 
which to spotlight the many activities, both physical and emotional, in which these 
parents must engage in order to meet the complex needs of their children. The 
remainder of the chapters are based on Tronto’s phases of care and their associated 
virtues. 
! In Chapter Five, I will concentrate on the first two phases, “caring about” and 
“taking care of.” Their associated virtues are attentiveness and responsibility, and looking 
at the many duties to which parent extreme caregivers are called upon to be attentive to 
and responsible for will serve to accentuate the enormity of the task they are performing. 
In this chapter I will also list specific concerns which have already been raised in the 
ethics literature, about some types of pediatric home health care, and correlate them 
with quotes from the parents’ narratives. In this way I hope to insure that the parent 
narrators are not considered to be exaggerating or unique in the claims they make about 
their lives. 
! Caregiving, or the actual hands-on meeting of needs, is the next of Tronto’s 
phases of care, and these parents do one of the most complex forms of it. Chapter Six 
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discusses the virtue of this phase, competence, relying now almost completely on 
narratives. It is in this phase where I think extreme caregiving moves beyond merely 
requiring a lot more of an action, and toward requiring a new sort of action. These 
parents must become something that most parents are not: competent medical 
caregivers. This chapter uncovers the reasons the parent narrators seek competence, 
how they achieve that competence, and how they think about the abilities they acquire. 
! The final phase of care, care-receiving, with its associated virtue of 
responsiveness is the subject of Chapter Seven. This phase insures that the cared-for is 
an integral part of the care given, by asking the caregiver to elicit a response to care, 
and the care-receiver to provide it. However, the narrators of these stories are all parents 
of children who are either unreliable in their verbal responses, or unable to speak at all. 
That the narrators spend many pages looking for and interpreting their children’s limited 
responses, attests to the importance of this phase. However the inability to elicit an 
accurate response raises ethical concerns, as it becomes apparent that the parents are 
not only the provider of their child’s needs but often the sole interpreter of them. In these 
stories of sickness, the parent is the only storyteller for the child’s life, and we shall see 
the uncertainty that this creates. 
! These parents are at the forefront of the ongoing revolution in home care, doing 
the most difficult of caregiving work, invisibly and without recognition. If the medical 
system continues to promote ever-more-difficult levels of pediatric home care, we must 
understand the lives these parents lead. We must understand the physical and 
emotional burden imposed by complex and prolonged caregiving. We must understand 
why families agree to take on the new burden of care, and how they arrange their lives 
around it. But mostly we must understand the intense relationship that forms between a 
parent who is also the provider of medical care and a child who is the recipient of such 
superhuman, extreme caregiving. 
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND
! Beginning in the late fifties, an increasing number of parents of children with 
“mental retardation” and other disabilities refused the suggestion that their children be 
institutionalized, and instead chose to care for them at home. At about the same time, 
advances in pediatric medicine began to result in astonishing increases in survival for 
dozens of congenital syndromes and pediatric disabling conditions. In addition, there 
have been recent advances in home health care, such as home ventilators and home 
gastrostomy feedings, which allow ever more medically complex children to be moved 
from the hospital into the home. Of course there have been huge benefits from these 
advances, as children are surviving and sometimes thriving with diseases, many of 
which had previously been considered fatal. But one of the unexpected complications of 
all of these changes is that an uncounted number of children with long-term disabilities 
and complex medical problems are now being cared for by their families at home.
! While some children with these problems will need only the usual amount of 
parental involvement, many will require a much higher level of care. At the most severe 
end of a multitude of pediatric conditions, are children whose care is complex and often 
burdensome. Because these children fall across a large number of chronic diseases, 
syndromes, and diagnoses, and their medical needs and types of disability vary so 
widely, those who do require high levels of care have not yet been identified as a 
separate group. In fact, they are not all even technically children, as many who are 
severely developmentally delayed or at the most compromised end of the autistic 
spectrum have now grown to adulthood but still require a level of care usually 
encountered only in infants or small children. Yet despite these differences in age, 
diagnosis, and disability, they all have in common an ongoing need for care that is 
intense, complicated, and prolonged. Their parents must provide an often complex form 
of medical home care, combined with the usual duties of parenting, which are often 
extended by the child’s problems. Essentially, these children all require what I call an 
extreme level of caregiving. 
! Like other care work, the caregiving that the parents and families of these 
children provide for them is largely unrecognized. These children are visible in schools 
and communities, but the work that is done at home is not always apparent. Even the 
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physicians and hospitals who provide medical care often do not realize the extent or the 
practical consequences of the care they prescribe. This is a problem that can be 
expected to grow worse as medical care becomes more fractionated by specialty, and as 
continuing medical advances at the borders of survival insure an increasing number of 
effected children. 
DEFINING EXTREME CAREGIVING!
! Eva Feder Kittay, in her analysis of caregiving presented in Love’s Labor (1999), 
stresses that all of us will at some point in our lives require care; we all required care 
during childhood and many will require it again in old age. Early theories of care balance 
out the vulnerability and dependency incurred during those times, by the ability to 
provide care to others during times in which one is less dependent. However, Kittay 
notes that there are some people, including Kittay’s daughter Sesha, whose need for 
care persists outside those expected periods, in whom the dependent state of infancy or 
childhood can last sometimes for an entire lifetime. Sesha’s development never 
progressed beyond infancy, and she remains dependent on others for almost every 
aspect of her daily living. Sesha and others like her, are not then able to return the care 
they have received, or equalize their dependent status by performing care work for 
others. Kittay calls this extended state of vulnerability and dependency, “extreme 
dependency” (Kittay, 1999, p. xiii). People in this state require a good deal of care (or 
dependency work) throughout their lives.  Kittay uses the situation of extreme 
dependency to analyze its consequences on vulnerability and autonomy, but I would like 
to turn it around and use it to analyze caregiving itself. If there are people who exhibit 
extreme dependency, it follows that they must require a similarly extreme level of 
caregiving. They require, then, “extreme caregiving.”
! Lynne Ray, in a 2002 paper based on interviews with thirty families of children 
with a variety of special needs, including medical fragility and technology dependence, 
identified a similar level of exceptional caregiving (Ray, 2002). The parents she 
interviewed were performing complex medical care, of the sort usually done only by 
specially trained hospital personnel. Like Kittay, Ray recognized that many of the 
children had severe delays in development and would, essentially, never outgrow their 
need for care. She called parenting these children, where stages of infancy and 
childhood can persist over an entire lifetime, “parenting plus.” The care was actually 
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more difficult than parenting a typical infant or toddler, however. Ray found that these 
parents were also on the front line of their child’s health care, responsible for “accurately 
diagnosing, and managing worrisome symptoms, complications, or emergencies” (Ray, 
2002, p. 427). This “parenting plus” was being done without respite and in constant fear 
for their children’s lives. She describes an intense, time-consuming, and emotionally 
difficult form of caregiving, for which there was often no anticipated endpoint. The 
prolongation of infancy or childhood, possibly throughout an entire life, is another aspect 
of extreme caregiving.
! Though much of the work of pediatric medical caregiving, the often messy, 
unrecognized dirty work of care, is done by professionals, I do not believe that 
professional caregiving often becomes extreme. Hospital health care workers are trained 
to maintain IVs and give medications, to maintain ventilators, watch monitors, and plug 
in OG feeding tubes. Dressings must be replaced, and blood must be drawn, and fluids 
must be measured. There are some ordinary tasks as well; there are diapers to be 
changed and various secretions to be cleaned up, there are baths to be given and beds 
to be changed. Much of this work has no time limit, no schedule that can be relied upon. 
This is intense, and often stressful, but it is not extreme. The need is 24/7, but health 
care workers, of course, have shifts. No matter how busy, at some point the work of 
caring can be passed on to someone else. 
! It is when we shift to the home environment to provide this same level of care 
that I believe caregiving becomes extreme. The parents, essentially called upon to do all 
of the above, are placed in a new and uniquely difficult situation. They must do all of the 
work of nursing, while also continuing to maintain the home environment. They must be 
both parents and medical caregivers, round the clock and with no endpoint in sight. 
! There is another aspect that is I believe unique to extreme caregiving, and that is 
the intimate relationship that already exists between parent and child. While 
relationships do develop between professional caregivers and patients, the care is 
usually being provided to someone who at least starts out as a stranger, with whom 
there are no past emotional ties or conflicts. Professional caregivers sometimes are 
called on to meet emotional needs as well as the physical needs of the child, but with 
parents that support is expected. Many parents report difficulty balancing the dual role of 
parent and caregiver for this reason. Even if there is a professional health care worker in 
the home, because of emotional ties, the parent’s responsibilities cannot easily be left 
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behind (Kirk, 1998). This emotional burden may be the most distinctive part of extreme 
caregiving, at once its most difficult and, possibly, most desirable aspect. Much of this 
paper will center around an attempt to understand the impact and evaluate the 
consequences of this emotional component. 
! Extreme caregiving, then, has four major components. One is its difficulty; 
complicated either by medical complexity or multiple time-consuming tasks. Second is 
the prolongation of difficult stages of childhood, causing parental caregiving to extend far 
beyond the expected time frame, sometimes for an entire lifetime. Third is its 
relentlessness; it is a burden that is taken on round-the-clock, with little possibility of 
relief. Fourth, and most important, extreme caregiving is performed for a person with 
whom the caregiver has an intense and personal relationship.  
Parenting and Extreme Caregiving
! Within an ethic of care, caregiving is understood as necessary work, done to 
fulfill a need. Caregiving in a broader definition can include the meeting of any need, 
from feeding the hungry to cleaning the environment, but it is most often thought of as an 
individual meeting the needs of another. It can be done by either professionals or non-
professionals. Parenting is certainly a form of non-professional caregiving, and has its 
own unique problems and rewards. Typical parenting has fairly well-defined parameters 
and expectations. Parents are expected to, at a bare minimum, keep the child fed and 
healthy, and safe from physical harm. But most agree that parenting also involves 
fostering independence, allowing the child to grow into a happy, free, and productive 
adult (Malek, 2009). There are certainly times when this is not an easy task, however 
there are numerous sources of advice and support, and, when the child reaches 
adulthood, for better or worse, the dependency eventually ends.  
! Extreme caregiving includes these expectations of ordinary parenting, but the 
parameters need to be reinterpreted for a child who will never be without disease, or on 
whom the parent must sometimes perform painful medical procedures such as 
suctioning or physical therapy. It is also complicated by the vast (and usually 
unexpected) increase in a child’s level of dependency. I have already stressed the 
possibility of prolonged dependency. As with Eva Kittay’s daughter and Lynne Ray’s 
families, difficult stages of childhood might be prolonged because of intellectual 
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disabilities or illness. Many such children remain permanently dependent, never able to 
reach a stage of self-sufficiency. 
! I have also mentioned the increase in difficulty and complexity of care. Of course, 
care of an infant or toddler is more time consuming than for an older child. However, 
care is also increased in complexity due to multiple medical needs. This is not the brief 
increase in care needed to deal with ordinary childhood illnesses, but complicated and 
ongoing care due to severe illness or disability. The children in Lynne Ray’s study had 
medical home health care needs on a level that sometimes rivaled hospital or even 
pediatric ICU care (Ray, 2002). I will outline the multiplicity of those tasks in more detail 
in the chapter on the burden of care. Many children, of course, fall into both categories, 
having simultaneously prolonged dependency and complex medical needs. 
! Not surprisingly, just as this combination of parenting and medical caregiving 
extends the parameters of parenting, it does not fall easily into understood forms of 
medical caregiving. In a 2006 book promoting an ethic of medical care that is expanded 
to include palliation, Joseph J. Fins provides a list of the goals of medical care. His four 
goals are 1) cure, 2) restoring function, 3) prolonging life, and 4) comfort care/palliation 
(Fins, 2006, p. 226). The sort of care that these parents are providing, while it might be 
informed by expectations promoted by these goals, is not really included in any of them. 
For most of these children, there is no cure. There is no loss of function to restore, 
though there is a pursuit of incremental improvement in abilities. While life is preserved 
and prolonged, because these children are felt to be at the beginning of their lives, the 
concept of end of life care is not very useful. Likewise, while pain management is 
sometimes a factor, this is rarely thought of as palliative comfort care to ease dying.
! Extreme caregiving then confuses the expectations and goals of both typical 
parenting and medical caregiving, and so is rarely recognized by those who study either. 
It exists across a spectrum of pediatric diseases and specialties, at the most severe end 
of hundreds of syndromes. While many of these children are studied as representatives 
of their various diseases, their common need for increased care is not often addressed. 
The children are not thought of as a group united by their need, and again, extreme 
caregiving falls unrecognized between the cracks. I suspect that only the parents who 
are doing it know what is involved.     
! I am aware that extreme caregiving can, and often does, occur at points in life 
other than childhood. Spouses caring for their partner through serious prolonged illness 
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will possibly be called upon to provide extreme caregiving, as will adults whose parents 
are at the end of their lives. Extreme caregiving by parents for their multiply impaired 
children, I believe, is more complex, in several important ways. The first is that the 
illness and possible death of a child is unexpected and often carries a larger emotional 
burden. The second is that the task of parenting a medically complex child is ongoing in 
a way that caring for a dying or sick person is not. These parents begin to realize that 
their children might live in a state of extreme dependency, as has Kittay’s daughter, for 
decades. Behind the physical work and sleeplessness and worry is the persistent 
knowledge that the caregiving task might be unending, and that the child’s need might 
extend beyond the death of the caregiver. 
! The third reason is more subtle and to me most interesting. Children are of 
course not yet fully developed as persons. It is one of the tasks of parenting to guide that 
development, keeping open for them as much potential for their future personhood as 
possible (Feinberg, 1980).  Until that future, however, the parents are the holders of their 
child’s identity as a person. They will inevitably create a life story for the child who is not 
yet able to do it for himself. However, many of the children I have defined as requiring 
extreme care do not have the intellectual capability to ever reach the independence 
required for fully autonomous adulthood. Their inability to express anything beyond the 
most basic of needs has been much discussed in the context of  medical decision 
making, however this is not the only consequence of their limitation. A far more signifiant 
problem is that they do not have a life story that they can tell and shape for themselves. 
That story is constructed, and their personhood defined, by their parent/caregiver.
!  Extreme caregiving falls randomly on families, when severe illness devastates a 
well child or, more often, when congenital problems (from prematurity to birth injury to 
genetic syndromes) result in a fragile or disabled infant. Extreme caregiving happens 
when a premie is finally sent home from the NICU with a feeding tube, tracheostomy, 
cardiac monitor, seizure precautions, and fifteen different medications. It happens when 
a medically fragile 8-year-old with Cornelia DeLange Syndrome remains 
developmentally in the active but clueless 18-month stage, and has to be watched every 
second for years so he doesn’t injure himself. It happens when an 14 year old, 160 
pound autistic child has not yet learned to use a toilet or sit at a table, and whose 
behavior outbursts, backed by increasing strength, are becoming destructive. The 
worrisome addition to these situations is that in ten years, or twenty, the level of care 
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may be unchanged. Extreme caregiving also happens when a 50 year old, 
developmentally delayed man who is still functionally a five year old, remains in the care 
of his 70 year old mother whose own health is failing.  
EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
! Statistics for the number of children requiring complex care at home are hard to 
come by. Most statistics available for medically complex children are done on fairly 
narrow parameters. They might estimate, for example, the number of children with one 
specific diagnosis, or evaluate the extent of the need for certain types of care, or monitor 
dependence on certain types of technology. Statistics for the number of children 
suffering from a single illness, for example, will include a range of severity, with no way 
to pinpoint the number of the sickest children whose care would be expected to be the 
most intense. Nor do they usually include an evaluation of the extent of home care 
required.
! There are some statistics on the number of children who are dependent 
specifically on use of medical technology in the home. Technology dependence is, I 
believe, a fairly good marker for a high level of home care, though again the range of 
illnesses and severity is enormous. Kirk, writing in 1998 on technology dependent 
children in Britain, reported that the number of technology-dependent children in the 
USA ten years earlier, in 1988, was estimated to be around 100,000, and increasing at a 
rapid pace. The types of technology available included mechanical ventilation, home 
oxygen, home IV therapy, peritoneal dialysis and tube feedings (Kirk, 1998). Of course, 
statistics for children using a certain technology at home will not find the number of 
children whose lack of need for advanced equipment in no way lowers their need for 
care.
! Another source of data, though still over ten years out of date, is a 1998 study 
done by the Minnesota Department of Health, Division of Family Health (MDHDFH) on 
Minnesota’s TEFRA program. TEFRA is Minnesota’s program for financial assistance to 
families with disabled children who require excess expensive medical care. (The 
acronym stands for Tax Equity Fairness and Responsibility Act, the law which 
established the criteria for the program. No one uses the full name, and the word 
TEFRA is commonly used to refer to every part of the implementation of the Act, from 
the forms filled out to the payments received.) To qualify for this assistance, children 
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must be “disabled with a physical or mental impairment that is comparable in severity to 
one that would prevent an adult from working and that is expected to last at least 12 
months, or results in death.” An additional eligibility requirement is that the children must 
need “the level of care provided in a hospital, nursing home or Intermediate Care Facility  
for Persons with Mental Retardation” (Chan, Jahnke, Thorson, & Vanderberg 
(MDHDFH), 1998, p. 13). 
! Chan, et al. at the MDHDFH studied the make-up of the children and families 
benefitting from TEFRA in 1995, and released the results publicly in 1998. 
Questionnaires were sent to half of the families of the 3770 children enrolled in 1995, 
and 959 of them responded. Interestingly, part of the reason the survey was done was to 
document that the families receiving assistance were truly in need of the enormous level 
of financial outlay incurred by the program. Diagnoses ranged from spina bifida to 
autism, from cancer to mental retardation, with many children carrying multiple 
diagnoses (Chan et al., 1998, p. 24). The type of care these children required depended 
of course on their specific problem, and was often very different, though its time-
consuming nature was not directly measured. Sixty seven percent of the children were 
on medications, with a mean number of 3 prescriptions, 25% had been hospitalized in 
the preceding year, and 35% required “durable medical equipment” in the home. Level of 
care could not be fully assessed, but parents reported that 82% of their children required 
constant or frequent supervision, and that “about one-fifth” were “totally dependent in all 
activities of daily living” (Chan et al., 1998, p. 2). That is, 20% of those 3770 children 
required assistance with every aspect of their daily lives.   
! It is not unreasonable to assume that most of the families on TEFRA are 
providing extreme caregiving for their child. If we assume that there were about 4000 
children requiring extreme care in Minnesota, and that Minnesota is an average-sized 
state, we can presume that there were 200,000 children nationwide. This is likely a 
underestimation, since not every child who requires extreme care in Minnesota is on 
TEFRA, which is given mostly to families on medical assistance or with limited 
insurance, and is provided on a financial need basis. Nor does TEFRA extend out of 
childhood, which, as we have seen, is not a limitation on extreme caregiving. It is also 
based on a figure from 1995, which has almost certainly increased since then. I would 
guess the number by now has at least doubled. 
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! The most recent estimate of numbers of children requiring extreme caregiving 
comes from Andrew Solomon’s 2012 book, Far From the Tree. The seventh chapter is 
about parents coping with children with multiple severe disability, or MSD. He defines 
MSD as considerable impairment in several areas of sensory ability or cognition, and 
states that it refers to people with an “overwhelming number of challenges,” many of 
which will never resolve enough to permit independent living. He reports that “Although 
the vagueness of the criteria for MSD makes it much harder to collate the relevant 
statistics than it is for single, clearly defined conditions, about twenty thousand children 
with MSD are born in the United States each year” (Solomon, 2011, p. 357). He also 
states that it has only been in the last 20 years that parents have been expected to bring 
home and care for such children. This estimate would indicate that there are somewhere 
around 400,000 families doing extreme caregiving, and would include only MSD children 
below 20 years old. 
! This number does not include another source of extreme caregiving, which is 
autism. The total number of people living with autism has not been reliably estimated, 
nor has the percentage of autistic children who require extreme caregiving. The results 
of a study done in 2008 by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which  
reported that one in every 88 children has been identified with autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD), have been highly publicized, as has the data that ASD diagnosis has been 
rapidly climbing in incidence (CDC, 2008). This says very little about the severity of 
problems over the entire spectrum of the disease. However I think it is safe to assume 
that tens of thousands of families, at least, are providing care for children at the most 
severe end of the spectrum.
! Another unknown is the number of elderly parents still caring for dependent adult 
sons and daughters. I have only one, rather personal and imprecise estimate, which 
comes from suburban Philadelphia. In the late 1990s, my parents, then in their early 
seventies, were unable to find a home for my then 40 year old brother. They’d had some 
experience in political activism, helping found the Montgomery County Association for 
Retarded Children when my brother was a child. They found a state senator who 
expressed interest in the problem of placement, and was willing to attend a meeting. My 
parents relied on nothing but word of mouth (without the internet) and had a little over a 
month to inform their fellow caregivers. There were almost 300 people at that meeting, 
all living in one small suburban area.
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! An estimate of about 500,000 children under the age of 20 living at home with 
some combination of multiple severe disability, severe autism, or technology 
dependence would not be unrealistic. This does not of course include the unnumbered 
adults with similar disabilities who have not been able to leave home. I believe the actual 
number is much higher. 
OBSCURING THE PROBLEM
! To evaluate extreme caregiving, I will have to rely on a variety of different 
sources. Most of the recent information on caregiving from medical and ethics journals 
comes from studies on families caring for technology dependent children at home. Some 
of these children could be identified as multiply and severely disabled, but not all of 
them. As a pediatrician I have met numerous children with a variety of problems in the 
office or hospital. I have also had personal contact with several families of special needs 
children, as well as severely autistic children, and have seen first hand some of the 
problems. Looking for narrative accounts from families dealing with this sort of 
caregiving, I found that most of the memoirs available are by parents of severely autistic 
children. So I will include discussion of parents of children falling into all three areas--
technology dependence, multiple severe disability, and severe autism--in my 
investigation of extreme caregiving. 
! Gaining an understanding of the lives of impaired children from the medical 
literature is difficult. With the exception of the 1998 MDHDFH survey on TEFRA, I found 
very few studies which estimated the type of care required or how many hours that care 
might consume for caregiver(s). Many pediatric outcome studies report the possibility of 
developmental delay, stating that independent living may never be achieved, but they 
rarely discuss the implications of that outcome. And the meaning of phrases such as 
“moderately delayed,” even when well-defined by numerical evaluations, do not give a 
very good window into the lives of those families.
! The pediatric and neonatal literature abounds with studies of disabled, 
intellectually delayed, and chronically ill children, however, very few look at the 
caregiving consequences of their problems. I looked at several types of studies which 
seemed likely to yield information about caregiving, but found few satisfactory sources. 
This included searching NICU outcome studies, quality of life studies for survivors of 
various childhood conditions, studies of the effects of childhood chronic diseases on 
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parents and siblings, and studies involved in determining the effectiveness of discharge 
planning for technology dependent children. I will discuss each of them individually 
below. 
NICU Outcome Studies
! One source of data on caring for impaired children might be expected to come 
from the vast neonatology literature on survivors of premature birth requiring NICU 
treatment. Many of the most impaired children living at home are NICU survivors, though 
of course that is not the only source of disability. But premature babies are a relatively 
homogeneous group, and NICU survivors are often followed at a single center for long 
periods of time after discharge. They provide an easily accessible and frequently used 
cohort for study. The group most likely to have a poor outcome, and therefor require 
parental caregiving, are the extremely premature babies, born under 28 weeks 
gestation. The group born between 22 to 25 weeks is the most controversial and very 
likely to have a poor outcome. There are dozens of papers providing survival and 
outcome statistics, at all levels of gestational age at birth, but very few that give any kind 
of picture of the lives of their subjects.
! A paper from 2005 from the UK is typical. Marlow et. al. did extensive 
developmental assessments at six years of age, on the survivors of delivery before 26 
weeks (Marlow, Wolke, Bracewell, & Samara, 2005). The paper is rife with statistical 
analyses based on complicated cognitive, neuromotor, and sensory evaluations, but 
provides very little description of the actual level of functioning or the amount of care 
required by their 241 subjects. They found a very high level of disability, with only 20% of 
their subjects described as having no disability. This is a somewhat higher level of 
impairment than reported in other studies. The authors point out that one of the 
problems comparing their results to earlier studies is a lack of a consistent definition of 
severe disability. They feel that their study is an improvement, because of their precise 
definitions and measurements. Yet, the level of care required is not measured, nor does 
there seem to be any recognition of the consequences of the disability to child or family. 
! Marlow’s group defined a disability as severe if “it was considered likely to make 
the child highly dependent on caregivers and if it included nonambulant cerebral palsy, 
an IQ score more than 3 SD below the mean, profound sensorineural hearing loss, or 
blindness” (Marlow et al., 2005, p. 10). Overall, 22% were identified as severe. “A 
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disability was defined as moderate if reasonable independence was likely to be reached 
and if it included ambulant cerebral palsy, an IQ score 2 to 3 SD below the mean, 
sensorineural hearing loss that was corrected with a hearing aid, and impaired vision 
without blindness.” They did not define “reasonable independence” (Marlow et al., 2005, 
p. 11). This level was present in 24% of the survivors. The largest group, 34%, was 
considered to be mildly disabled. “Mild disability included neurologic signs with minimal 
functional consequences or other impairments such as squints or refractive 
errors” (Marlow et al., 2005, p. 11). This group included those children with IQ scores 
from 1 to 2 SD below the mean, who will presumably eventually reach full independence, 
but I would suspect will need quite a lot of assistance to achieve it.   
! They also included a control group of non-premature students from the same age 
group. Even with several mildly cognitively disabled children in the control group, the 
differences are remarkable, with the non-premature students clustering above the mean 
IQ of 100, and the ex-micro premies averaging at best 70 to 80. The authors are 
concerned with the differences between the two groups, and with the frequency of 
“adverse cognitive sequelae” in the ex-premies. They recommend follow up to determine 
whether these sequelae create future academic and psychological difficulties. They do 
not consider the implications for current or future caregiving needs. Advancement in the 
care of the micro premie is expected to provide better outcomes for future infants. 
! A review of the effectiveness of perinatal care of the 23 to 25 week premie, 
published in 1995 by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in cooperation with the 
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), reports similar poor outcomes. 
The survival rate is only 15 to 54%, depending on a variety of factors, and 72% are still 
on ventilators at one month. There is a 30% rate of  severe (level III and IV) 
hemorrhages in the brain. They state, “Recent experience suggests that almost half of 
the surviving children who weigh less than 750 grams at birth experience moderate or 
severe disability, including blindness and cerebral palsy, and require special education. 
Many infants have more than one disability” (AAP/ACOG, 1995, p. 974). Yet the advice 
parents expecting an extremely premature delivery are to be given continues: “Families 
should be counseled that, despite the high rate of overall disability, many of these 
children are educable and can function within their family unit” (AAP/ACOG, 1995, p. 
974). 
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! I find the brevity and hubris behind that statement appalling. There is no 
consideration for the level of care, or length of that care, expected. Parents given this 
recommended counseling are receiving no useful information and are, quite possibly, 
being terribly misled. I suspect that physicians are likewise placated by this lack of 
information, and not often led to think beyond the rosy picture they paint. It is perhaps 
not surprising that health care providers are not fully aware of the problems faced by 
families raising an impaired child at home. 
Quality of Life Studies
! This is a more recent type of follow-up study, which, like outcome studies, has 
been used to follow up on the survivors of prematurity, and purports to be more specific 
about the effects of disability on the lives of children. Quality of life studies are conducted 
by ratings questionnaires, with several different verified scales now available. Subjects 
are asked to rate either their satisfaction with their lives or to rate the desirability of living 
in scaled states of disability which are similar to their own. 
! Quality of life studies have recently yielded some rather unexpected results when 
applied to cohorts of NICU survivors. An example is a 2007 study from Northern 
England, in which the researchers analyzed health related quality of life surveys in 
teenagers who had survived premature birth. Gray et al. sent questionnaires to every 
teen in the region who had been born before 28 weeks gestation in 1983 and 1984. 
They mailed 218 surveys, and received back 175, then compared them to 108 age-
matched peers from the same schools. Interestingly, 28 surveys could not be included 
because those children were in special schools, where there were no control children. 
This effectively excluded the most impaired children in the cohort. Surprisingly, despite 
the known fact that ex-premies are at far more risk for health problems than children 
born at term, the “self-reported health status and health-related quality of life” of ex-
premies in mainstream schools was not significantly different from their peers (Gray, 
Petrou, Hockley, & Gardner, 2007).  
! The authors give several interesting reasons why the ex-premies rate their health 
related quality of life as equivalent to their peers. In the conclusion they postulate that “it 
is possible that teenagers’ perceptions of their health status and health-related quality of 
life may be different from that of their families, caregivers or health professionals” (Gray 
et al., 2007, p. e91). But this statement from the introduction may be more accurate, 
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“[E]ach child has a unique perspective on and valuation of his or her health status and 
may also learn to conceal his or her true emotions from parents and caregivers” (Gray et 
al., 2007, p. e87).
! This echoes a controversy following an earlier series of studies of quality of life in 
survivors of extreme prematurity, led by Saroj Saigal at McMaster University in Toronto. 
The group has been following a cohort of survivors of extremely low birth weight (ELBW) 
delivery over several decades. They have reported diminished cognitive abilities and 
school performance at age 8 (Saigal, Satzman, Rosenbaum, Campbell, & King, 1991),  
a much higher level of “neurosensory impairment” than their peers with normal birth 
weight at 12 to 15 years (Saigal et al., 1994), and ongoing health problems with 
“substantial morbidity” in adolescence (Saigal, Stoskopf, Streiner, & Burrows, 2001). 
! Saigal’s group has also been monitoring quality of life in this same cohort, initially 
by asking doctors and parents to rate the children’s lives. In 1996, they were for the first 
time able to obtain quality of life data directly from the children, as they were now in their 
teens. (Nine of the 141 surviving teens were too impaired to do the interview, so their 
parents acted as proxy.) They reported that the ELBW children, while they reported a 
significantly lower quality of life in terms of morbidity (increased problems with such 
things as cognition, sensation, mobility and pain), on satisfaction scales they “view[ed] 
their quality of life as quite satisfactory and [w]ere difficult to distinguish from 
controls” (Saigal et al., 1996, p. 453). 
! Several years later, they performed a similar interview survey, comparing the 
ELBW teens’ impressions of quality of life with those of NICU doctors and nurses. All 
groups were asked in interviews to rate the desirability of living in five hypothetical health 
states which were comparable to the health states of the ELBW teens. Saigal found that 
the teenagers and their parents rated living in impaired states much higher (more 
desirable) than did doctors and nurses (Saigal, et al., 1999). Both studies have been 
used to support the ongoing resuscitation of extremely premature infants, though the 
2001 outcome study by the same group continued to show poor health outcomes (Saigal 
et. al., 2001). 
! I am not an expert on the conducting of quality of life assessments, but on close 
reading of Saigal’s methods, believe that the only thing actually proved is that teenagers, 
both impaired and non-disabled, for the most part prefer to be alive. While the level of 
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impairments described implies an increased need for care, neither the level of this care 
nor the person performing this are are part of Saigal’s calculations.  
! Helen Harrison, an author and parent of a 26 week premie, published a protest of 
these and other studies in The Journal of Clinical Ethics in 2001. She points out various 
inconsistencies in Saigal’s results, and postulates that the parents and teenagers 
involved in the studies might have been motivated to exaggerate their quality of life to 
meet the expectations of their doctors. She casts doubt on all quality of life studies, and 
suggests that the doctors’ and nurses’ assessments of quality of life might actually be 
more accurate than those of patients or parents. She believes that the unquestioning 
reliance on surveys that show satisfaction with poor outcomes is misleading other 
parents in their decisions surrounding resuscitation of extremely premature infants 
(Harrison, 2001). 
! I will return to this subject later, in the narrative methods section. For now, I will 
merely point out that these studies are not only contentious, but unlikely to reveal the 
reality of living with a multiply disabled child. The controversy demonstrates how very 
difficult it would be to evaluate the lives of these children or their caregivers based on 
quality of life studies. 
Studying the Families of Medically Complex Children
! Gaining an understanding of the lives of the families of disabled children is 
perhaps even more difficult. While there have been numerous studies of the effects on 
various family members of an impaired or chronically ill child, very few go beyond 
psychological profiles. I have by no means made and exhaustive study of this literature, 
but will summarize briefly several more recent studies. A few of the more recent ones do 
begin to consider caregiving.
! Seltzer et al, in 2001 reported on “mid-life well-being” of the parents of disabled 
or mentally ill children. They state that earlier studies reported decreased ability to cope, 
increased levels of stress, and financial and marital strain in this group. However some 
of these results are inconsistent. They separated out self-reported parents of “mentally 
ill” and “disabled” children from a large population cohort followed over decades in 
Wisconsin. They screened those parents for multiple factors, including employment rate, 
family size and marital status, finding only minor differences from parents who did not 
report a mentally ill or disabled child. They found that those parents had decreased 
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social participation (meaning involvement in social organizations, and number of visits to 
friends), but were equal with the general population in their “psychological well-being,” 
which was screened by  questionnaires about physical health, depression, and alcohol 
use (Seltzer, Greenberg, Floyd, Pettee, & Hong, 2001).
! Since then, a variety of similar parameters have been used to study the parents 
of children with a variety of disabilities. Mothers of developmentally delayed children 
have been found to be at elevated risk for depression, compared to mothers of typical 
children (Singer, 2006). Parents of children with developmental disabilities have been 
noted to have an increased level of caregiver stress if their child’s disability included 
behavior problems (Plant & Sanders, 2007). Aging parents of disabled children were 
noted to have higher levels of negative affect, poorer psychological well-being, and 
increased somatic symptoms (Ha, Hong, Seltzer, & Greenberg, 2008). Families of 
children with Down Syndrome in Australia were reported to have poorer family 
functioning, particularly if their child also displayed symptoms of autism (Povee, Roberts, 
Bourke, & Leonard, 2012). None of this comes as much of a surprise. Most of the 
recommendations for improvement center around family support such as counseling. 
! Another study which seems fairly typical, but does begin to look at aspects of 
care, was done at the University of Amsterdam in 2009. This group has been developing 
a scale for Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL), and used it to evaluate the impact 
that various factors in caregiving can have on the parents of chronically ill children 
(Hatzman, Mauriec-Stam, Heymans, & Grootenhuis, 2009). Some of these parents were 
not extreme caregivers, but the group did include parents of Down Syndrome and 
multiply disabled children. They found that parents who had fewer days on holiday, 
illness of their own, and less emotional support, had lower HRQoL scores. But the most 
important factor they found affecting parents’ HRQoL was the care dependency of the 
child. Parents whose children needed more help had significant lowering of their HRQoL. 
The researchers recommended that these parents go out more and be given more 
emotional support, though, except for providing more respite care, they do not suggest 
ways in which this might be accomplished. They also state that they cannot verify that 
any of these things will actually improve the parents’ HRQoL.
! To evaluate level of care, they evaluated eight domains in which the child might 
require help: physical, mobility, eating and drinking, medication use, coping with devices, 
entertaining, contact with other children, and education. This yielded an eight point scale 
21
which would they used to determine the difficulty of caregiving. This is a good start, but 
would, I think give only a very rough idea of the amount of care needed by an individual 
child.  
! A final paper, from Texas A & M University, provides a much more extensive scale 
to examine caregiving, though the actual intent of this paper was to analyze factors 
influencing parents’ requests for medicare payments for “formal care” (professional 
caregiving) for their children with intellectual disabilities (Fournier et al., 2012). For 
evaluation purposes, Fournier’s group used a 20-page form developed by the state of 
Texas, and available on line, (Texas Personal Care Assessment Form (PCAF) 4-20, from 
Texas A&M University). This was originally intended for use in the elderly to determine 
medicaid eligibility for personal care assistance (PCA) at home, but is now being used 
by the State of Texas to determine aid for children as well. It has detailed questions 
about medical diagnoses, medications, and use of durable medical equipment. It also 
assesses ability to communicate, hearing, vision, memory, continence, and behavior 
problems. There is a separate section listing all the activities of daily living (ADL)--
including mobility, feeding, hygiene, and housework--with which a person may require 
help. There is also a section in which the caregiver can report their own status, 
particularly employment or other commitments which might cause them to require more 
help. It is far from a perfect assessment, in my opinion, but does demonstrate well the 
complexity and individuality of home caregiving. 
! However Fournier et al, (2010) were actually interested, not in actual caregiving 
need, but in the number of hours of assistance parents of children with intellectual 
disabilities were requesting from the state. About a fourth of the Texas form is taken up 
with the parent’s request for a specific number of hours and types of caregiving 
assistance. The study group referred to this consistently as parents’ “perceived need” for 
personal care services (PCS). They did a very complicated analysis of the variables in 
the enormous amount of data provided by these forms, and were not able to 
satisfactorily make a model that would predict the number of hours parents requested. 
They end by concluding that, “Medical diagnoses, health conditions, communication 
problems, and incontinence have no direct effect on the number of hours caregivers 
believe they need. Instead, all these factors affect a child’s functional status, which in 
turn translates those effects into the perceived hours needed for PCS” (Fournier et al., 
2010, p. 220). So they were unable to predict how much assistance parents would 
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request based on the child’s medical need. Instead, the hours requested seemed to be 
based on the child’s “functional status,” or level of disability. This was a seemingly 
disappointing and unexpected result, though it makes sense to me that parents would 
request more help if their child’s disability interferes with more activities of daily living. I 
am also not sure why the researchers did not consider that parents of children with 
intellectual disability perceive a need for help because they actually do need help. It 
would have been far more informative, to evaluate the number of hours that actually 
might be consumed in the care that these parents provide, and look for ways in which to 
assist them. 
!  
Studies of Hospital Discharge Planning
! Another way that home caregiving for children has been studied is to evaluate 
the ways in which parents are prepared to take care of their medically complex children 
following discharge from the hospital. This mostly involves the parents of children who 
need to use medical technology in the home. It has been noticed that some of these 
children are not so much being discharged from the hospital, as being given a little 
hospital to take home with them or, rather, “home is reconstructed as caregiving 
space” (Dyck, Konton, Angus, & McKeever, 2005). Wang states that “the traditional 
meaning of home is altered by the intrusion of medical machinery” (Wang & Bernard, 
2004, p. 40). Yet, in my experience, the image both medical staff and parents have on 
discharge is of a family happily home again in a normal home environment.
! There are numerous papers studying hospital discharge planning for medically 
complex children. Some examine its effectiveness at providing adequate medical care, 
more do cost analyses comparing it to hospital care, and many more evaluate various 
improvements in the efficiency with which parental training is carried out. According to 
Wang and Bernard, in a 2004 review of technology dependent children, the assumption 
is often that home is the best place for the child (Wang & Bernard, 2004, p. 38). It is also 
usually assumed that home care is the most cost effective way to care for the child, 
though some are questioning that assumption. Wang and Bernard mention that cost 
analyses are biased toward expensive hospital charges, and do not take into account 
the financial cost to the family of caregiving (Wang & Bernard, 2004, p. 41). 
! A review of the ethics of pediatric home health care, done in Chicago in 1992, 
questions both the presumed psychological benefits and cost reduction of complex 
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home health care, pointing out the ways in which home care can strain the parent-child 
as well as the doctor-patient relationships. Lantos and Kohrman recommends that the 
benefits of home care for the child must ethically be balanced against the burden of care 
for the family (Lantos & Kohrman, 1992). This is not ordinarily a part of discharge 
planning, as it is generally assumed that the family both desires to, and is able to, take 
care of their child at home.
! Noddings, speaking about home health care for adults, has also noted the lack of 
preparation and support for the caregiver. She reports that family members are being 
trained, often unexpectedly, to use technology only recently available outside of the 
hospital setting. This is not work which they have chosen as a career, but have taken on 
out of need. “It is often assumed that almost anyone can be prepared to administer high-
tech home care. Much attention is given to the quality of training, not much attention is 
given to the emotional needs of the caregiver” (Noddings, 1994, p. 3).
! A recent American Academy of Pediatrics review on caring for children with 
complex medical needs or technology dependence states as the goal of home care “to 
ensure that each child remains healthy, thrives, and obtains optimal medical home and 
developmental supports that promote ongoing care at home and minimize recurrent 
hospitalizations” (Elias and Murphy (AAP), 2012, p. 996). These goals, like Joseph J. 
Fins’ stated goals of medical care, are directed toward cure and rehabilitation. They do 
not attempt to redefine “health” and “thriving” for a child with a lifelong disability. They fail 
to acknowledge the complexity and length of the home caregiving task. In fact, the single 
most important goal seems to be to keep the child at home, and away from the hospital.  
! According to the AAP guidelines, before the child is discharged to home care, 
parents must be trained in the use of any necessary medical equipment, learn to do 
CPR, and understand when and how to call for help. They stress that discharge planning 
should include arranging medical followup, scheduling ongoing developmental 
evaluation, obtaining proper home equipment, and assuring insurance coverage. They 
also mention that family members may be stressed or otherwise affected by the ill child, 
and psych referral may be considered. They recommend that, prior to discharge, the 
parent spend one or two nights in the hospital with the child, during which time the 
parent provides all necessary care under nursing supervision (Elias and Murphy (AAP), 
2012). One of two nights seems to me minimal preparation for a complex sometimes 
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lifelong task, and demonstrates lack of recognition of the difficulties likely to be 
encountered. 
! According to a study done by Ray (2002), parents agree that the preparation they 
receive is inadequate. The parents of technology dependent children whom she 
interviewed, said that it took them a long time to become comfortable with their 
caregiving tasks. Ray states that, “Parents estimated that it took 6 months before the 
technical aspects of care became the most taken-for-granted part of their child’s care. 
This time frame seemed to apply regardless of the complexity of the care” (p. 426). As 
stated above, the AAP recommends that parents be given one or two nights in the 
hospital to learn the special care on which their child’s life depends. 
 ! Neither the AAP guidelines for discharge planning, nor the numerous studies 
evaluating parental preparation for home care seem to me helpful in evaluating extreme 
caregiving. A relentless drive to accentuate the positive seems to be informing health 
care workers’ and researchers’ opinions and reports, making their analyses of caregiving 
for medically complex children rather suspect. Often it seems that the determination to 
keep the child at home serves to obscure the true complexity of caregiving required from 
the professionals that are ordering and monitoring it. Including an understanding of the 
lives, not of just of those children but of their families as well, in any medical decision-
making, seems paramount to the task of providing ethical care for them.
AN EXAMPLE OF A MISUNDERSTANDING
! John Lantos opens The Lazarus Case, his 2001 book about a semi-hypothetical 
neonatal case gone wrong, with this statement. “A baby who should have died did not 
die. Somebody was to blame. Clearly, somebody would have to take responsibility. 
Certain parties would pay a lot to find out why the baby had survived. They would figure 
out who was answerable. The culprit would roast” (Lantos, 2001, p. 1).
! It is an interesting first paragraph, full of anger and, presumably, a large dose of 
irony. The case that follows is not a medical history but a court case, involving a lawsuit 
brought by the parents of a nameless baby, who had miraculously survived an extremely  
premature birth, against the doctors who had saved the baby’s life. This was not, as I 
expected when I opened the book, a case of “wrongful life.” The baby had not been 
resuscitated against the parents’ objections. Rather the baby had been briefly 
resuscitated at birth, thought to be unsalvageable, and medical rescue had been 
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stopped. Efforts had been resumed some time later, when the baby failed to die as 
expected. The parents’ lawsuit revolved around the fact that the baby had survived in a 
severely impaired condition. They blamed this poor outcome on the delay of treatment, 
though everyone should have been aware from the beginning that extreme prematurity 
alone frequently results in high levels of disability.  
! Lantos does not give much information about the baby’s impairments. He reports 
medications for heart and lung problems, and for seizures. He mentions delayed 
development requiring early intervention programs, as well as weekly physical therapy, 
speech, and occupational therapy. The developmental delay requiring all this is 
described as “moderate,” but a neurologist has admitted that the “ultimate neurologic 
prognosis, though not good, was still uncertain” (Lantos, 2001, p. 10). As an 
afterthought, Lantos mentions that the child, now three years old, is being fed by 
gastrostomy tube. The parents are suing for thirty-five million dollars. 
! Lantos seems somewhat bemused by the parents’ actions. Their relationship with 
their doctors had always been amiable. They still bring the child to those doctors for 
follow-up care. He does not understand where their sudden anger has come from. While 
analyzing the doctors‘ decisions, his own difficulty in explaining why their actions were all 
justifiable, and the current state of the ethics of neonatal care, he never examines the 
lives of the parents. He does not imagine their side of the story.
! But, based on those few statements above, some conclusions are possible. The 
parents are giving feedings by gastrostomy tube, which means that, at three years old, 
the baby still hasn’t figured out how to suck and swallow, something which a normal 
newborn learns in a few hours. Along with the presence of seizures, this seems a very 
bad sign. The neurologist might be unwilling to convey the dismal prognosis, but it 
seems likely that the baby is and will always be significantly mentally impaired. The other 
medications, six in all, mean ongoing respiratory and cardiac problems, so the baby’s 
general health is quite fragile. Frequent hospitalizations, for things as simple as colds, 
would be expected. The parents--charged with giving at least six medications (probably 
12 to 15 separate doses each day, at least one as a fifteen minute breathing treatment), 
setting up and monitoring the gastrostomy feedings and equipment, maintaining that 
fragile health, and coordinating all those appointments for therapy--are spending most of 
the day (and likely the night too) caring for a child who may not ever learn to suck from a 
bottle. Likely one of them has already had to quit their job to become a more-than-full-
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time caregiver and care coordinator. Likely they are financially strapped. Possibly they 
have figured out that they are in this new and unexpected care task for the rest of their 
lives. Thirty-five million might be too much to ask, but they probably feel they have no 
other reasonable option. 
! Lantos’ Lazarus Case is hypothetical, a composite of real cases in which he has 
been involved. My estimation of the baby’s and parents’ lives is likewise hypothetical, 
based on cases from my own practice, from the pediatric literature, and from written 
accounts by parents, including the Ian Brown book (2011) quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter. 
! As Brown states, modern medicine has created a new situation by rescuing 
children who would not have previously survived and who now require an extraordinary 
amount of care. Lantos hints in his opening paragraph that the down side of these 
medical miracles is indeed an unknown number of children who perhaps shouldn’t have 
survived, but whose continued existence is undeniable. Together with the medical 
advances that make this dubious survival possible, the burden of care has been 
increased by the move to care for those children at home rather than in institutions or 
hospitals. Lantos’s book (2001) is a coherent and complete account of the doctor’s side 
of the story. It is time now to understand the parent’s side; not the choices they did or did 
not make, but the lives they must now build around the undeniable existence of the child. 
To do that, we must understand caregiving. 
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS: NARRATIVE ETHICS
! Use of narrative or story in ethical thinking is a somewhat new concept, and has 
not received universal recognition in an ethical system looking for one-size-fits-all 
answers. However, narrative seems to many an appropriate way to consider ethical 
dilemmas, particularly those that are situational or relational and, therefor, do not fit 
comfortably in the universalist and strictly autonomous system of principle ethics.  
! The situation of extreme caregiving, often unrecognized and rarely studied, is 
intensely personal and isolated in the home environment. Analyzing the emotional 
consequences of this relationship would be difficult, using the usual methods of 
interview-based or medical outcome studies. Narrative is perhaps the only way to begin 
an ethical analysis of this intimate, hidden caregiving relationship. This chapter covers 
narrative ethics, its uses and potential pitfalls, and summarizes the parent caregiver 
narratives I will be using.
! Narrative ethics has its beginning in stories told by physicians about the practice 
of medicine, but perhaps becomes more useful with the addition of stories of sickness 
told by their patients. It has now broadened to include the use of literature to teach 
medical humanities, and the use of case reports as stories to aid ethical decision 
making.
! There are recognized problems with using stories as a basis for ethical decision 
making. Even the proponents of narrative ethics realize that stories contain untruths, or 
at least distortions of the truth. These can be deliberate, as the author purposely slants 
the story to make himself look better or changes facts to make a more engaging story. 
Or they can be subconscious if the author has unrecognized biases or prejudices. There 
is also no consistent basis upon which even the most truthfully told narrative can be 
identified as morally exemplary.
! However, stories do have potential. In this section I will discuss some of the 
theories and uses of narrative, as well as some of the pitfalls of using them to do ethics. I 
will also describe the narratives I encountered during this project, and the admittedly 
biased reasons I have for choosing some of them for closer reading. 
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! The narratives I have selected, I believe, have important messages both for 
pediatric medicine and for the field of bioethics, particularly the developing ethic of care. 
Even if some of the details about their lives and the lives of their children that these 
authors have provided are entirely fabricated, their books still point toward an injustice. 
Their stories are a demonstration that the ‘good’ of saving the lives of children with 
complex and previously-fatal syndromes, often assumed to be universal, has led to an 
immense and unrecognized burden placed on their families.  In addition, the difficulty of 
the ongoing caregiving these narrators describe, even if exaggerated and self-serving, 
still exceeds the levels expected of professional caregivers. We may not have to decide 
from these stories whether these parents are ‘good’ or even ‘moral’ caregivers in order to 
learn from them something of the nature of caregiving at its most extreme level.  
WAYS OF DOING NARRATIVE ETHICS
! According to Howard Brody, the telling of stories is crucial to medicine, and the 
lack of ability to tell them can be devastating. Brody believes that, in order to provide 
guidance through an illness for a patient, a physician must be able to use narrative in 
both personal and relational ways. He suggests that physician burnout is in part due to 
“having no one to whom to tell one’s stories of practice, and little opportunity of coming 
to understand for oneself the meaning of these stories” (Brody, 2003, p. 11). He also 
states that, in order to alleviate suffering, the physician must provide for the patient an 
explanation for the illness and a prognostication of the course of the illness. Both 
explanation and prognostication are a form of story. “Suffering is produced and alleviated 
by the meaning that one attaches to one’s experience. The primary human mechanism 
for attaching meaning to particular experiences is to tell stories about them” (Brody, 
2003, p. 13). An effective and ethical physician must then be a good storyteller, both in 
the stories he tells himself and the awareness of the stories he is relating to his patients. 
! Perhaps more important than understanding the physician’s story is 
understanding the patient’s story. This is important both for treating illness effectively and 
for making ethical decisions. An illness, again according to Brody, should be seen as a 
part of a life story, sending the arc of that story off on a new and often unexpected 
trajectory. Understanding the experience of illness from the patient’s perspective is 
necessary in order to provide ethical care. “Patients come to physicians with broken 
stories as much as with broken bones and bodies,” he says, and it is part of the 
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physician’s job to understand and guide the healing of both (Brody, 2003, p.13). Arthur 
Frank also a proponent for the importance of narrative ethics, has gone even farther, 
saying that a serious illness is a “call for stories;” that the sick person must revise their 
life goals and create a new understanding of themselves by creating new stories (Frank,
1995, p. 53). If physicians distance themselves or fail to understand this task that their 
patient must be performing, they will miss much of the practice of medicine. 
! Frank has pointed out that clinicians and patients are, essentially, characters in 
each other’s stories. The medical history and physical, as recorded on the medical chart, 
is only one way to tell that story, and, at least from the patient’s perspective, possibly not 
the most accurate version (Frank, 2002). I agree with him that the medical record is a 
limiting, and in some ways destructive, way to tell a story of illness. Despite exhortations 
to treat the whole patient, practitioners are ever more finely focused on single parts of 
the patient’s body. And despite the proliferation of patient support groups and informative 
pamphlets, illness still comes as a disruption in life through which the institution of 
medicine is not much of a navigator. The stories told by practitioners and heard by 
patients, and the stories told by patients and heard by their physicians, are quite 
different. It is not just the storytelling abilities of both parties that is inadequate, however, 
the fundamental stories we tell about illness and its meaning are sometimes broken. Our 
focus on cure and insistence on optimism creates a dissonance when a story does not 
have an ending in a complete and happy cure. 
! In my experience as a pediatrician, this deviation is most apparent in the care of 
medically complex and severely developmentally delayed children. Medical advances in 
pediatrics have created a new sort of story, one that alters the life trajectory not just for a 
patient but for an entire family, and for which we seem to be entirely unprepared. The 
debilitating illness happens to a child at the beginning of a life, and its consequences for 
both child and family often do not become immediately clear. If there is to be optimism, it 
must be created from very small amounts of progress. The families living this story have 
been telling it to each other through parent support groups and blogs for years, but their 
concerns have barely penetrated to public awareness. Meanwhile the medical system 
churns along, seemingly unaware of the problems it has created. This paper is a first 
attempt at listening to those stories.  
! I am a bit less certain about the use of story to prove the correctness of a moral 
conclusion. I agree that, as a form of ethics, hearing the patient’s story is a valid way of 
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bringing the patient’s interests to the forefront, possibly more effective than citing the 
principle of autonomy. In this way the patient’s own story can provide a more personal 
and authentic account of illness than that provided in the medical chart. However, I 
agree with the sentiment expressed by John Arras in Stories and Their Limits; “[T]he 
connection between narrative and moral justification remains maddeningly 
obscure” (Arras, 1997, p. 67). 
! However, Hilde Lindemann Nelson has summarized the four ways in which 
narratives can be used in moral analysis (Lindemann Nelson, 2004). She has also 
helpfully outlined the ways in which narrative can be both used and abused by those 
methods. The reading that I am doing does not fall easily into any one of her categories, 
but I will try to summarize her ways of ‘doing ethics’ with narrative, and to describe the 
ways in which my readings might conform to those categories. 
Cultural Understanding, or the stories we invoke
! The first way to use narrative is to provide a cultural moral standard derived from 
cultural tradition. This type of ethics relies on stories that have emerged from long 
tradition and are so ingrained in a culture that they have become a signpost for a cultural 
priorities and moral understandings. Stories that are known and accepted as truth by 
most of the members of a society can be used as a form of moral justification which can 
uphold the morality of newer stories. 
! The pitfall with this, of course, is that not everyone, even within the same culture, 
will find themselves represented in the stories that form an overriding truth for most. 
These outsiders have had no part in the creation of the story, and have often been 
disenfranchised by the truths thought to be inherent in the culture. The story, at least 
from their point of view, cannot be a basis for moral judgement. 
! One way these outsiders can become recognized is by providing a counter-story, 
one in which their concerns and way of being are explained and legitimized. The telling 
of these different stories is not only a personal venture, but a way of creating a new 
community within a culture, collecting others who understand or recognize the story as 
representative of their own. Frank puts it like this, “The claim to speak in one’s own voice 
and tell one’s own story is not, however, a claim that this story is exclusively one’s own. 
On the contrary, what is claimed is membership in a community of those who share 
one’s story” (Frank, 1997, p. 36).
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! The stories I will be reporting on form a quiet voice standing against the more 
well-known and popular stories which tell us what being a parent is supposed to be all 
about. Yet I believe that the experiences related in these narratives are not unique; I 
have met through my pediatric practice others who are living similar stories but are 
silent. These books become, then, attempts to describe an unrecognized community of 
parents who are living with the same problems. 
! This recognition of shared experience has been an essential part of the disability 
movement from its outset. In many of the narratives, the discovery of other families 
dealing with similar problems is important enough to fill several chapters. The disability 
movement is in part created by and continued by the telling of these stories. However, it 
becomes clear that there are some parts of this story that even those who share it are 
unwilling to recount. The reshaping of stories in order to meet the expectations of this 
community are in themselves an interesting part of their story. The most interesting of 
the narratives, I think, are the ones that dare to question the authority of the story they 
think they should be telling, and compare it to their actual experiences. 
Moral Education, or the stories we read
! The second way in which narrative has been used is in moral education. This is 
one of the most popular use of stories in medicine. There is a widely-held idea that 
teaching the humanities to physicians or medical students will provide moral education, 
or will impart to doctors some previously absent empathy or understanding (Lindemann 
Nelson, 1997). It is generally thought that a certain type of critical reading of a certain 
type of great literature is needed to accomplish this. “Narrative competence may be 
defined, first as the ability to choose good literature, and second, as the ability to read 
good literature with care, skill, and critical judgement” (Lindemann Nelson, 2004, p. 171). 
Even Lindemann questions the usefulness of this approach, pointing out that such finely 
honed understanding is hard to come by, and hard to use as any kind of moral standard. 
! None of the books that I have read approach literary greatness. One of them, A 
Child Called Noah, by Josh Greenfeld became a popular read in its day, and the 
Greenfelds enjoyed a sometimes uncomfortable kind of notoriety for several years in the 
early 70s (Greenfeld, K.T., 2009). However I believe it has now sunk into obscurity. 
Another, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down, remains widely read among 
medical personnel but the understanding of the story is almost entirely focused on 
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cultural sensitivity (Kleinman & Benson, 2006). The story of Lia Lee’s mother and the 
care which she provided for thirty years is barely noticed in our attempt to translate the 
priorities of American medicine for other cultures. 
! I believe that The Boy in the Moon, by Ian Brown (2011) should be required 
reading for all pediatricians, but I do not think that the reading of it is likely to confer any 
special moral sensibility. It is a much easier book to read than others which have been 
proposed as educational, however. The first chapter can be read in less than fifteen 
minutes, and the images it leaves behind of the relentless, tiresome tasks involved in 
caring for a medically complex child, should not quickly be forgotten. It will not change 
anyone’s moral fiber, or bring about any dramatic reduction in suffering, but it may not be 
too much to expect that perhaps some pediatrician, after reading it, will take the extra 
time to simplify a child’s medication regimen. 
Building on Ethics Case Studies, or the stories we compare
! This is actually the fourth of Lindemann’s approaches, but it is an approach that I 
will not be using much, or will be using only in a sort of sideways manner. Her third 
approach, using the stories we tell about sickness, is much more useful to me, and will 
require a much longer discussion, which I will leave for last.
! If the medical history is, as Frank (2002) suggests, the composing of a certain 
type of story, it is clear that the ethics consult or presentation of an ethics case history is 
also a way to construct a story. Just as with medical diagnosis, those ethics cases can 
be compared to each other, and used to build a larger understanding. So the similarities 
between an established ethics case where the moral meaning is clear, or at least agreed 
upon, and a newer or more complex ethics case story can be examined. This 
comparison will perhaps lead to justification for an ethical decision, based upon previous 
understanding of a similar situation. This casuistical approach is already familiar, as it is 
the way in which much of US common law has been reasoned. 
! The problem, of course, is coming up with a starting point, that paradigm case 
upon which there is ethical certainty. And even if a perfect case can be agreed upon, it 
would take only a small misunderstanding for the whole construct built upon it to topple.   
As has already been pointed out, our understanding of each others’ stories, particularly 
between provider and patient, is inadequate. 
33
! With this approach, however, used with full awareness of its drawbacks, the 
ethicist by necessity will take care in hearing and eliciting the stories of those involved. 
Comparison with other stories and the outcomes of earlier cases is almost unavoidable. 
Uncertainty will lead, ideally, to more stories told and compared. This seems to me to be 
the only way to arrive at a solution that maximizes everyone’s interests, while remaining 
within the constraints of the larger reality of the way in which medicine is perceived by 
most Americans. One can hope that enough stories heard and told together might also 
lead to a revision of that larger and somewhat misleading cultural understanding, where 
life is always good and death always failure, and states in between, such as disability, 
are invisible. Overall, however, I think telling and comparing stories is a valid way to ‘do’ 
ethics, and more likely to ultimately lead to a fair solution of an ethical dilemma than the 
reliance on a few principles.
! In this, I seem to be in agreement with John Arras (1997), who concludes his 
critique of narrative ethics in “Nice Story. So What?” with the recognition that 
understanding narrative is an essential part of ethical analysis, but is not by itself a basis 
for moral statements. He outlines three approaches to the use of narrative, each relying 
more heavily on narrative. He dismisses the second two, the use of stories as a source 
of moral truth (ethical justification by historical narrative) and the use of the narrator as a 
source of authentic truth (the post modern approach), saying that they are both 
undermined by the essential unreliability of stories and storytellers. However he 
recommends the first approach, in which narrative is used in conjunction with 
established principles. He says, “I have come to the provisional conclusion that the first 
approach, which conceived of narrative as an essential element in any and all ethical 
analyses, constitutes a powerful and necessary correction to the narrowness and 
abstractness of some widespread versions of principle and theory-based ethics” (Arras,
1997, p. 84).   
!
Stories of Sickness, or the stories we tell 
! The last of Lindemann’s narrative approaches is the stories we tell or, more 
specifically, stories of illness told by patients. I have already mentioned the works of 
Brody and Frank which stress the importance of the patient’s story in treating illness. 
Brody states that in order to provide good care, a physician and patient must develop a 
therapeutic relationship, which includes both doctor and patient understanding the 
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meaning of the illness in the patient’s life. Frank adds that telling a story of the illness 
that is not reduced to the dispassion of the medical chart is essential for the patient to 
combat the loss of self that illness brings about. For both, narrative is an integral part of 
the clinical relationship.
! The value of this for the practice of medicine is clear, though neither Frank nor 
Brody provide guidelines for exactly how a physician might go about aiding a patient in 
reclaiming his story and self from the narrative wreckage that illness has made of his life. 
While listening to the patient might be on the curriculum in medical school, narrative 
repair is not. I suspect that the best we can hope for now is not further wrecking the life 
narrative by insisting on intrusive or inappropriate narratives. 
! For the practice of ethics, listening closely to the patient is also not a new idea; it 
is presumably necessary to carry out the principle of autonomy. Narrative ethics gives 
moral weight to both the telling and the hearing of the patient’s story. According to 
Lindemann, “The moral value of the story, then, lies in its ability to reveal both to the 
patient and to those in her storytelling community who the patient is and should be seen 
to be” (Lindemann Nelson, 2004, p. 173). Considering the patient’s interests as a 
narrated story that is part of their bigger life story would provide the insights necessary to 
upholding autonomy.  
! But narrative ethics assumes further, that the story itself has a moral message 
beyond the value of evaluating the storyteller. Frank states, “People who tell stories of 
illness are witnesses, turning illness into a moral responsibility” (Frank, 1995, p. 137). In 
his assertion that illness stories are a form of testimony or witness, Frank implies that 
another moral use for stories of sickness is to impart understanding gained by living with 
pain or illness. The stories offer guidance for people who are also ill, or may become ill 
some day. They perhaps also offer a different and deeper view of what is important in 
life. The ill storyteller, by this testimony, becomes a sort of living proof of another way of 
being, one that those of us who are not ill can experience only second-hand. 
! The narrative then not only serves to reconstitute a self wrecked by illness, but 
also creates a community of listeners who share the experience. The story then can be 
of benefit to both teller and listener. The listeners may benefit from this either because 
they themselves have had similar experiences with the interruption of illness, or because 
they have heard the story and understand something of its message. In this way, sick 
people who are willing to share their story are like travelers to a foreign country which we 
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are expecting ourselves to visit some day. The report they bring back should be a 
guidebook for that unexplored territory. 
! The narratives that I have read are not exactly stories of sickness. The narrator is 
not the sick person, his own body a testimony to the changes in his life and in himself 
brought about by illness. He is instead the parent of a sick child. The stories are about 
the effects an illness can have on a life, but the person telling the story is observing the 
illness of another. 
! The illness certainly sends the child’s life onto an unexpected trajectory. The child 
has barely begun a life story, but his parent nonetheless has certain expectations of that 
life. We will not hear from the child; in all these stories the child is unable--and probably 
will never be able--to speak for himself. We will not hear how the illness has changed the 
child’s life except by comparing it to what the parent expected from it before the illness. 
In addition, the child’s life is not the only life to have been sent on a new trajectory. The 
stories of both parent and child are inexorably altered. The parent has been sent into a 
new and difficult role, that of extreme caregiver. The parents who are willing to tell this 
story are, I think, writing from a different unexplored land, one where many lives are sent 
on an unexpected new trajectory by the illness of another. That new trajectory is partly 
defined by caregiving. 
! Though the illness resides in another’s body, these parents are also witnesses to 
illness, and to ways of being taught through illness. All of the parents claim at some point 
that their child is their teacher from whom they have learned many important lessons 
about how to ‘be.’ This idea is expressed frequently, both in narratives by, and in 
interviews conducted with, parents of sick children.  
! Frank provides a way to understand this. Speaking of an adult chronic pain 
patient named Gail, he says, “Gail claims different knowledges, but what would her 
answer be if she were called to account for such knowledge? . . . Gail could certainly say  
this and that about delivery of health care, but her true witness, the witness that ‘really 
matters’ to use her phrase, is not what she could say but what she is” (Frank, 1995, p. 
141). Her embodied, pain-ridden self is a message apart from what she communicates 
verbally. These parents, with the daily intimate contact of caregiving, do not have quite 
as close a contact with pain, but nonetheless must unavoidably experience the 
testimony of their children’s bodies. Part of their story is a desperate attempt to 
understand this message, and to communicate with the reader what they have learned. 
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Their own journeys to cope with the changes the child’s illnesses have made in their own 
lives, revolve around their attempts to discover the meaning of this message. They have 
to make do with the few clues they are given, and ultimately become the interpreter of 
their child’s illness.  
! This message from their children, as a second-hand account, may be less 
reliable than similar messages sent in first person narratives from sick patients. 
However, I believe that the child’s story is only a small part of the story that must be 
understood. The parents are also on an unexpected journey, perhaps not as common as 
the adult journey through illness and death, but it is not unusual, and may well have 
similarities with other forms of family caregiving. They have to reach beyond the usual 
concerns of parenting, in order to navigate the unknown territory of medical caregiving, 
often giving up their own plans and expectations in the process. How they find their way 
through the task of caregiving, indeed what they discover themselves becoming in order 
to perform the task, I think holds important clues to the process of caregiving itself.  
! And I maintain that, for medicine, understanding the journey made by these 
parents is essential. This is only in part because the parent becomes the voice of the 
child, and as such becomes the acknowledged custodian of the child’s best interests. It 
is also important to understand the parent’s story.  That story is so entwined with the 
child’s that any medical decision made must take both stories into account. 
Understanding of the parent’s experience of the child’s illness is just as important for 
clinicians as understanding of the first-person narrative of the sick patient.
! John Hardwig, in Autobiography, Biography, and Narrative Ethics (1997) makes a 
similar statement about the importance of paying attention to other voices surrounding 
the ill patient. He notes that our current form of patient-centered ethics requires that we 
consider only the patient’s interests. This reliance on one person’s story, he says, is a 
form of oppression that “effectively silences all other members of her family.” He adds, 
“Decisions are made every day that promote the patient’s interests at truly staggering 
costs to the lives of other members of the patient’s family. These decisions are routinely 
made as if families were no more than patient support systems or as if the interests of 
other members of the family were somehow morally irrelevant” (Hardwig, 1997, p. 59). 
! Parents taking care of medically complex children at home have been asked to 
sacrifice much to the best interests of their children. That they seemingly do so willingly 
does not make their sacrifice any less imposing. That their assessment of their child’s 
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best interest might differ from that of their providers should be of no surprise to anyone. 
Yet their story is rarely listened to and, in fact, rarely even told. To ignore these parents’ 
stories silences the voice of the people who are most significant in the disabled child’s 
life, who must receive the medical care plan and turn it into action, and who must live 
intimately with the consequences of any decisions. 
TYPES OF ILLNESS NARRATIVE
! In my search for parent narratives of caring for sick children, I found myself 
drawn to certain types of narratives. I have been a medical provider for a variety of 
complex children in my pediatric practice, and became aware of both the number of 
parents living with multiply disabled children and the difficulty of the caregiving task they 
are doing. It was possible to piece together their stories, from details on the medical 
record and from quietly asked questions, but their stories were clearly incomplete.  
! Initially I looked on the internet, at parent support groups, caring bridge sites, and 
blogs. These were even less satisfactory. The stories are told in brief, emotional 
paragraphs, with little connection or follow-up. The narrators do not have to even identify  
themselves. It seemed a particularly unreliable way to tell a story, giving no idea whether 
a comment made on one day was immediately regretted by the next. There is no way to 
tell if a statement is a true feeling shining suddenly through or a work of fiction. 
! An example is a web site called “PostSecret”. The site claims to be a repository 
for awful things that people think but would never dare to tell even a close friend. People 
supposedly mail their secrets on post cards and send them to a post office box, from 
which a mysterious person, or group of people, post them on line. New cards arrive 
frequently and older entries are archived. The anonymous web masters describe 
PostSecret as an “online community art project” (www.postsecret.com). There are some 
interesting and appalling secrets, many of which ring true. 
! One of the “secrets,” posted on an unknown date from an anonymous person, 
shows a graphic of a child’s brain with arrows pointing to areas of hypoxic ischemic 
encephalopathy damage. There is a second illustration of a brain, in bright red and 
yellow, torn in two. The message reads, “Part of me wants my severely disabled child to 
die so this nightmare can end . . . & I can just be me again.” The back of the card adds, 
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“I’m terrified of what the future holds . . . and I’m so very tired”
 (Postsecretcollection.com). This is an astonishing thing to say, but may well be 
representative of a parent of a special needs child. However, looking at some of the 
other “secrets,” it becomes apparent the secret-tellers all have very similar (and rather 
impressive) abilities in graphic design. There is no way to tell if a secret is truly 
representative or concocted by the designers. 
! It seemed best to rely, then, on narratives published in print, preferably in a 
longer form. While this does give a chance for the author to craft a story, perhaps 
altering it for purposes of his own, at least there is a reflective process required in the 
months it takes to put that many words on paper. Rather than rely on fiction, which would 
be filtered through another person, I looked for first person narratives written by parents 
of multiply disabled children. There are also narratives by siblings, and by people who 
grew up with disabilities themselves. Siblings, in particular, can and do participate in the 
caregiving process. They are also likely to have stories to tell about extreme caregiving, 
but at this early stage I think it best to focus on the parents.       
! My search for narratives was somewhat haphazard, relying on word of mouth, 
internet listings of books recommended by various disability web sites, and searches of 
the shelves of libraries and book stores. There are not many parents who have so far 
shared their stories of living with the sort of disability that makes a parent into an 
extreme caregiver. And many of the stories that I did find, did not seem to me to reflect 
the reality of raising such children that I had witnessed in my clinical practice. I found 
myself looking not just for parent narratives, but for a certain kind of narrative. 
! In The Wounded Storyteller Frank (1995) identifies three kinds of narratives 
about sickness, three different ways of approaching the story of sickness. Brody, in 
Stories of Sickness (2003), reiterates and refines those categories. Both divided 
narratives into three types, which they called restitution narratives, chaos narratives, and 
quest narratives. The narratives that seemed genuine to me fall into only one of those 
categories, the quest narrative. This section will provide a short description of all three 
types of sickness narratives, and support my selection of only one type. 
Restitution Narratives
! This is the most common and most popular narrative form. The restitution 
narrative follows a simple plot, in which illness interrupts a life but is overcome, restoring 
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the person to his former state of full health. It is a reassuring story, that illness can and 
will be cured, and is the preferred story told by the medical system and those that 
support it. Fortunately, it is also often true.
! Brody indicates that the restitution narrative sometimes is helpful because the 
narrator will gain some wisdom from his illness experience that he will then impart in the 
narrative. Frank, however, states that a narrative in which some self-realization or 
change occurs, is no longer a restitution story. He sees the restitution story, not as a 
story about a person dealing with illness, but as a documentation of a method of cure. 
He says, that “restitution stories bear witness not to the struggles of the self but to the 
expertise of others; their competence and their caring that effect the cure” (Frank,1995, 
p. 92). Restitution narratives reflect the optimistic and heroic narratives that are 
dominant in medicine and in the larger culture. 
! As a dominant narrative about medicine, the restitution narrative can be 
particularly destructive. It makes the body into a thing that has broken down and needs 
to be repaired by others. This commodification is encouraged by a medical system that 
celebrates its ability to sell restitution. Lost in the overwhelming story of success is the 
fact that not all illnesses are amenable to cure. Time and resources are often wasted in a 
vain attempt to make the story come out the way it is supposed to. “But eventually the 
reality and responsibility of mortality, and its mystery, have to be faced. Doing so 
requires a story outside the restitution narrative” (Frank,1995, p. 84).
! Chronic illness also falls outside the restitution narrative. “The problem arises 
when the ill person does not find restitution , of when someone who can only tell 
restitution stories encounters another whose health will not be restored” (Frank, 1995, p. 
92). Since restitution stories are the only kind of stories that many people can tell, and 
the most likely to be published, there are restitution stories about chronic illnesses. 
According to Brody, since chronic illness by definition does not resolve, these restitution 
stories are “ultimately false” (Brody, 2003, p. 85).
! There are restitution narratives by parents of children with chronic diseases, 
diseases that are known to be incurable and unremitting. They can usually be identified 
from their cover copy, in which their child’s unexpected miraculous cure is announced. 
They also take a format where the parent realizes that there is in fact nothing really 
wrong with their child, despite the fact that the child still has the disorder. They do seem 
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to be fairly common, and I encountered several, two of which I will review below. Like 
Brody, I find them deeply suspect. 
! One of the things I will be looking for in narrative accounts of extreme caregiving, 
is a description of the ongoing and intense relationship that forms between parent and 
child when they are also medical caregiver and patient. I found that in the restitution 
narratives, the optimism necessary to find restitution in a child’s long-term, incurable 
disabilities essentially makes the child disappear. These narratives describe who the 
parents wish their child to be, rather than accepting what their child is actually like. In 
analyzing the difficulties and consequences of extreme caregiving, a reliable picture of 
both caregiver and cared-for is necessary. If the child’s need for care, and the ongoing 
nature of the caregiving relationship, are lost in the parent’s triumphant restitution, the 
narrative is difficult to interpret.  
Chaos Narratives 
! The chaos narrative, according to Frank (1995), is not really a narrative, since it 
really has no plot, consisting instead as a series of interruptions. A chaos narrative can 
really only be lived, not told. “The person living a chaos story has no distance from her 
life and no reflective grasp on it. Lived chaos makes reflection, and consequently 
storytelling, impossible” (p. 98). The person living them does not have a presence or a 
voice in the story, and can only relate the random interruptions, without any organized 
past or future. The chaos narrative does not exactly describe the narrator or the chaos, 
but can supply enough of the edges of it that the real story can be partially 
reconstructed. According to Frank, the moral responsibility brought on by the chaos story  
is to listen to it, for only in the telling can the narrator find a way out of the chaos. 
However they are difficult to listen to, uncomfortable to hear, and a horror to live. 
! It seems likely that this type of story will rarely be encountered in published 
narrative form, but that many people, particularly the poor and disenfranchised, are living 
it. “The worst thing medical staff can do to someone in the chaos story is rush him to 
move on. Moving on is desirable; chaos is the pit of narrative wreckage. But attempting 
to push the person out of this wreckage only denies what is being experienced and 
compounds the chaos” (Frank, 1995, p. 110). 
! A chaos narrative is a bad place from which to raise a child. It is tempting (and 
sometimes necessary), when there is no possibility of rushing the parent out of chaos, to 
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at least remove the child from it. But most parents of special needs kids live barely 
controlled chaos lives, with most of the chaotic interruptions happening around and 
because of the child. They counter the chaos narrative, on a lived basis, by complicated 
systems of keeping track of their responsibilities. For some, this works well as a counter-
narrative; and they are in control most of the time. For others, the schedule is all-
consuming, both of time and self, and is in itself frequently comprised by interruptions. 
! Those extreme caregivers who are living chaos narratives, by definition, will not 
be able to provide much information on caregiving. Nor are they likely to write published 
narratives. However, chaos hovers at the edge of all of these parents’ stories. They have 
often lived through it and, even when able to frame a more organized narrative, remain 
close enough to that edge that at any time they could again be consumed by chaos.  
Quest Narratives 
! Since both restitution and quest narratives do not coherently depict the 
caregiving relationship, the narratives I have found most useful are quest narratives. The 
illness story told as a quest narrative becomes the description of a journey, which is 
often modeled after mythological quests, or the hero’s journey. As in mythology, the 
journey can be divided into three parts. The first is “departure” from ordinary or prior 
existence, the often unexpected call to become a different person or follow a new path. 
In illness, of course, this call is heralded by symptoms and sealed by a diagnosis. The 
second stage is “initiation,” in which the hero undergoes trials, comprised of physical, 
emotional, and/or social suffering. This may lead to transformation, or the idea that “the 
teller has been given something by the experience, usually some insight that must be 
passed on to others” (Frank, 1995, p. 118). The final stage of the journey is the “return,” 
in which the hero reports on that experience or insight. It does not have to be a return to 
health. Brody notes that the point of the journey is to accomplish a specific goal, and that 
recovery is not necessary to achieve that goal. He states that, “Part of the transformation 
may be that one comes to change one’s goal” (Brody, 2003, p. 87).
! Both Brody and Frank agree that the quest narrative is the most useful type of 
illness narrative, benefiting both the storyteller and the listener. The narrator uses the 
story to work through the changes in his life that illness has brought about. The listener, 
or reader, or witness, “both affirms that change, which is one sort of moral duty, and 
gains a model for his own change, another moral duty” (Frank, 1995, page 128). A 
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written illness quest narrative becomes a moral effort, as both writer and reader work to 
become  transformed by the events related. 
! The parent narratives that I found most revealing do take the form of quest 
narratives, though chaos is never far away. The illness is lived by the child, but the 
journey is undertaken by the parent. In fact, two of the three most useful narratives have 
the word ‘journey’ in their titles: Ian Brown’s (2011) book, The Boy in the Moon is 
subtitled A Father’s Journey to Understand his Extraordinary Son. Josh Greenfeld’s 
(1970) book is titled A Child Called Noah: A Family Journey. They are very much illness 
quest narratives, with the quest undertaken by the parent in order to comprehend both 
the child and his illness. In some cases the journeys are literal, as diagnoses and 
treatments are searched out and available only at far away hospitals. And, unlike in the 
restitution narratives, one of the things that is sought is an understanding of the child’s 
experience. Once they have accepted that there is no cure or easy solution--itself an 
arduous journey--they seek to know the child, and who he is within the context of his 
disability. 
! The stages of departure and initiation are not always sequential, as new 
diagnoses and new therapies for the illness often supplant old ones. While the child 
bears the illness and is the one on whom tests and treatments are performed, it is clear 
that the trials of the initiation are not limited to the sick child. They encompass the lives 
of the authors and their families as well, and all are changed by the illness. The return is 
both the act of and a result of the writing of the books. They are all reports from a land 
that few others have inhabited, or are even aware of.
! The question to be asked, then, is What can we, as providers, parents, 
caregivers and witnesses, learn from this unexplored territory?   
THE NARRATIVES
! While I will use statements made by parents in my own practice, the majority of 
my information is taken from three autobiographies, spanning four decades. Noah 
Greenfeld, the subject of A Child Called Noah was born in 1966. The book was 
published in 1970, using excerpts from diaries kept during Noah’s early years 
(Greenfeld, 1970). Ted Hart from Without Reason was born in 1970, but the book was 
written in 1989 (Hart, 1989). The Boy in the Moon, Walker Brown, was born in 1996, with 
the book published in Canada in 2011 and the USA in 2012 (Brown, 2012). 
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! Interestingly, the author of all of these books is the child’s father, not the mother, 
despite the fact that Greenfeld’s wife was also a writer, and Brown’s wife is, like him, a 
journalist. I cannot speculate why it is the fathers who had the successful books, except 
to point out that all three men admit somewhat guiltily that their wives did the majority of 
the care. (According to Noah’s brother Karl Greenfeld, who wrote his own memoir about 
his life with Noah in 2009, his mother did write about Noah. In the late eighties, after 
Noah had been moved into assisted living, Foumiko Kometani wrote articles and several 
books in her native language, which were published in Japan (Greenfeld, K.T., 2009).) 
! None of the children were particularly medically complex, nor did they require 
complicated technology in the home, except for Walker Brown who was tube fed. 
However all did require extreme caregiving. Their care was complex, involving a variety 
of therapies, mostly for development delay, done both at home and at multiple visits to 
professionals. Their care was time-consuming, largely because of their behavior 
problems which often required round-the-clock attention. And eventually their caregivers 
were additionally burdened by the realization that there would be no effective treatments 
leading to cure, so that the need for care would be life long. 
 
Quest Narratives
A Child Called Noah: A Family Journey, Josh Greenfeld, 1970
! Greenfeld was a professional writer, the author of several novels and 
screenplays,  when his second son Noah was born in 1966. He kept a diary during 
Noah’s childhood, and published this book as the first of three volumes in which he 
collected his experiences dealing with Noah’s problems. This book comprises Noah’s 
first five years, when it first became apparent that there was something wrong, and 
during which a variety of medical encounters led eventually to the identification of 
autism. This is one of the earliest books about raising an autistic child, and was for a 
time quite famous. It was followed by two other books, numerous articles, and 
interviews, also about raising Noah. This first book is to me the most important, since the 
resulting publicity had not yet touched the author’s life.
! The journey undertaken was initially a search for a diagnosis which would 
confirm that Noah did indeed have problems. This led through several diagnoses, since 
at the time autism was even less well understood than it is now. The journey became 
literal when the family moved to New York and then California, looking for an effective 
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treatment program. The book ends on a hopeful note, with a diagnosis of autism and 
some promising improvements in speech and behavior with operant conditioning 
therapy.   
Without Reason: A Family Copes with Two Generations of Autism, Charles Hart, 1989.
! Hart’s son Ted was born in 1974 and, like Noah Greenfeld, developed problems 
that were not immediately identifiable. Hart’s journey, like Greenfeld’s, was to identify 
and find treatment for Ted’s unusual behavior. The diagnosis of autism was finally arrived 
at, by Hart himself, when Ted was ten years old. Surrounding this search for diagnosis 
and cure, and eventually becoming more important, is Hart’s search to understand the 
way his son sees the world. Ted can read and talk and memorize things, but his ability to 
use the facts he can recite remains elusive. He never becomes toilet trained and he 
does not sleep at night. Obvious frustration and misunderstanding often lead to 
increasingly violent behavioral melt-downs. Hart wants to know who his son is, how he 
thinks, and how to help him eventually find a place in society. 
! Interestingly, Hart’s much older brother Sumner (born in 1929) is also severely 
autistic, though his diagnosis is not established until Hart recognizes the similarities 
between his brother and his son. By that time, Sumner is over 50, and has been living in 
isolation with his mother since birth. Hart has to unlearn some of the lessons on the 
shame of disability that he learned from his mother’s example. Hart also chronicles the 
problems that Sumner has after their mother’s death, and makes parallels with Ted’s 
emerging life. 
! Sumner is placed in an institution after his mother’s death and, even though he is 
slightly verbal, the experience is at first nightmarish. By age 14, Ted’s unpredictable 
behavior makes him impossible to handle at home. He has a much better time adapting 
to his new group home, though it is of course quite difficult for his father. The journey 
concludes with the opening of a new relationship made possible by Ted’s new home. 
The Boy in the Moon: A Father’s Journey to Understand his Extraordinary Son, Ian 
Brown, 2011
! Brown’s son Walker was born in 1996, and by 8 months his very astute 
pediatrician had diagnosed his particular set of dysmorphic features, medical fragility, 
and developmental delay as a rare syndrome called CFC (Cardiofaciocutaneous 
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Syndrome). The book opens with a vivid description of caring for Walker at age eight 
years, which I think should be required reading for all who work in a pediatric hospital. 
Walker is the sickest of the children in these narratives, the only one requiring home 
medical equipment. He needed tube feedings, which is probably the least complex of the 
medical technology available for home use. His father’s description of a night feeding in 
the opening chapter speaks volumes about the cost of this simplest of procedures. 
! Brown then backtracks to fill in details of his life with Walker, centering around his 
quest to understand who he is, why he is the way he is, what he might be thinking about, 
and how to communicate with him. There is no search for a diagnosis, just a prolonged 
and guilt-ridden search to understand the nature of this exceedingly rare problem. Brown 
is a journalist, and uses his skills to ferret out information, traveling widely to visit 
everything from genetics labs to the homes of fellow CFC parents. There is also no 
possibility of cure for this genetic defect, just a multitude of mostly failed attempts to 
modify behavior. 
! There is no question that Walker requires extreme caregiving. He remains non-
verbal, unable to feed himself or toilet train, sleepless, and must often be restrained to 
prevent self-injurious behavior. Brown’s descriptions of his life with Walker are vivid, 
deeply felt, and brutally honest. There is a rich description of the interactions between 
the two, as Brown carefully observes and describes Walker’s behavior, and speculates 
on what he thinks Walker may be trying to express. But in spite of this, Walker remains 
as inscrutable and distant as the man in the moon. 
! In the final chapters, Walker becomes too much to handle at home, and has to be 
placed at age 13 in a group home. Like Hart, Brown’s relationship with Walker changes 
and deepens when he is no longer a primary caregiver. This is an interesting subject for 
further work, and possibly offers a way out of some of the ethical dilemmas posed by 
extreme caregiving, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Brown uses his new freedom 
to visit a variety of institutions for the mentally disabled, including an exemplary one in 
France. His message upon return from his quest is to begin to outline for us the value 
that people like Walker offer to the world. 
The Still Point of the Turning World, Emily Rapp, 2013. 
! This memoir is not exactly a record of extreme caregiving, but is does contain a 
journey of discovery, or at least speculation, about the meaning of a severe illness in a 
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child. It was written during and after the death of the writer’s son from Tay Sachs 
Disease, a rare and lethal mutation which causes progressive neurologic destruction. 
Hers is a different sort of journey from the others’ however, as Rapp learns of the 
diagnosis on the first few pages, and immediately accepts the fact that the disease will 
lead to death in the first few years of life. She does research the disease, but never with 
any expectation of discovering a cure. She also does not document the caregiving which 
she must have done. Though she decided to forgo life extending treatments such as 
tube feedings and home ventilation, she still would have had a formidable amount of 
medical care to administer, including multiple medications, seizure precautions, physical 
therapy, and comfort care. 
! The intent of the memoir is to describe her grieving process, a journey which 
began on the day of the diagnosis. However a large part of the grief is due to the 
realization that her son, who never advanced developmentally beyond age 6 months, 
would never be able to create a life story of his own. She takes on the task of creating a 
narrative for him, to imagine and describe the limited life he led to the best of her 
abilities. She examines him minutely, gauging both what he can and can’t do, with an 
eye toward how her love and care for him are reflected in his limited responses. She has 
much to say therefor about the emotional component of the virtue of caregiver 
responsiveness. 
Restitution Narratives
! There are many books available whose cover descriptions or titles make it 
obvious that, even though they deal with chronic illnesses, the illness will be cured by 
the end. Some books, like Changed by a Child, a 1997 book by Barbara Gill about 
raising a child with Down Syndrome, whose cover states that it offers “comfort, solace, 
and resonance on every page,” comprise a series of short essays offering uplifting 
advice. Other books declare themselves by their titles, such as Miracle Birth Stories of 
Very Premature Babies: Little Thumbs Up! written by the father of a micro-premie. The 
cover reads like an advertisement for a neonatal intensive care unit, claiming “miracle 
babies” and saying that the book is “an uplifting testament to hope” (Smith, 1999). 
! However I did find two useful restitution narratives. These were both written by 
mothers: 
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The Anti-Romantic Child: A Story of Unexpected Joy, Priscilla Gilman, 2011.
! When her son, Benjamin is born in 1997, Gilman has specific expectations of a 
certain, rather old-fashioned, childhood. She thinks her hopes are dashed when he 
begins to have developmental issues. She does embark on a quest for a diagnosis and 
eventually arrives at Aspergers Syndrome. However she prefers to refer to this as 
hyperlexia with sensory integration dysfunction, and never uses either Aspergers or 
autism to refer to her son. 
! Benjamin does not actually require extreme caregiving, though he is not the easy 
romantic child Gilman was expecting. Perhaps because her child is less severely 
effected, her narrative brims with enthusiasm and hope and, to my thinking, quite a bit of 
denial. The book becomes a restitution narrative, with the author ultimately denying that 
there is, or has ever been, anything wrong. She can tell by Benj’s poetry, which is 
included in the book, that the problem was never with him, but with herself being unable 
to recognize his romanticism. 
! However Gilman’s search for knowledge and use of that knowledge is 
interesting, and in many ways similar to that of the three male quest narrators. She also 
does a great deal of research and acquires extensive medical knowledge, which will be 
discussed in the section on competence. 
Finding Jesse: A Mother’s Story of Grief, Grace, and Everyday Bliss, Marianne Leone, 
2010
! Despite the title, Finding Jesse, the severely impaired Jesse is nowhere 
described in the book. Jesse was effected by prolonged lack of oxygen at birth and had 
as a result severe cerebral palsy, minimal motor control, and inability to communicate. 
Nevertheless, his mother is absolutely sure that Jesse was, not merely mentally intact, 
but incredibly intelligent. Leone describes no interactions with Jesse that would help the 
reader confirm this. Jesse was mostly non-verbal, and communicated via an “eye gaze 
computer”, to which he was introduced at age seven. On this, he did calculus and Latin 
homework, as well as writing poetry. Examples are included, but the process by which 
this communication was discovered and takes place is barely discussed.   
! Given the nature of the impairments his mother admits to, Jesse must have been 
on multiple medications, tube feedings, and monitors, therefor requiring a level of 
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extreme of caregiving beyond any of the children in the other narratives. However his 
mother rarely mentions this, and never describes it.  
! The book is mostly about his mother’s efforts, against all odds, to assert this 
intelligence to the rest of the world, particularly to unfeeling doctors, teachers, and home 
care aides. Those who do recognize Jesse’s intelligence are lavishly praised. It is also 
about her efforts to recover from his sudden death at age seventeen; a journey back 
from depression aided by her husband, actor Chris Cooper, the family dog, the writing of 
the book, and a tattoo that says ‘Jesse.’ Her love for Jesse is enormous, but the person 
she loved was not apparent to me from her book. 
Other Narratives
!
i wish i were engulfed in flames: my insane life raising two boys with autism, Jeni 
Decker, 2011
! This book is comprised of a series of humorous essays centering around the 
author’s difficulties raising two autistic sons. She concentrates on the ways in which her 
sons’ inappropriate behaviors and need for care constantly interrupt her life. There are 
honest depictions of her son’s toileting (or rather lack of toileting) behaviors and 
masturbation in public. There are also numerous complaints about the effect of these 
interruptions on the author’s sex life. 
! The book is, seemingly, a fairly successful chaos narrative. However its 
concentration on the embarrassing social situations caused by autism, rather than on the 
effort required for caregiving, makes it less useful as a story of illness, or a depiction of 
extreme caregiving.  
The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and 
the Collision of Two Cultures, Anne Fadiman, 1997
! This book is famous not as a parenting memoir, but rather as a journalistic 
documentation of the wrongs visited on a Hmong girl named Lia Lee, by her American 
doctors. It is meant to depict the Hmong experience in America, and how it has been 
misunderstood. However, Lia’s care, even before the sepsis that left her in a vegetative 
state, is the most difficult I have seen documented in print. Fadiman’s portrait of the 
caregiving relationship between Lia and her mother, though neither in first person nor the 
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intent of the book, still provides interesting insight into both the nature of caregiving and 
the way in which it is often overlooked.
Boy Alone: A Brother’s Memoir, Karl Taro Greenfeld, 2009
! Josh Greenfeld’s book, A Child Called Noah, is one of the three major memoirs 
about extreme caregiving. This memoir was written recently by Greenfeld’s son, Noah’s 
brother, Karl. It is not so much about Noah, who grew up to be much more severely 
autistic than was obvious from his father’s early memoir, as it is about the effects Noah’s 
problems had on the family. It is a much darker book than Josh Greenfeld’s, filled with 
cynicism, guilt, and anger. Noah never did learn to speak, and his behavior deteriorated 
in adolescence. He began a series of disastrous placements in institutions at age 14. I 
have included it because it provides a further history of Noah, as well as some 
perceptive observations about the relationship between Noah and his father. 
  
The Lazarus Case:  Life and Death Issues in Neonatal Intensive Care, John Lantos, 
2001.
! The Lazarus case is a fictional court case of suspected neonatal malpractice 
constructed by Lantos, a pediatrician and ethicist, from his own experiences testifying in 
similar cases. It is a careful and nuanced study of medical thinking, progressing through 
a variety of important neonatal issues, as the author encounters the need to explain 
them. The impaired infant, whose parents have initiated the malpractice suit, is never 
seen, perhaps because Lantos’ testimony is being taped before a group of lawyers as 
expert witness, not in a court room. It is therefor very much a doctor’s story, and not a 
narrative about either sickness or caregiving. 
LIMITATIONS OF THIS WORK
! Many of the pitfalls of narrative ethics have been discussed above, making them 
a difficult source for moral underpinnings, though of course stories can be, and are, used 
in moral evaluation. Stories are crafted from a cultural ethos that may itself not be moral, 
or may tell the story of only the dominant part of the culture. There is no set standard for 
the stories we read, and even literary acclaim does not guarantee morality. Stories as 
case histories can be faulted for being intensely personal, situational, or anecdotal. Even 
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when compared with similar stories there is no agreed upon foundation story to use to 
cross check moral conclusions.  
! In addition, particularly in the modern accounts that I have found, stories are 
crafted from other stories and, particularly in the medical arena, much of the information 
authors use as a basis for their story is unreliable. There are for example widespread 
beliefs in what medicine can and cannot do that are based on repeated hearing of 
inaccurate stories, particularly the heroic and sanitized portrayal of emergency medicine 
in television and other media. These stories are not acknowledged as a source of 
information; they just seem to be things that everyone knows. A parent writing about his 
or her child’s illness will already have preconceived ideas about the causes and 
meanings of that illness. I chose longer narratives in part to see how those attitudes 
toward medicine and illness might become more informed over time.
! I also chose crafted narratives, novel-length biographies about living with a 
disabled child, to avoid the spur-of-the-moment blurt of emotion that is blogging. Of 
course the longer form also gives the narrator a chance to tidy up his feelings. One of 
the criticisms of narrative ethics is that the narrator usually has a stake in the telling of 
the story, and is never completely factual. This is true even in autobiography. It is 
possible to verify the authenticity of the facts about the author’s life, but not to insure his 
reliability. However, I believe that the story told is in itself important, and its usefulness in 
moral analysis is not dependent on complete objectivity. 
! Narrative ethicist Rebecca Garden (2010) uses the example of Lucy Grealy’s 
Autobiography of a Face, to show the ways in which even a personal narrative of illness 
can be subverted. According to Garden, Grealy gave her book a happy ending in order 
to get it published. She became well-known, and many then used the narrative to shed a 
positive light on disability, and hold Grealy up as an example of triumph over adversity. 
However Grealy’s death from heroin overdose, together with a less happy retelling of her 
story by author Ann Patchett, has, according to Garden, been used to question the 
authenticity of that restitution story. Garden suggests that the possibility of subversion 
might cast doubt on the use of stories of sickness in ethical analysis. As Garden puts it, 
“the author is a concept produced by the text itself and through culture, a figment of 
cultural imagining to which readers ultimately do not have access” (Garden, 2010, p. 
126). However, she ends by suggesting that both versions of Grealy’s story are valid and 
useful in ethical analysis. The ambiguity itself, essentially, is instructive. 
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! I agree that, even in an autobiography, the narrator may not always stick to 
factual truth. He may be fabricating events, or altering them consciously or 
subconsciously in order to make himself look better, or worse. Or he may have a hidden 
agenda, which he can mold his story to support, including agendas which are imposed 
or even coerced by the publication industry. Perhaps we can’t completely trust him, but 
this does not decrease the value of the story. Narrative ethics, I believe, must accept the 
possibility that the narrator of any story might be suspect, and include that suspicion as a 
part of the narrative.  
! Johanna Shapiro agrees that narrators may in some ways be unreliable, but feels 
that patient stories are still of utmost importance. She acknowledges that the personal 
motivation of the author will introduce biases into a story, but feels also that “patients tell 
the story they need to tell” (Shapiro, 2011, p. 68). The unreliability and possible 
inauthenticity of the narrator therefor does not negate the usefulness of his story. She 
recommends that we “approach all stories from a context of narrative humility,” paying 
attention not only the story being related but to the context in which the story is being 
told and the narrator’s intent in the telling (Shapiro, 2011, p. 70). This I have tried to do.  
! Probably the biggest problem with this thesis is the choice of narratives. I admit 
to a somewhat random selection process, depending on chance and cover copy to 
select narratives. I by no means made an exhaustive search for every book written by 
the parent of an ill or disabled child. I have no doubt that there are books which I 
overlooked, and books which I perhaps should not have excluded.
! I also chose a specific type of narrative. I believe that my avoidance of restitution 
narratives, would be supported by Frank, Brody, Shapiro, and Garden. However my 
selection of stories that reveal a specific context of anger, guilt, sorrow, or regret may be 
less supportable. I have no idea if these are more ‘true’ than the number of restitution 
stories available. They do reflect feelings that I have seen in my family and practice, but I 
cannot guarantee that they hold true for all parents of special needs children. I could be 
criticized for making a deliberate selection of stories which reinforced personal 
experiences.
! Another limitation is in the types of narratives available. I found several books by 
the parents of autistic children, and those inform the majority of my thinking. Of the 
numerous disabling genetic conditions, I found accounts by parents of only two: the rare 
disease called CFC (Cardiofaciocutaneous Syndrome) and Tay Sachs. However there 
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are numerous other disorders which require extreme caregiving, and which are likely to 
have at least a few differences in consequence. There must be differences as well in the 
parenting of children with intellectual disabilities other than autism, children with chronic 
diseases that cause physical dependence without intellectual delay, and children with 
progressive medical problems who are not expected to live past adolescence. I 
encountered no narratives dealing with these types of illnesses.  
! However, I am using these narrative in hopes of amplifying unheard voices, to 
make visible some of the undocumented and invisible consequences of care. The 
narrative voices I did find serve to express at least some of the enormous consequences 
of extreme caregiving. I hope to reveal ethical issues that are barely on the radar of 
clinical ethics, by telling stories that, even if somewhat ambiguous, need to be heard. I 
am hoping that the willingness to put something, particularly something negative, into 
print under one’s own name must count for something. Even the ways in which these 
parents might be misguided is important, as are the stories they might need to tell. 
!
MAKING LEMONADE: A WORD ABOUT OPTIMISM
! There is a particular limitation to parent’s telling of illness stories for their children, 
which has been alluded to above but not discussed in full. It colors, I believe, the entire 
experience of having a disabled child, and is so culturally ingrained that it effects 
everything from individual parenting stories, to doctor patient interactions, to the 
construction of parent support groups. I am referring to an emphasis on positive thinking, 
which produces a near requirement or duty to always look on the bright side.
! This phenomenon has been described recently in the literature by Helen 
Harrison, as “making lemonade” (Harrison, 2001). She feels that parents of disabled 
children are expected to have a positive attitude. She reports that both parents and 
children who express negative feelings about their experiences or disabilities have been 
forced out of support groups and off of internet lists. Most parents feel the need to 
appear strong for other parents, their doctors, and even themselves. Those who do not 
can be seen as complainers, bad parents, or politically incorrect in their attitudes toward 
disability. 
! Harrison believes that this attitude permeates and calls into question the results 
of quality of life studies, particularly those done by Saigal’s group in Toronto (Saigal et 
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al., 1996, 1999). In a paper questioning the reliability of these influential studies of the 
quality of life of teenagers who survived extremely premature births, she points out 
several inconsistencies between actual and reported abilities. In these studies, severely 
impaired teenagers rated their quality of life higher than control teenagers on several 
scales, some of which, such as educational success, were clearly exaggerated. Other 
studies have likewise found and questioned the fact that teenage survivors of premature 
birth who clearly are in poor health, rate their health-related quality of life as equal to or 
even better than their unaffected peers (Gray et al., 2006).
! Harrison proposes that the parents and children involved with these studies felt 
that they had to give a positive report, knowing that it was their doctors and hospital that 
were conducting the study. She feels that this inaccurately high assessment of the 
quality of life reflects, among other things, a coping mechanism for dealing with severe 
disability, a social mandate to be seen bearing up well under adversity, the need to 
maintain a politically correct attitude towards disability, and an unwillingness to 
disappoint the medical caregivers still actively involved with the child’s care (Harrison, 
2001).
! This expectation is evident in the nature of the books published about special 
needs parenting, which seem to require at the very least a sunny acceptance and an 
insistence that everything has been all for the best by the end. It is apparent in on line 
parent groups, where tips for parenting--which brands of diapers fit best, where to find 
special formula, what gadget works best at capping a feeding tube--are mixed with 
cheeriness, as though these parents feel they must convince each other how wonderful 
their children and their lives are.
! It is also not a new problem. My father once came home furious from a parent 
support meeting of the newly formed ARC (Montgomery County Association for 
Retarded Children), for which he was a founder and activist. The circle of parents had all 
been sharing how wonderful it was, and how blessed they were, to have the gift of a 
retarded child. My father found this attitude unbelievable. He was at a loss for words at 
their misunderstanding, but had finally managed to blurt out, “It is not a gift. Mental 
retardation is Hell.” His remark had not been appreciated, which he found a shocking 
betrayal by people he thought he knew and trusted. 
 ! The parent authors of caregiving narratives have also commented on the 
expectation of positivity. Charles Hart, author of Without Reason, founded and attended 
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an early autism parent support group, in which he states outright that a positive attitude 
was desirable. “We tried to make the workshops a positive experience. Those parents 
needed more hope in their lives. They needed to feel positive about their handicapped 
children and to feel good about them selves as they struggled against social attitudes 
that tend to devalue people with disabilities and their parents” (Hart, 1999, p. 182). No 
doubt many in Hart’s group benefitted from the hope and positivity, though my father’s 
experiences in the same decade demonstrate that not everyone was able to feel that 
way. 
! Ian Brown also takes exception to this view of disability, calling parents who live 
their lives eagerly treating and championing and thereby denying their children’s 
limitations “disability masochists” (Brown, 2011, p. 75). He and his wife abandoned 
support groups. Though he understands the importance of such reassurance, he objects 
particularly to the religious overtones expected by such groups. “Walker had given my 
life shape, possibly even meaning. But Walker had also made our lives hell. On the 
hellish days the mawkish sermonizing about angels and specialness felt like rank self-
delusion” (p. 135). And, “It was hard to think of Walker as a gift from God, unless God 
was a sadist who bore a little boy a grudge” (p. 136).
! Helen Harrison, in the beginning of her paper on making lemonade states, “Upon 
becoming parents of a disabled or “high-risk” child, one of the first things we learn to do 
is lie--to our friends and family, to the doctors, to our child, and to ourselves. We quickly 
learn that others do not want an honest answer . . . and we oblige by giving the positive 
and politically correct answer” (Harrison, 2001, p. 239). 
! It is against this backdrop that I am trying to find narratives that relate the realities 
of caregiving for a medically complex or multiply disabled child. I am looking specifically 
for narrators who are willing to express the anger my father had, the sorrow that these 
parents live with day to day, and the ambiguity of their child’s existence. Josh Greenfeld, 
father of autistic Noah, says, “I’ve leafed through three books, chronicles by parents of 
severely disturbed or brain damaged children. None of them palpitated with truth for me. 
The parents didn’t burn with enough anger; they were all too damned heroic for 
me” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 126). Like him, I am searching for truths that, for all of the 
reasons given above, many people are unwilling to say. 
!
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE VIRTUES OF CARE
!  Having found several narratives by parent caregivers who are doing extreme 
caregiving, the question is, then, how to analyze them. I believe that the existence of 
children requiring extreme caregiving must be recognized, and that elucidating and 
evaluating the problems encountered by their caregivers is morally imperative. The 
analysis must not merely contain a description and definition of the lives of extreme 
caregivers, but also involve an ethical component. Yet, just as these children challenge 
the defined boundaries of medical care and of parenting, they also call for an expansion 
of our understanding of ethics. In this chapter I will build on theories of care proposed by 
Joan Tronto (1993) in order to work out a system by which components of the physical 
and emotional work of caregiving can be separated and discussed. 
! Under an ethic of principles, there are fairly clear guidelines, balancing parental 
duties, by setting a standard of beneficence and defining a level of harm at which society  
must intervene. However, harm to the parent is rarely considered as a possibility. The 
rules defining parental duties were not formulated to take into account the enormous 
physical and emotional burden that comes with extreme caregiving. The assumption that 
the caregiving must and should always fall on the parents has contributed to the 
invisibility of the work, and the harm, that is being done. 
! Likewise, the rules balancing parental autonomy with the child’s emerging 
selfhood and autonomy, are not helpful. There is no allowance for the possibility that the 
child will not ever become self-sufficient. We shall see also that the burden of care is 
often accepted unknowingly, a choice made on insufficient information. Once accepted, 
the care becomes inescapable, leading to a great deal of guilt and ambiguity. 
! The undeniable existence of these children then poses a complex moral 
dilemma, but I believe that the existing rules are inadequate. We need to do better than  
trying to balance our understanding of parental duties and setting limits on unacceptable 
parental care. We need more than a desire to preserve the autonomy of both parent and 
child. Under an ethic of principle, the care these children require is invisible. Within the 
limitations of principle ethics, these children present, at best, an insolvable problem.
! To better understand extreme caregiving, we need methods which examine the 
act of caring itself. To evaluate a state of extreme dependency requires an ethic which 
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acknowledges and accepts the existence of dependency, and seeks to understand the 
relationship that is caregiving. Thus, an ethic of care, which revolves around the 
recognition and meeting of needs, is more likely to provide the insight into the nature and 
depth of the caregiving relationship than an ethic of principles. 
AN ETHIC OF CARE
! In a departure from principle ethics, which Margaret Urban Walker has described 
as following a “theoretical-judicial” model of morality, some ethicists are working out a 
different method for making moral judgements. This method, based on relationships and 
emotions considered unimportant, or even undesirable, in principle ethics has been 
called both feminist ethics and care ethics. Both follow what Urban Walker called an 
“expressive-collaborative” model. This model departs from statements about individual 
rights and autonomy, concentrating instead on community and interdependence, and the 
possibility of caring for each other (Walker, 1992).
! In the field of medicine, where the entire focus is on providing care, an ethic 
based on care and caring seems an ideal match. Particularly when analyzing caregiving, 
as I intend to do, an ethic based on the caring relationship seems more appropriate than 
an ethic based on prescribed universal rights and duties. However care ethics has been 
criticized for relying too much on unreliable and unmeasurable emotions such as caring, 
compassion, pity (Boyd, 2004), or empathy (Slote, 2007).  
! In her book Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care Joan 
Tronto (1993) has proposed, among other things, a care ethic based on the ability to 
recognize and meet needs. Unlike theories based on emotion, the recognition of needs 
and the moral meeting of those needs can become measurable and actionable. Within 
that system, she has proposed four phases of care, each of which holds a unique moral 
property or virtue on which to base action. These phases serve to separate the action of 
caring from the emotion called caring (or empathy, or pity). The focus on the 
identification and meeting of needs has the potential to turn the discussion of an ethic of 
care away from a somewhat vague and controversial analysis of the emotion of caring, 
and toward an ethic where care becomes a politically actionable concept. Thus caring 
goes beyond an emotional interest in something to include reaching out to another and 
taking some action. “. . . [T]o care implies more than simply a passing interest or fancy 
but instead the acceptance of some form of burden” (Tronto, 1993, p. 103).
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! “Caring” is a complex process, involving emotional components that muddy the 
moral waters. For this reason, I have chosen the framework provided by Joan Tronto’s 
phases of care in order to break down the complex and intense act of extreme 
caregiving into specific components, each of which can then be evaluated on both an 
emotional and morally actionable level.   
THE PHASES OF CARE
! Since I will be relying on concepts developed from these four phases to provide a 
framework to analyze caregiving narratives, it is necessary to review this part of Tronto’s 
theories. 
 ! Tronto’s four phases of caring are: 1) Caring about. This is the closest to the 
emotion of caring, as it involves the usually empathic awareness that someone is in 
trouble. However within Tronto’s definition, there is an additional requirement of being 
open to the world, paying attention and being willing to notice unmet needs. 2) Taking 
care of. This involves taking on some of the burden of care, agreeing to help meet a 
need, but in an indirect manner. Things like making a contribution to a disaster relief 
fund, working for a day at Feed My Starving Children, or becoming an activist for the 
disabled are all ways to indirectly take care of a need. 3) Caregiving or caring for. The 
caregiver is the heart of caring, doing the often unrecognized dirty work of care. 
Caregiving is direct action: cleaning the muck out of flooded houses, preparing and 
delivering meals, or actually helping to build necessary wheelchair ramps. In health care, 
it is the changing of bedpans, the holding of hands, the coming in response to a distress 
call. This is the direct, hands-on work of care. Thus care is a practice, an action, not an 
emotion or a principle (Tronto, 1993, p. 105-108).  
! The last phase, number 4) is receiving care. This is an interesting and somewhat 
different phase. Including it in the set of phases acknowledges that all of us are 
interdependent and rely on others for some sort of care, though not all care is 
recognized as such. “Once again, care is not universal with regard to any specific needs, 
but all humans have needs that must be met” (Tronto, 1993, p. 110). It also 
acknowledges that, at some point, any of us could find our need for care increasing, and 
become the care-receiver of a different or more intense level of care. But since the other 
phases all seem to require some action, the inclusion of care-receiving suggests that the 
recipient of care is not to be a passive slate on which care is written. Tronto states that, 
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as part of the cycle of care, the recipient is in the best position to determine if needs are 
being met. But I would argue that the inclusion of care-receiving as a separate phase 
implies that the receiving of care is in itself a skill that might be mastered. It also implies 
that an inability to provide an adequate response to care might impede the caregiving 
process. I will return to this concept at length later.  
! Tronto has assigned to each phase of care an associated virtue, a way to begin 
to guide us in how to act in each of those degrees of closeness to care. The virtue 
associated with caring about is attentiveness. A person who demonstrates this will stay 
open to the recognition of needs of others, and likely will find many. They may feel 
sympathy or pity, but it is not a necessity. The virtue needed for the second phase, 
caring for, is responsibility, and is a call not merely to notice needs but to be ready to 
take some personal stake in the meeting of them. For the third phase, the caregiver 
must be able to perform care that actually meets the needs that are present, so the 
virtue that caregiving requires is competence in the provision of care. Tronto has also 
assigned a virtue to the process of care-receiving, that of responsiveness, in keeping 
with the tasks of the recipient to report on the effectiveness of the care and of the 
caregiver to be able to elicit that response. 
!  The virtues that Tronto has assigned to the phases of care are modeled after 
Aristotalian virtues, where moral behavior is understood to be a mean between two 
extremes. Tronto does not specify the sort of extremes to be avoided for each virtue, 
however. In Aristotalian virtue ethics, a virtue is a sort of middle ground for behavior, 
surrounded by less desirable actions or attitudes of the same sort. By the technique of 
identifying the extremes of undesirable (or less moral) behavior, Aristotle approaches a 
definition of  a certain moral virtue. In this way, as a sort of thought experiment, he is 
able to zero in on the true meaning of virtues by assessing the dangers of their 
extremes.  
! In much of the work in health care or nursing that follows Tronto’s phases, 
including in some of her own work, all four phases of care are assigned to the individual 
nurse caregiver. Thus a nurse is called upon to care about and to take care of; to be 
attentive and responsible. She of course must be competent in her caregiving duties. In 
addition, the care-receiver is often not in a position to provide feedback, so that being 
responsive to her patient’s needs becomes another duty of the nurse caregiver. 
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! Edwards has criticized Tronto’s work, saying that it does not provide an approach 
to moral problems in heath care that is distinctive from approaches, such as virtue 
ethics, that have already been tried. He believes, correctly, that telling nurses to be 
attentive and responsive and competent is nothing new, and can be done with virtue 
ethics or principle ethics (Edwards, 2009). 
! Edwards has also stated that impartiality is an “essential element” of any ethical 
system. An ethic of care based solely on emotional caring can indeed be criticized for 
risking becoming too personal, too likely to result in unfair advantages to those in range 
of our vision. I’m not sure I agree that complete fairness is essential (or attainable), but it 
is important if an ethical system is to be useful. I disagree that principle ethics is likely to 
be applied with more justice and impartiality than an ethic of care, despite its attempts at 
universality. But Edwards agrees that Tronto’s phases of care somewhat overcome the 
problem of impartiality (Edwards, 2009, p. 233). Attentiveness can be expressed in a 
way that makes caring into a set of actions that can be applied with justice in mind, not 
merely an emotion that will only be aroused unreliably.
! Based on Tronto’s levels, the number of things involved in caring is extensive, 
and the virtuous caregiver will have her hands full. But I don’t believe that the caregiver 
should have to shoulder all of the aspects of care, all of the time. The four phases are 
quite versatile, and can be applied to an entire cultural or political system, as well as to 
the work of a single nurse. The phases, used in this way, are not then merely stages 
which a single actor or potential caregiver goes through as she approaches the need for 
care; from recognition of a need through to accomplishing the hard work of meeting it. 
They are degrees to which any agent or agency is involved in the caring process. In 
particular, attentiveness and responsibility enacted by others, both toward the care 
receiver and the caregiver, would likely improve the final result, which is the recognition 
and the meeting of needs.
! I believe that when we examine the work of parent extreme caregivers, using 
Tronto’s phases to pinpoint all aspects of the task, we will be able to break down this 
complex task into comprehensible components. We will be able to determine where 
extreme caregiving differs from typical parenting merely by the level of difficulty, and 
where its intense nature becomes morally problematic. I hope to learn something about 
the nature of caregiving itself. Discovering others who should be involved in some of the 
phases of care is not a primary goal of this thesis, however once the complexity and 
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consequences of the task become clear, I hope that the need for others in the medical 
system to take action will be obvious. 
!
 Caring About 
! Caring About is the first and least involved phase of caring. We are all capable of 
caring about those who are close to us. Caring about strangers is more difficult, but 
certainly possible, though we often require that their need be waved in our faces before 
we recognize it. And so the virtue associated with caring about is attentiveness, a quality  
that implies a certain way to look at the world; one that notices the needs of others, and 
recognizes both the possibility of fulfilling them and those who are already doing that 
work.  
! Peta Bowden (1998) has written a summary of feminist philosophers’ thinking on 
the subject of ethical attentiveness, using the works of Simone Weil, Iris Murdoch, and 
Martha Nussbaum. What emerges is an ideal of attention as an act of looking clearly at 
another with a sort of patient expectancy, waiting to understand who they are and what 
their needs might be. One’s own ego and selfishness should be put aside in the process, 
according to Weil, in an “energetic ‘gymnastics’ aimed at erasing all those attachments 
to persons and objects that we form for our own sakes rather than from any sense of 
those persons’ and those objects’ own intrinsic worth” (Bowden, 1998, p. 61). According 
to Bowden, Murdoch also sees attentiveness toward others as an emotional and 
possibly ecstatic engrossment in the other.
! Bowden goes on to say that there is some controversy over whether such total 
putting aside of one’s own self and desires is necessary. Weil’s mental gymnastics seem 
to require a self abrogation that could ultimately be undesirable. However Bowden points 
out that this self-erasure is all too close to the disenfranchising self-denial that women as 
default caregivers are now starting to overcome. Applied to an ethic of care, this could 
lead caregivers to define their selves and desires almost entirely in terms of the interests 
of others.  
! However there is agreement that proper attentiveness to another will ultimately 
lead to a broader self-understanding. Attentiveness can become a continuous work 
building a world view that notices and values others, and cycles back toward self 
enrichment. It requires intelligence, imagination, and possibly education about the world 
inhabited by the other. “[N]ot only does attentiveness directed to others reflect back on 
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oneself in enriched possibilities for self-knowledge, but that correspondingly, ethical 
attentiveness to oneself, one’s limits and prejudices, facilitates revised and augmented 
possibilities for attention to others” (Bowden, 1998, p. 72). Thus proper attention builds 
personhood in both the subject of the attention as well as in the attentive person.
! Though Bowden is not specifically talking about child care, this sort of 
attentiveness applied to the parenting of either sick or well children is not inappropriate, 
and may well define excellent parenting. In my experience, the arrival of a child seems to 
provide an instant and possibly unavoidable closeness, an almost mandatory caring 
about. There is certainly a possibility of attentiveness that both engrosses and enriches, 
without loss of selfhood for either parent or child. 
! If attentiveness is considered as a virtue around a mean, too little attentiveness 
will express itself in self-interest, a scattered and unreliable recognition of the need for 
care. It is more difficult to imagine a situation in which there is too much attentiveness, 
but attention focused narrowly on a single area might lead to a sort of paternalism, 
where needs that don’t actually exist are identified. It also could potentially lead to the 
loss of selfhood in the caregiver, if the caregiver becomes so focused on the needs of 
another that her own desires and life goals are put aside. Certainly both extremes exist 
in parenting, with children effected by neglectful or suffocating parents, and parents 
submerging both too little and too much of themselves in their children. In these 
statements, though, I have gone beyond attentiveness, and into considering the results 
of actions taken because of this attention. 
! It is not my intent here to provide a manual for attentive ethical parenting, but to 
analyze parent caregiving in its most difficult form. For this purpose, I must assume that 
parents of both typical and special needs children will be attentive in very similar ways. 
While parents of medically complex children do indeed have more needs to notice and 
pay attention to, their ability to recognize those needs is not in question. The action in 
this phase--attentiveness--while differing in the number of needs to be recognized, does 
not seem to me likely to reveal any unique aspects of caregiving.  
  
Taking Care Of
! The next question for an ethic of care is how to direct that hard-won moral 
attention. The mere knowledge of need is only a small step toward meeting that need. 
This second of Tronto’s phases of care is agreeing to take care of a need, or being 
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willing to take some action to meet a need. She has assigned to it the virtue of 
responsibility. In order to respond to this, we need to know the extent to which the 
recognition of a need obliges a response to that need. We need an ethic of taking on 
responsibility. 
! John Caputo, in an essay called ‘Against Ethics,’ recognizes a form of ethical 
attentiveness which comes with the realization that needs, when noticed, will sometimes 
evoke a response. That response, which he identifies as obligation, is a realization that 
present needs call forth a sympathetic desire to help. He defines obligation as “the 
feeling that comes over us when others need our help, when they call out for help, or 
support, or freedom, or whatever they need, a feeling that grows in strength directly in 
proportion to the desperateness of the situation of the other” (Caputo, 1993, p. 5). 
However the form that response should take is not clear.  
! Principle ethics, which claims to be a guidebook for moral action and a secure 
foundation for good, does not help Caputo identify the proper response to this obligation. 
Instead, he says, it gives us the illusion of safety from responsibility, since there is no 
rule that requires action. But obligation comes anyway, often unexpectedly and 
chaotically, and we are not safe from it. Caputo puts it like this; “Still, I would say, 
obligation happens, the obligation of me to you and of both of us to others. It is all 
around us, on every side, constantly tugging at our sleeves, calling upon us for a 
response” (Caputo, 1993, p. 6). Principle ethics does not provide an answer to the 
question of which needs, when noticed, call forth an obligation or a requirement to act. 
! It seems to me that responsibility as a virtuous act might be the deliberate 
acknowledgment or acceptance of Caputo’s obligation. Recognizing a need, we act, not 
from some assigned duty or in response to the rights of the vulnerable, but because we 
agree to take responsibility for some part of the necessary care. In doing so I believe we 
often must willingly sacrifice some degree of our own independence in order to attend to 
the needs of others.
! Accepting responsibility for the raising of a child is a clear obligation of 
parenthood. Parents are judged on their ability to take on a variety of responsibilities, 
and parenting books are filled with advice on how to meet them. Most parents 
understand that this is a part of the parenting process. The parents of medically complex 
children do not differ from the parents of well children in this acceptance, except that the 
complexity and number of their responsibilities increases vastly. They inevitably learn to 
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take on this a new set of responsibilities, most of which were not expected. As we shall 
see, these responsibilities are numerous, time-consuming, and for some, endless. There 
is no ethic to dictate which of these responsibilities they might be allowed to put aside.   
! Like the virtue of attentiveness, responsibility is meant to be a mean between 
extremes. It is certainly possible to ignore needs which should be your responsibility, as 
well as take on more problems than one can handle. But it is not clear to me exactly how  
those extremes might be avoided, particularly by parents who have taken on the 
responsibility for raising a child, and find that the job more difficult than they expected. If 
there is no process by which responsibilities that have been taken on, but can’t be met, 
can be passed on to another person, it is inevitable that some people will end up too 
burdened. It seems to me then that an ethic of responsibility might be impossible within a 
society that is not focused on recognizing and meeting each other’s needs. 
! In Chapter Five, which discusses the burden imposed by extreme caregiving, I 
will outline the number and difficulty of the responsibilities that parents of multiply 
disabled and intellectually delayed children are obliged to take on. As with attentiveness, 
those responsibilities are not ethically different from those encountered by parents of 
typical children. There are just many more of them. If there are any new ethical 
implications, they will not be found by analyzing the way parents take on their 
unexpected responsibility. Instead, I believe that the existence of these children and the 
difficulties encountered by their caregiver/parents, once made visible, should call forth 
an obligation from us. 
! Framed within an ethic of care, these children have a level of need that is too 
vast to be the sole responsibility of their families. The parents of these children, we will 
see, are themselves in need of care. If we as medical providers wish to claim that we are 
taking responsibility for caring for medically complex children, we might find that we 
need to think about redirecting some of the responsibilities that currently fall on their 
extreme caregiver parents.  
Caregiving
! This is the most interesting phase to me, the heart of caring, an action both 
under-recognized and absolutely necessary. The emotion of caring or empathy is not 
required for the action of caregiving, though it may be necessary for doing it well. Tronto 
has assigned the virtue of competence to the hands-on caregiver (Tronto, 1993). This 
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one virtue I will take exception too. I don’t think it embodies the entirety of the act of 
caregiving. 
! Competence as a virtue is most understandable when considering the physical 
act of caregiving. For the work of caring, in medicine as in other fields, you want people 
who do it well. For a sick patient in the hospital, you want people who know how to 
change bed linens without causing pain, how to work the suction equipment, how to start 
an IV. You want people who know what lab tests to order, are good at obtaining them, 
and know what they mean.  You want nurses and doctors who have passed their boards, 
who aren’t working while impaired, who are competent. You also want nurses and 
doctors to do only what is necessary, not ordering excessive tests or doing unnecessary 
procedures. Following a technological imperative to do things because they are 
available, or are reimbursed well, or will make a great research paper, is not desirable. 
All of this can be done, and done well, without any emotional attachment.
! Defining competence as a virtue between extremes is not terribly difficult. A 
performance within certain standards of care is expected and in many circumstances 
has already been defined. We already have measurements of competence to apply to 
the practices of medicine and nursing. Incompetence is measurable with final exams. 
Over-competence is somewhat harder to spot, but would result in care that is either 
excessive or unnecessary. Because this is often carried out by the most admired, 
“cutting-edge” form of medicine, only constant vigilance regarding the actual best 
interest of patients can recognize it. This is the first hint that something other than 
competence in science is required for care. 
! Others agree that competence is not enough. Berit Lindahl, for example, states, 
“Competence without compassion can be brutal and inhuman, and the reverse, 
compassion without competence, is meaningless or, at worst, dangerous” (Lindahl, 
Sandman, & Rasmussen, 2006, p. 897). I agree, but requiring compassion from the 
caregiver puts us back to relying on the presence and strength of an emotion in order to 
evaluate care. However Tronto has not overlooked the need for caregiving to be 
moderated, but relies instead on feedback from the care receiver. I will return to this 
later. 
! There are no standard requirements for competence in the caregiving task that is 
parenting, but the task is fairly well defined, and its success can be measure somewhat 
by the growth of the child. Likewise, there are no recognized standards for competence 
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in caring for a medically complex child at home; there are merely a minimal set 
expectations to be met prior to discharge from the hospital (Elias & Murphy (AAP), 
2012). As I have said, many feel that these are inadequate, and parents report feeling 
unprepared and uncomfortable with caregiving for months following discharge (Ray, 
2002). In Chapter Six, I will discuss the variety of tasks at which extreme caregivers 
must become competent, and the ways in which they acquire and frame that 
competence. 
! It is in this phase that I believe an analysis of extreme caregiving will begin to 
reveal significant, morally problematic differences from typical parenting. There is no 
precedent for requiring, acquiring, or maintaining the level of expertise these parents 
must achieve. The implication in guidelines, such as those provided by the AAP, is that 
competence can be gained easily by any parent, yet the full extent of the caregiving 
these parents are expected to carry out is rarely recognized. The only people completely  
aware of the level and types of competence needed to carry out extreme caregiving, I 
believe, are the parents who are doing it. Examining the way in which they expect 
themselves to be competent, think about their own competence, and eventually become 
competent, is a starting place for understanding what is required to be a caregiver. This 
might reveal valuable information, not just useful to prepare non-professionals to care for 
their medically complex children at home, but to understand the important task of 
caregiving for everyone who performs it. 
RESPONSIVENESS
! In the four phases of care, Tronto assigned the virtue of responsiveness to the 
fourth phase, care-receiving (Tronto, 1993). Yet while that responsiveness is certainly an 
aspect of care receiving, to best be demonstrated by the person requiring care, it often 
falls upon the caregiver to initiate it. I think it would be clearer to assign responsiveness 
right up front as an additional virtue required for caregiving, as well as for care receiving.
! Caregiving in medicine does not seem to me to be merely the competent 
maintenance of a patient’s physical health. Caregiving for a whole patient, as doctors 
and nurses have recently been asked to do, requires making a connection with another 
person. At its fullest, the caregiver interacts on a personal level with someone in need, 
responding to their emotional as well as physical needs. I suppose it is possible to 
identify responsiveness to emotional needs as a skill which the a moral caregiver must 
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learn to perform with competence. But interpreting a patient’s emotional needs as a part 
of treating them as a whole person, is quite a different process, and will require a very 
different sort of competence. 
! I am basing my inclusion of the virtue of responsiveness as a second facet of 
caregiving on three initial examples, which will serve to demonstrate how subtle and 
complex responsiveness can be. The first is Hilde Lindemann’s essay on “holding 
well” (Lindemann, 2009). Lindemann wrote about caring for patients (and family 
members) with dementia, and how a good caregiver will become a bridge to the past, a 
repository of memory of who the person used to be. Holding well “holds on to the 
demented person’s identity for him or her” (p. 416), bestowing or recognizing humanity 
by remembering the life story already lived. This is a type of responsiveness. 
! When their children are young, parents must also carry out a form of “holding 
well,” but they are holding a future for their child rather than remembering the past. The 
presence of a disability will unavoidably alter the anticipated future. Edward Verhagen, in 
a talk at ASBH last year, reported that advances in prenatal screening in the Netherlands 
have now made it possible to screen all infants for the of presence of spina bifida prior to 
birth. Parents with advance warning of this disability are able either to have an early 
abortion or proceed with full knowledge of the consequences of spina bifida. Verhagen 
called the decision to go ahead with the pregnancy, “accepting the child” (Verhagen, 
2012). All parents, by expecting and preparing for their child’s future, are bringing forth 
and in some way creating their child as a human being.  The parents who are able to 
accept a disabled child have been able to construct a different future for their child, a 
future which includes the disability.  
! The third example is from Francine Wynn (2002), who believes that one of the 
aspects of nursing is to give testimony to the life in the nurse’s care. The caregiver is 
witness to any suffering or injustice, and responds emotionally with her own distress. 
This act can maintain a patient’s humanity in the face of suffering. In Wynn’s example, a 
nurse holds a dying infant who has been abandoned as non-viable by doctors and 
parents. By witnessing the child’s death, she gives the life a story, however short, and 
confers it with humanity. However she also makes it possible to notice that a person has 
died, something which other caregivers were trying to deny. This is perhaps the ultimate 
in responsiveness, the bringing forth of a person (life?) by an act of caregiving (Wynn, 
2002, p. 128-129).
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 ! Wynn also discusses the work of Agamben, a philosopher who studied the 
Holocaust. He proposed a duality to consider human life; zoe and bios. Zoe, or mere life, 
is the biological process of life; a heartbeat, the physiologic maintenance of the body. 
This is the daily work of medicine. But there is also bios (as in biography, not biology), 
the idea that persons are writing themselves a life story, in which encounters with the 
medical system are chapters and the providers of medicine are merely characters. Bios 
is where humanity and personhood are found. The maintenance of zoe, mere life, can 
be accomplished with competence. But to provide care for the whole patient, a bios, 
requires responsiveness.
! But what is responsiveness but empathy and caring-as-emotion? Are we now 
back where we started, at an ethics of care requiring a virtue based in emotion to carry it 
out? This is the sort of ethic that has been dismissed in the past as inadequate, for some 
compelling reasons.
 ! Boyd has spoken against the reliance on compassion (and its resulting emotion 
of pity) alone in order to fill the needs of the vulnerable in a democratic state. He 
believes that pity “rests inexorably on a sense of difference, is fueled by an aversion to 
suffering, and is more likely to yield a world of ‘reluctant spectators’ than one of simple 
souls eagerly rushing to the aid of others” (Boyd, 2004, p. 519). His understanding of 
caring through the emotion he calls pity would strand us all in a state of voyeuristic and 
helpless attention. 
! Even the proponents of virtue ethics recognize its lack of perfection. Slote, in a 
2007 book encouraging the use of empathy as a virtue to measure ethical behavior in 
medicine, indicates that one of the problems with virtue ethics (an ethic of empathy) is 
that, like other abilities, empathy is not bestowed equally. Slote gives the example of 
setting empathic laws regarding hate speech. A law could be proposed wherein hate 
speech was defined as speech which emotionally harms another, which would then not 
be permitted as free speech. But any law administered which requires the determination 
of emotional harm is subject to the conclusions of the judge, who might not have the 
same priorities as were intended by the framers of the law. So laws requiring empathy-
based judgements rely heavily on a similarly empathic judge. Use of empathy as a rule 
could easily backfire, as different judges have different levels of empathy. Use of the 
emotion of caring to set moral standards could likewise backfire (Slote, 2007).
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! Noddings (1984) believes that caring can be taught, and possibly that is so. 
However the field of medicine is a long way from teaching empathy or caring as a part of 
the profession. Too often, in my experience, considering the “whole patient” is a 
shorthand for taking a social history, usually a minimal inquiry into things like marital 
status, risk-taking behaviors such as smoking, and drug use. Professional training in 
empathy usually involves training in the communication of information to patients, and its 
effectiveness is measured in patient compliance with instructions (Frank, 2002, p. 20). 
An example is a brief letter to Lancet promoting empathy in physicians, which argues 
that during primary care visits physicians miss opportunities to convey information 
because they do not recognize verbal cues from the patient called “potential empathic 
opportunity continuers” (Neuwirth, 1997, p. 606). The writer admits that there is no 
established way to train physicians to recognize and respond to these moments. He is 
quite convinced however that, if used properly, the patient will “feel understood,” and be 
less likely to be non-compliant.  
! Adding to this lack of empathy is the ideal of clinical detachment. Those who step 
beyond the social history and attempt to feel what the patient is feeling or imagine 
themselves in the patient’s situation, are felt to be in danger of loosing an objectivity 
necessary to the effective practice of medicine. A recent essay in the Lancet warns of 
this “dangerous practice of empathy,” saying that “full experience of mutuality or 
understanding is not possible” in the clinical setting (Macnaughton, 2009, p. 1940). 
Physicians who try to employ empathy and claim to feel what the patient is feeling, have 
no grounds on which to base that claim. They are in danger of a self-delusional 
misunderstanding of the very person they are attempting to relate to.
! In the same essay, Macnaughton states that physicians could have a 
“momentary mirroring of that patient’s feelings” which is a form of sympathy, not 
empathy. She concludes, “Doctors do not need to feel the distress of their patients 
themselves to do something about it. We may have a momentary mirroring of that 
patient’s feeling within us, but what we maintain is sympathy (feeling for not with the 
patient) and the need to respond” (Macnaughton, 2009, p. 1941). I agree that, if the 
physician or caregiver maintains that sympathy, along with a need to respond, complete 
empathy is unnecessary for good caregiving. If that sympathy becomes a form of 
openness or ethical attentiveness to the needs of the patient/care receiver, the response 
made is more likely to be appropriate. If the relationship between caregiver and care 
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receiver sustains that cycle of responsiveness, evolving over time, perhaps moral 
caregiving is being accomplished.
! But the phases of caring are not merely based on holding a proper emotional 
state, whether it is called empathy or compassion or pity. The attribute of responsiveness 
is based on emotion but also requires action. The results that it might engender in the 
cared-for could be observed, though our current ability to evaluate this is lacking. 
Certainly the scales that measure understanding of directions, or patient satisfaction, or 
patient compliance, are inadequate. Responsiveness is a cycle of perceiving need, 
responding to that need, then resetting the perceived need in response to that response. 
It is a feedback loop, always in the process of being perfected.  
 ! As a caregiving virtue, responsiveness must also be a mean between two 
extremes. It is once again not too difficult to define one extreme. Too little 
responsiveness will result in a sort of hard-heartedness, where patients are treated as 
interchangeable bodies harboring interesting diseases. (This can be done quite 
competently, I might add.) Too much responsiveness is more difficult to imagine, but it 
must be possible to be paralyzed in caregiving by too much emotional involvement. For 
medical providers, there likely is a level of emotional investment that would interfere with 
the ability to provide competent medical care. For parents and other family caregivers, 
this level of emotional attachment could take the form of complete engrossment in the 
other. This is not only potentially damaging to the self of the caregiver, who becomes lost 
in the other’s needs, but may have consequences for the care receiver as well. 
! Extreme caregivers whose children are, and will always remain, minimally 
responsive must by necessity uphold both sides of the responsiveness feedback loop. 
These parents are called on, essentially, to provide the responses to care that their child 
cannot. Over a lifetime, they might find it particularly difficult, to “hold well” the life story 
of their child. It may be possible for the caregiving relationship to create and maintain a 
person who does not exist, or who no longer exists. This is precarious territory, and I will 
return to it in Chapter Seven.  
! So the way now to further an ethics of care is to determine how best to express 
the virtue of responsiveness and how that might translate into good (and moral) 
caregiving. It will, like the other virtues, be a mean between extremes that have yet to be 
determined. I propose to do that through an analysis of the most extreme form of 
caregiving, the parenting of a multiply impaired child. These parents, whose lives are 
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lived almost totally as a response to their child’s disabilities, likely have much to teach us 
about the difficulties and consequences of responsiveness. 
A Word About Care-receiving
! Since I have moved the virtue of responsiveness to the realm of the caregiver, 
perhaps we need a new virtue for those receiving care. Assigning the virtue of 
responsiveness to the care-receiver was meant as a way to insure that care is offered 
rather than imposed, and to in some part reduce the vulnerability of the care-receiver to 
the caregiver.  Care ethicists recognize, as does Tronto, that, “To be in a situation where 
one needs care is to be in a position of some vulnerability” (Tronto, 1993, p. 134). “The 
vulnerable care-receivers face “dangers . . . at the hands of their care givers and other 
champions, who may come to assume that they can define the needs of the 
vulnerable” (Tronto, 1993, p. 135). Responsiveness is meant to equalize that 
vulnerability. 
! In situations where the care-receiver will not or is reluctant to be responsive, 
then, it is up to the care-giver to try to elicit a response. “The moral precept of 
responsiveness requires that we remain alert to the possibilities for abuse that arise with 
vulnerability” (Tronto, 1993, p. 135). However, there are care situations in which the 
care-receiver is unable to respond. It is easy to imagine a position so vulnerable that 
there is no ability to protest inadequate or unwanted care. Those protests will be heard 
only if the caregiver is willing to listen to them. It is clear that responsiveness as a virtue 
must be shared with, of not completely shouldered by, the caregiver.
! However, assigning any virtue to the care-receiver implies that there are some 
moral responsibilities to receiving care. A state of vulnerability cannot negate the ability, 
or completely forgive the necessity, to act morally. Certainly there are ways in which the 
care-receiver can undermine and make unpleasant the caregivers’ tasks, thus 
complicating their own need for care. These infractions could constitute a moral wrong 
that cannot be excused by the vulnerability that is part of the need for care.  
! I think the best virtue to assign to care-receiving is acceptance, a mean between 
denial of the need for care and demanding too much care. However, evaluating this must 
be outside the scope of this thesis. The children who are the care receivers in the 
situation of extreme caregiving are, for the most part, even less capable of moral 
decision making than other children of the same age. Many of them are unresponsive or 
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minimally responsive. Their ability to accept care cannot readily be evaluated or 
questioned. 
72
CHAPTER FIVE
THE BURDEN OF CARE: THE INVISIBLE WORK OF CARE
 
! Joan Tronto (1993), in establishing the four phases of care, assigned to each a 
virtue or actionable ethical component. So from the four phases of care--caring about, 
taking care of, caregiving, and care receiving--come the “four ethical elements of care: 
attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness” (Tronto, 1993, p. 127). 
These virtues are both ways of further defining just what is involved at each phase, as 
well as ways to explore how best to carry them out. Thinking about extreme caregiving 
by breaking it down into the four phases of care and their associated virtues will, I hope, 
begin to elucidate the nature as well as the moral consequences of this most difficult 
type of caring. 
! This chapter begins to evaluate extreme caregiving in the first two of Tronto’s 
phases, the least intimate levels. Since much of the work being done in these two 
phases is common with typical parenting, some of the territory will be familiar. These are 
also the two phases which are easiest to observe, so there is relevant information from 
several interview-based studies which uncover ethical concerns in pediatric home health 
care. Those studies have already enumerated several categories for concern, and I will 
use them also in my analysis.  
! The virtues associated with the first two phases are attentiveness and 
responsibility. Both of these are assumed to be present in the raising of typical children, 
and I believe they can be assumed equally to be present in the parents of special needs 
children. The main difference in these two phases is in the number of things the extreme 
caregiver must be attentive to and take responsibility for. The burden of care is larger, 
both in the amount of physical work required and in its emotional and psychological 
consequences. There is also a difference in the length of time this caregiving will be 
required.   
! The best information about the nature of the parent/caregiver’s responsibilities 
from the medical and ethical literature comes largely from the families of children who 
are dependent on technology in the home. Most of the papers in this field are concerned 
with discharge planning, providing tools for training the parents or analyses of the most 
cost-effective techniques. However a few papers, mostly from the nursing or ethics 
literature do provide insight into the burdens that this care imposes on families. 
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! I chose three papers that review family experiences with technology 
dependence, spanning two decades, one from 1998 (Kirk, 1998), one from 2002 (Wang 
& Bernard, 2002), and one from 2012 (Cockett, 2012). The issues described, while 
sometimes given different labels, are remarkably similar. I also chose several more 
recent papers presenting data based on interviews with families of technology-
dependent children. The children from these are mostly ventilator dependent, but cross a 
variety of syndromes and diagnoses. I have no doubt that all of the families interviewed 
were engaging in extreme caregiving. 
! Lynne Ray, in Alberta, Canada, interviewed 30 families of children with chronic 
health problems, who required a variety of durable medical equipment, from mobility 
aides to ventilators, specifically asking about the work required to give care to these 
children. Her study was published in the nursing literature (Ray, 2002). Also in the 
nursing literature, from 2005, is a study by Susan Kirk, in Manchester, UK. She 
interviewed the parents of 24 technology dependent children, again asking about their 
experiences performing this complex care. The children required one or more of the 
following technologies: home IVs, home dialysis, tracheostomy care, or home ventilation 
(Kirk, Glendinning, & Callery, 2005). This builds on an earlier review of the US and 
British literature about technology dependent families (Kirk, 1998). The only paper from 
the pediatric literature, though again carried out by nurses, is from 20086 by a group in 
Quebec, Canada, led by Franco Carnevale. His group interviewed 11 families of 
ventilator dependent children, concentrating on the families’ moral experiences with care 
(Carnevale, Alexander, Davis, Rennick, & Troini, 2006). The most recent paper, this one 
from the nursing ethics literature, was done by Dybwik et al., in Norway. This group used 
the content of earlier evaluations from focus groups and interviews involving families of 
ventilator dependent children, analyzing them for ethical issues (Dybwik, Nielsen, & 
Brinchmann, 2011). This is the only paper which found that the parents’ concerns 
matched neatly the four principles of bioethics. The concerns thus raised were centered 
only around the decision to provide home ventilation, and did not include the difficulties 
in actually carrying it out. I include the paper largely because they consider whether or 
not the parents truly choose to take on the burden of such care. 
! It has been noted that, since caring is traditionally women’s work, the largest 
burden of care often falls upon women and, as such, is relatively undervalued and 
underpaid (Noddings, 1994). This was not a theme of any of the research on technology 
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dependent children, where both fathers and mothers were interviewed (though there 
were more mothers than fathers), and there was no attempt to do separate analysis by 
gender. A review of the literature does mention that mothers were more likely than 
fathers to give up their jobs (Cockett, 2012), and there is an underlying assumption that 
mothers are doing most of the caregiving. However, I did not pursue more information on 
the gendered nature of extreme caregiving, nor try to explore the reasons why the 
narratives I found were largely written by men. 
! From the concerns raised by these papers, I chose a set of themes, which 
seemed to be the most common concerns of parents doing caregiving for a medically 
complex child. Most obvious is the physical burden of care, including the enormous 
amount of work required, multiple parental responsibilities, and the financial burden. 
Emotional concerns include ongoing grief, guilt and fear for the child’s health, as well as 
more subtle concerns: a lack of choice at taking on the care, social isolation, and 
ambiguity in the relationship with the child. 
! It is interesting that most of the concerns raised by the families interviewed for 
these papers were reflected in the autobiographies written by fathers doing extreme 
caregiving. This chapter will correlate common themes from research interviews with 
quotes from the narratives. I will also add anecdotal information gathered from patients 
in my pediatric practice, including an unpublished essay by Annette Jennings, the parent 
of a special needs child. (Jennings, 1995) This will serve both to illuminate the problems 
encountered in raising such children that have been identified thus far, and show that the 
narratives I have chosen are not fiction. While the autobiographers were free as 
narrators to exaggerate or understate their problems, none of what they express is 
outside the range of feelings or experiences reported by research on the families of 
technology dependent children. Those similarities exist also despite the fact that the 
researchers interviewed only families of technology dependent children and the 
narrators experienced children with different medical problems who were not, for the 
most part, dependent on any technology.    
THE PHYSICAL BURDEN OF CARE
! The first, and what should be most obvious, factor in extreme caregiving is the 
sheer amount of work required to care for children with complex medical problems, 
technology dependence, or intellectual disability. Researchers interviewing families of 
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technology dependent children described “physical overburden” causing parental 
burnout and exhaustion (Wang & Bernard, 2004), as well as a high amount of 
sleeplessness and sleep deprivation (Wang & Bernard, 2004; Kirk, 1998). In an earlier 
review of the literature about families taking care of technology dependent children at 
home, Kirk reports that, “sleep deprivation due to anxiety about the child’s condition, 
false monitor alarms or the need to remain vigilant over their child during the night” is a 
consistent theme (Kirk, 1998, p. 106). Lynne Ray describes ‘parenting plus’ where the 
normal work of infancy--feedings, dealing with night-time crying, and diaper changes--
extends years past the usual need. Her parents reported that they “were so busy doing 
things for their child that they didn’t have time to think about it” (Ray, 2002, p. 432). 
! Carnevale’s group, in researching the effects on the family of caring for 
technology dependent children, was able to recruit only twelve families, in part because 
the families contacted had difficulty scheduling time for the home interview required 
(Carnevale et al., 2006). This study concerned only children who received ventilator 
assistance at home. At the time, 38 families were registered with Quebec’s Program for 
Home Ventilatory Assistance, however only 15 families met the study criteria. Three had 
to be excluded due to “significant psychosocial issues in the home” (Carnevale et al., 
2006, p. e51). Another family refused to participate. Eleven families were able to 
schedule the initial interview, upon which the study was based, but only three of them 
had time to schedule a longer, in-depth interview. Those families reported that, “Virtually 
every aspect of their lives was highly complicated and frequently 
overwhelming” (Carnevale et al., 2006, p. e53).
! Carnevale et al. also noted that families with less ill children, those who did not 
require full time ventilation, or were able to receive support via face-mask rather than 
tracheostomy, were not significantly different or less distressed than those families 
whose children required full time ventilatory support via tracheostomy (Carnivale et al., 
2006, p. e53). This is a very small sample, and may not be relevant for other types of 
home health care, but it lends support to the idea that all families caring for medically 
complex children at home encounter similar significant problems.
! The sheer burden of work and sleeplessness involved in extreme caregiving is 
probably best described in the opening chapter of The Boy in the Moon, by Ian Brown 
(2011), whose son Walker, eight years old at the time, has a rare syndrome called CFC 
(Cardiofaciocutaneous Syndrome) . 
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! For the first eight years of Walker’s life, every night is the same. 
The same routing of tiny details, connected in precise order, each 
mundane, each crucial. . . 
! Tonight I wake up in the dark to a steady, motorized noise. . . 
Nnngah. Pause. Nnngah. Nnngah. . . It’s my boy, Walker, grunting as he 
punches himself in the head, again and again. . . .
! I count the grunts as I pad my way into his room: one a second. To 
get him to stop hitting himself, I have to lure him back to sleep, which 
means taking him downstairs and making him a bottle and bringing him 
back into bed with me.
! That sounds simple enough, doesn’t it? But with Walker, 
everything is complicated. Because of his syndrome, he can’t eat solid 
food by mouth or swallow easily. Because he can’t eat, he takes in 
formula through the night via a feeding system. The formula runs along a 
line from a feedbag and a pump on a metal IV stand, through a hole in 
Walker’s sleeper and into a clever-looking permanent valve in his belly, 
sometimes known as a G-tube, or mickey. To take him out of bed and 
down into the kitchen to prepare the bottle that will ease him back to 
sleep, I have to disconnect the line from the mickey. To do this, I first have 
to turn off the pump (in the dark, so he doesn’t wake up completely) and 
close the feed line. If I don’t clamp the line, the sticky formula pours out 
onto the bed or the floor (the carpet in Walker’s room is pale blue: there 
are patches that feel like the Gobi Desert under my feet, from all the times 
I have forgotten). To crimp the tube, I thumb a tiny red plastic roller down 
a slide. (It’s my favourite part of the routine--one thing, at least, is easy, 
under my control.) I unzip his one-piece sleeper, reach inside to unlock 
the line from the mickey, pull the line out through the hole in his sleeper 
and hang it on the IV rack that holds the pump and feedbag. Close the 
mickey, rezip the sleeper. Then I reach in and lift all 45 pounds of Walker 
from the depths of the crib. He still sleeps in a crib. It’s the only way we 
can keep him in bed at night. He can do a lot of damage on his own 
(Brown, 2011, pp. 1-2).
This is only a small part of the night time ritual, which takes another several pages. 
Brown and his wife have been doing it every night, taking turns, neither of them ever 
really getting a full night’s sleep, for eight years. The individual caregiving tasks that 
must be done, like the disconnection of the gastrostomy tube, are simple, but they are 
not always done in ideal conditions. The frequent need to perform each task, together 
with the need to deal with the consequences of any mishaps, add up to an enormous 
amount of caregiving work. And, of the various home technologies available, Walker’s 
gastrostomy tube is probably the least complicated. 
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! It does not require home medical technology to cause care to be time consuming 
and exhausting, however. Another child with CFC, Savannah, uses her GT tube only for 
medications and fluid supplementation during the day. At age 19 however, she is not 
toilet trained and frequently wakes at night. Her father rocks her to sleep every night at 
about eight, and wakes when she does at four AM, bouncing her in his arms 
continuously to keep her happy and quiet. Her mother stays up until about midnight 
catching  up on housework, in order to change Savannah’s diaper (and often bedding) 
before she becomes uncomfortable enough to wake up. Both parents are up again at 
six, to get Savannah ready for her day program at school. They are doing the type of 
caregiving that Lynne Ray called parenting plus (Ray, 2002). After nineteen years of it, 
they are both exhausted. 
! Another example of the work of caring for a special needs child comes from Ann 
Fadiman’s book about the cultural clash between American doctors and Hmong parents, 
caring for a child named Lia Lee, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down (Fadiman, 
1997). Though Lia Lee lived in a persistent vegetative state from age four through to her 
death in 2012 at age 30, her mother Foua rejected all technology. Lia was not tube fed, 
though any other child in the same state would be. At first Lia’s mother “squeezed 
formula into her mouth with a baby bottle” (Fadiman, 1997, p. 212). Later her mother 
pre-chewed food for Lia, or ground it up with a mortar and pestle, before putting it in her 
mouth. 
Every day Foua boiled quantities of a spinach-like vegetable called zaub, 
which she grew specially for Lia in the parking lot, and fed her the broth. 
Lia usually straddled Foua’s lap, her long legs sticking out on either side, 
while Foua, after putting her lips to the food to make sure it wasn’t too 
hot, coaxed tiny bites into her mouth. She always wiped Lia’s drool with 
her hand rather than with a napkin or a towel. “It takes a long time to 
eat,’”she told me [Fadiman] once, as she fed Lia rice. “You have to open 
Lia’s mouth to look inside, because if there is already rice in there and 
you put some more in, she might vomit it back out. You have to hold your 
hand in back of her neck all the time or she can’t swallow.” Then she 
laughed and kissed Lia’s ricey mouth (Fadiman, 1997, p. 217).
   
! Fuoa would not even use the expensive wheelchair provided, preferring to carry 
Lia everywhere in a “nyias,” a Hmong baby carrier, which she made herself. “It was 
perhaps the biggest nyias in Hmong history, since Lia was more than three feet tall and 
weighed thirty-six pounds,” says Fadiman (1997, p.  210). Lia slept with Foua instead of 
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in the hospital bed acquired with some difficulty by a social worker. “ ‘Lia always sleeps 
with us,’ Foua told me. ‘She is the only child who sleeps in our bed. I hold her during the 
night and we pat her feet all night long because we love her so much. If you don’t pat Lia 
on her foot or her knee, she cries a lot.’ ” (Fadiman, 1997, pp. 212-213). Lia’s mother, 
whose birth date in a hut in the mountains of Laos is unrecorded, was somewhere 
around fifty when Fadiman’s book was published, and seventy when Lia died. 
! Not only is extreme caregiving for these children an enormous task, but it looms 
as a lifelong burden. For many children, as with Lia Lee, the need for care does not 
diminish with time. For developmentally delayed or neurologically impaired children, 
increasing body weight poses an increasing burden, and daily chores such as diapering 
and bathing become more difficult. Carnivale says, “Several families expressed 
concerns about how their children’s needs would be met as they grew older, when the 
parents would eventually become less physically capable of caring for them” (Carnevale 
et al., 2006, p. e54).
! In 1986, my parents, who had become activists for the mentally retarded in the 
sixties, and who had always cared for my mentally retarded brother at home, returned 
briefly to politics. They found a state senator who seemed interested in the plight of 
aging parents of disabled children. (“Aren’t there group homes?” he asked. “Yes,” my 
mother reportedly replied. “And the only way I can get my son into one is by dying.”) 
With only word of mouth contact, within a few weeks they were able to compile for the 
senator a list of 300 “children” (as my mother called them; they were all at least 40) still 
living at home, all with parents over age 65, and all in the same small county on the 
edge of Philadelphia. Caregiving, particularly ‘parenting plus,’ does not come with 
retirement benefits.
MULTIPLE PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARE
! The caregiving burden carried by the parents of an intellectually disabled or 
medically complex child is actually more complicated than that described above. The 
work of feeding and diapering and maintaining technology are essentially nursing tasks, 
though done often under less than ideal conditions. Almost all of the researchers on the 
parents of technology dependent children reported that these parents carry on a number 
of other caregiving tasks that are less obvious. They become not only caregivers, but 
also care coordinators, case managers, advocates for their child’s specific medical and 
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educational needs, activists for the provision of special services, and secretaries in the 
complicated and time consuming game of paperwork required by insurances and social 
services. They must translate the care prescribed by medical providers into the reality of 
their lives. Carnivale et al. (2006) says, “Parents had to integrate the multiple, often 
contradictory, complex roles of caregiver, advocate, activist, educator, and case 
manager. . . . Parents were often faced with the challenge of complying with prescribed 
care while adapting its application to a more livable plan for the home context” (p. e53).
! They also are parents. The dual role of parent and caregiver is for many, 
particularly the parents of ventilator dependent children, one of the most difficult to fulfill. 
Susan Kirk reported on the specific difficulties encountered by these parents. The 
ventilator equipment is particularly intrusive, transforming the home into a medical space 
that operates round the clock. Home health care nurses or aides are often required, with 
the home becoming a public space often open to strangers. But perhaps the biggest 
factor distressing these parents was their nursing duties. Parents were required to do 
procedures such as suctioning which were clearly causing their child discomfort, 
conflicting with their parental role of protection (Kirk, 2005). 
! Those parent who do require help in the home find themselves learning another 
new skill set, care coordinator. Ray (2002) reports that some of the parents she 
interviewed were responsible essentially for the finding, hiring, and training of their home 
health care staff. They were “keeping time sheets, coordinating schedules, and 
essentially maintaining a pool of staff” (Ray, 2002, p. 429). In addition, particularly for 
medically complex children, parents must seek out and make appointments for the 
multiple doctors and therapists usually involved. It is not unusual for a child to regularly 
visit several specialists--one for each separate medical problem--as well as a variety of 
therapists. As a pediatrician, I once worked with a hospitalized child who had an 
unidentified syndrome that effected almost every bodily system. When I listed on her 
chart all of the specialists the child needed to visit, I had no problem coming up with 
fifteen different doctors. None of them were available in her tiny home town. In fact, they 
were spread between three different cities, all at least 100 miles away.
! Of course, all of those visits demand another responsibility, care management, as 
the availability of services must be discovered and paid for. Every visit comes with 
attendant insurance paperwork. Minnesota’s TEFRA program to provide supplemental 
insurance to disabled children requires a yearly update to assure the state once again 
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the child has not outgrown their permanent medical diagnosis, and is still in need of 
assistance. It takes 15 to 60 minutes of physician time, and far more than that for 
parents. 
! Advocacy is another responsibility that parents often find necessary to carry out. 
It is not unusual, in the rapidly changing field of medicine, for parents to learn about 
improved services or treatments that are not yet available for their child. The only way to 
achieve the best possible outcome for their child is to raise awareness, or raise money, 
or to start the service themselves. Charles Hart, author of Without Reason (1989), 
finding no community services after his son was finally diagnosed with autism in 1984, 
ultimately established his own parent support groups and parent workshops. A decade 
earlier, my father helped found a local chapter of the Association for Retarded Children, 
and later acted as president of a non-profit organization which established the sheltered 
workshop in which my brother still works. Both of my parents spent an enormous amount 
of time fighting for appropriate education, an effort which led to the Equal Opportunities 
Education Act passed in 1974.  
! And that Act has made possible the last of the multiple unexpected parental 
responsibilities, to become an educator. A mandate for appropriate education for all 
children does not mean that schools are automatically adopting every new service, nor 
that they make it easy for parents to obtain the services they believe will best benefit 
their child. The required Individual Educational Plans (IEPs) are produced at the cost of 
long hours of meetings, and are constantly in need of revision. It is not unusual for 
parents to have to visit the schoolroom regularly both to monitor the child’s comfort in a 
new environment, and to assist the teachers with complicated care.
!  Ray (2002) reports that all of the parents she interviewed “found that they had 
no choice but to become an advocate for their child” (p. 429), constantly intervening with 
health care professionals, home health care services, and educational services in order 
to obtain what they needed to meet their child’s needs. In addition, they often sought an 
understanding of their child’s illness. “Collectively, parents spent an extraordinary 
amount of time searching for information, people, and services.” (Ray, 2002, p. 429) 
Several parents reported that this activity took up as much as half of their caregiving 
time.
! Caregiving it seems, is not a full time job. It is three full time jobs. At least. 
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FINANCIAL BURDEN
! It is widely accepted, and would not be surprising to find, that families raising 
special needs children often encounter financial difficulties. This is mentioned in several 
of the papers on technology dependent children (Wang & Bernard, 2004; Kirk, 1998; 
Cockett, 2012), but is only reported as a broad generalization. And since those reports 
come from other countries--Canada, England, Australia--where universal health care is 
established, the difficulties encountered by the parents in their studies might be different 
from those encountered in the US. Though even in countries with universal health care, 
the additional expenses incurred by these families were felt to be significant (Cockett, 
2012).
! Information directly about families living in the USA is scant. Kirk (1998), writing 
from England, reported that in the US studies have shown as many as 40% of families 
experiencing financial difficulties (p. 108). This is corroborated by a survey done in 
Minnesota in 1998, on families receiving TEFRA, Minnesota’s supplementary health 
coverage for disabled children (Chan et al. (MDHDFH), 1998). The average annual 
medical cost for a child on TEFRA in 1998 was $35,000, of which only 77% was covered 
by various insurances. Families on TEFRA were spending about 11% of their income on 
medical care for their disabled children. (The average spent by families without a 
disabled child was 5.5%.) The expense of medical bills, home equipment, therapy, and 
home health care nurses will of course vary wildly depending on insurance coverage and 
diagnosis. But it can be assumed that this increased expenditure takes its financial toll 
on most, if not all, families doing extreme caregiving. 
! In addition, these numbers take into account only direct medical expenses; the 
indirect costs were not measured. For example, sixty four percent of the parents on 
TEFRA responded that their employment was affected in some way - with the most 
frequent response being "accepted a lower paying job with more flexibility or fewer 
demands" (Chan et al. (MDHDFH), 1998, p. 3). Cockett (2012) also mentions the 
frequent need for one parent of a technology dependent child to have to quit working, (p.
34), and Kirk (1998) adds that this is usually the mother (p.108). 
! But there are other, more deeply hidden expenses. Doctor and hospital visits are 
usually covered by insurance, but the travel expenses and the time taken off from work 
to get to them are not. Perhaps the large-sized diapers and the special formulas are 
covered, but not always. Special equipment is covered, though often with a waiting 
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period, but the simple things--safety locks needed well past the typical toddler years, 
gates that will keep a toddler in a seven year-old size body safe, toys that might interest 
an unreachable autistic child--are not. Wang & Bernard (2004) report, “equipment, 
pharmaceutical, electricity, telephone and transport expenses are potential financial 
burdens that are hidden within families” (p. 41) 
! These hidden costs have brought into question the overriding assumption that 
caring for these children at home is the most cost-effective way to provide care. To the 
medical system that enables the survival of technology dependent children, the expense 
incurred by these families is as invisible as the care the children require. Kirk (1998) 
states that home care of technology dependent children is in part motivated by evidence 
that suggests that home care reduces costs. She questions that evidence, however, 
suggesting that the financial, social, and emotional costs to families are not taken into 
account. She believes that most of the savings to insurance companies comes from “the 
substitution of parental for professional nursing care,” which comes at a high cost in 
terms of stress to parents” (Kirk, 1998, p. 104)
! Carnevale et al. (2006) do not question the assumption that home care is less 
expensive, but the group is also well aware of the costs to families. They recommend 
that a sustainable home care program “should require significant family supports in the 
way of salary support, provision of part-time assistance within the home, and the 
development of suitable respite services” (Carnevale et al., 2006, p. e59). Ray (2002) 
noted that, when these families are offered “support,” it often comes in the form of 
counseling or therapy, which for many families just adds another appointment to their 
already full schedule. She also recommends providing health care coordinators, 
informative internet databases, and measuring the actual hands-on work required (Ray, 
2002, pp. 435-6)
! In my personal experience, this financial burden has been a major factor. The 
two families with special needs children that I know well have both been in difficult 
financial straits for years. Both of the mothers had to quit their jobs shortly after their 
children were discharged from the hospital after prolonged and rocky neonatal courses. 
And both families have at some point been forced to declare bankruptcy, in part due to 
medical and home health care expenses. They also have experienced difficulty in 
acknowledging that they need financial help. Years before declaring bankruptcy, one of 
the mothers wrote this advice for other parents of special needs children:
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Aside from the difficulty of locating resources appropriate to your 
situation, difficulty may also be experienced in actually accepting 
assistance. As many of us like to think of ourselves as self-sufficient 
people who are in control of our lives, the realization that financial 
assistance from government programs for the disabled is necessary in 
order to meet the medical needs of our children can be devastating 
(Jennings, 1995).
 
! Financial difficulties were not a large part of the parenting narratives that I 
encountered, however. It is not clear whether they had no problems, or simply did not 
include them as part of their stories. Certainly the caregiving they were doing curtailed 
the careers of many of the parents, particularly the mothers. Josh Greenfeld laments 
“[t]he books I will not write, the paintings Foumi [his wife] will never paint . . .” (Greenfeld, 
1970, p. 169) because of caring for autistic Noah. Greenfeld’s wife, Foumi Kometani, 
worked on her writing at home, while doing the majority of the caregiving; Josh 
Greenfeld meanwhile found an office away from home. Charles Hart (1989) and his wife 
Sarah were both college professors when their autistic son Ted was born. She 
apparently continued with her job, but Charles Hart resigned from his job when Ted was 
eight “to become the primary homemaker, chauffeur, and resident child development 
specialist” (Hart, 1989, p.158). By the end of the book, he was working with state grant 
money to advocate for autism programs and research. He does not discuss the financial 
consequences of this.   
! Ian Brown and his wife had already hired a nanny named Olga to help with 
Walker’s older sister, while both he and his wife continued their writing careers. When 
Walker was born with CFC, they were fortunate that Olga was willing to stay, at least 
during the day, to help with him as well. Brown and his wife were on their own for their 
alternating sleepless nights (Brown, 2011). Philosopher Eva Kittay had a long-term 
caregiver Peggy, who took care of her mentally disabled daughter Sesha while she 
continued her career. After Peggy retired, Sesha was placed in a group home (Kittay, 
1999, pp. 147-161). I do not know where either Ian Brown or Eva Kittay found the money  
to pay their wonderfully dedicated caregivers. Neither philosophy books nor parenting 
biographies seem to me a reliable source of piles of money. 
! Greenfeld (1970), the father of autistic Noah, makes this cynical observation, 
“Indeed, the more I read about such children, the more I’m convinced, unfortunately, that 
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only money can solve most of the problems of having a child like Noah. That’s the 
damned truth of it. The more money I have, the less of a problem Noah becomes--I can 
hire out the problem to others. Have a crazy kid and get to understand the gut meaning 
of society” (p. 126). Ironically, Josh Greenfeld became quite famous for his books about 
Noah, in part paying for Noah’s treatments and care by writing about his problems.    
!  
SOCIAL ISOLATION
 ! Almost all of the papers on caring for technology dependent children mention 
social isolation as a concern reported by parents, and cite a number of different reasons 
why this is so. Ray (2002) mentions that families of chronically ill children become 
isolated as friends and even family members tend to drift away after initially offering 
support (p. 431). Wang and Bernard (2004) see social isolation as a failure of social 
services to provide adequate support (pp. 40-41). Kirk (1998) describes many families 
essentially becoming house-bound due to factors including parental exhaustion, difficulty  
finding respite care, and parent’s fear of leaving their child with complex problems to 
someone else’s care. She also mentions the intimidating nature of the changed home 
environment, taken over by medical equipment and home health care nurses (Kirk, 
1998, p. 105). Carnevale et al. (2006) mention an additional factor; the distance between 
friends and family can increase when other’s children grow up and move on to new 
things, while the disabled child remains behind, unchanged (p. e56). All these themes 
are echoed in the parenting biographies. 
! Loneliness and feeling trapped in the home was a common finding in a 1999 
study of Finnish families caring for severely impaired children, who were not all 
technology dependent. Brinchmann (1999) conducted long interviews in the homes of 
seven families who had faced ethical decisions in the NICU and were experiencing life 
with a severely disabled child, though two of the children had since died. The families of 
the surviving impaired children expressed ambivalence toward their past decisions, and 
had extremely stressful lives. Brinchmann described their predicament as “The home 
can seem like a prison, from which it is impossible to escape” (Brinchmann, 1999, p. 
137).
! Interestingly, one of the parent autobiographies also used the term prison, to 
describe his mother’s life with his autistic brother. Charles Hart (1989) is both brother to 
an autistic man, Sumner, and father of an autistic son, Ted. Sumner was born in 1929 at 
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a time when most parents chose to institutionalize their impaired children, but Sumner’s 
mother refused to do this. She lived her whole life for Sumner, rarely going outside, in 
order to shelter him from condescending eyes, and herself from the shame of bearing 
him. However, it was in part advancing arthritis and the consequences of lack of care for 
herself that made her home a prison, as her activities in her old age became restricted 
by illness. (Hart, 1989, pp. 123-124). She continued to watch over Sumner, both of them 
trapped in her home, until her death. 
! Hart’s mother’s difficulties with Sumner demonstrate an additional, more subtle 
aspect to the social isolation experienced by these parents. Even in these more 
enlightened times, parents feel the need to protect their children and themselves from 
the disapproving eyes of strangers. In Carnevale’s study in 2006, parents still reported 
feeling isolation from their families due to disapproval of their decision to keep their child 
at home. Another family with two impaired children reported avoiding public places like 
the mall because of their discomfort with the stares from strangers (Carnevale et al., 
2006, p. e56).
! Other parents describe the necessity to maintain appearances of normality, and 
thus establish their child’s presence in the world, by being very conscious of appearance 
and dress. Nearly every morning, my mother would send my “mentally retarded” (the 
politically correct term at the time) brother Paul back up to the bathroom to shave areas 
that he had missed on the first, or sometimes, second attempt. It was terribly frustrating 
for him, and mystifying to me. The spots he missed were essentially invisible next to his 
unsteady gait and slack mouth. But my mother insisted that his cleanliness reflected the 
adequacy of the care she was providing. She interpreted the stares of strangers as 
disapproval of both herself and her son. 
! McKeever and Miller (2004), in a review of three studies on body image in 
children with disabilities, noted that mothers reported investing a lot of time and effort 
into keeping their children not only meticulously clean but also fashionably and brightly 
dressed. They understand this as a way for parents to increase their child’s social worth 
by visual cues despite the obvious disability. (McKeever & Miller, 2004) It could also be 
seen as a way of bearing up under the stares, maintaining a personal wall against the 
guilt and embarrassment unavoidably engendered. 
! The stares of strangers are not without consequence. They can be reminders of 
the things that are put aside in order to get through the day. In many of the narratives, 
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there is a moment where watching normal children causes sadness and perhaps a bit of 
jealousy. Greenfeld (1970) describes a visit to friends with children the same ages as 
autistic Noah and his older brother Karl. He says, 
It’s getting painful to watch children grow past Noah. This afternoon we 
dined with some friends whose two-year-old son joined--or followed 
after--Karl and his older brother in play, while Noah just sat on the couch 
or in the corner, addressing his fingers and grinding his teeth. The same 
thing happened Thanksgiving Day. Other friends were over with their 
three kids. Their baby girl, a little thing, now talks, while Noah remains a 
baby (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 126).
 
! There is another aspect to the reluctance to appear in public. Those stares 
remind the parent of the disability, essentially breaking down the private world in which 
the child’s problems become the norm. Greenfeld (1970) describes an experience he 
has while touring special schools for Noah. This was in the early seventies, before the 
mandate to supply appropriate level education for all children. He finds a school for 
“retardates” of all ages, which has been established by a private community and arrives 
during a birthday party for an adult attendee. “Of course, they were all like children, 
those close-eyed, sweetly vacuous heads. I almost cried. I refused to imagine that Noah, 
my son, belonged in such a place, with such a group” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 74) He was 
not ready to include Noah with these similarly impaired people. Perhaps he also wasn’t 
ready to include himself in the company of parents of impaired children. 
 ! Ten years later, in the beginning of the book Without Reason, Charles Hart 
(1989) reports spending a lot of time apologizing or attempting to control embarrassing 
or inappropriate behaviors from his brother and, later, son. This was done both at home 
through behavior modification training and in public by rapidly withdrawing from 
potentially embarrassing situations. But neither Sumner nor Ted was equipped to notice 
public shame. They never saw or responded to the emotions of others. It is part of 
autism to be socially unaware. It is only late in the book that Hart realizes that he is 
doing this, not to protect them from humiliation, but to protect himself. “Protect Ted? 
Protect Sumner? Slowly I had to recognize that a sense of family shame made me want 
to hide them, protecting me from public judgment as surely as I tried to conceal them 
from their imaginary persecutors” (Hart, 1989, p. 264). That there is no need for such 
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shame, does not make the feeling any less real for him, or the isolating consequences 
any less difficult. 
! Interestingly, in the most recent of the parenting autobiographies, The Boy in the 
Moon, written in 2008, the author Brown claims not to be ashamed of his son in public. 
“The opinion of other people matters less and less the more you walk down the street 
with a boy whose lumpy looks attract attention, stares and smiles alike” (Brown, 2011, p. 
36). Brown’s isolation is more a reordering of priorities, a life suddenly different from 
what he had expected. He says, “The boy recalibrates the world. The crisis of so-and-
so’s unhappiness about her job or his inability to meet a woman who will pay him what 
he considers to be a sufficient degree of attention pales next to the crisis of how to stop 
Walker from beating his own brains out” (Brown, 2011, p. 36)
! Yet Brown is still isolated. Walker is too much work, too complicated, to leave 
with a babysitter. There is no nearby family, and he does not dare to ask the few friends 
who persist in offering help to spend a second night. And though he does not hide 
Walker from people, he is not entirely comfortable either. Walker is an intrusive child, 
ranging from person to person intruding but not exactly paying attention to them. “He 
was a steady reminder not just of his presence, but of the existence of all children like 
him, the children we so often try to forget. For this reason we tended to select our dinner 
guests carefully”  (Brown, 2011, p. 71). I suspect that the need for careful selection of 
friends and even family, is the most isolating aspect of raising any special needs child.  
EMOTIONAL BURDEN 
! In addition to the physical burden, it is almost universally understood that 
caregiving for any disabled or chronically ill child carries a heavy emotional toll. The 
parents of technology dependent children live in a state of constant vigilance, listening 
for alarms from equipment and monitoring for signs of serious illness. For the sickest 
children, fear of death or of finding their child dead is ever present (Kirk, 1998; Ray, 
2002; Wang & Bernard, 2004; Carnevale et al., 2006; Cockett, 2012) For those who are 
not quite so fragile, parents worry about what the future will bring, particularly if the child 
will be dependent on their care long-term (Carnevale et al., 2006). These fears and 
worries contribute to chronic anxiety, sorrow, sleeplessness, high levels of stress, and 
depression (Wang & Bernard, 2004). Also present are frustration, anger, and guilt. (Kirk, 
1998)
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! All of these emotions are evident throughout the parent narratives (Greenfeld, 
1970; Hart, 1989; Brown, 2011), often running together in a tangled mix. Though the 
children were not technology dependent, so there was no need to listen for alarms or live 
in constant fear of death, there was no less need for vigilance. Ted Hart and Noah 
Greenfeld needed to be watched for behavior outbursts, and Walker Brown for self-
injury. Only Walker was medically fragile, but all of the parents felt worry, fear, and 
anxiety, both while they were going through the difficult process of diagnosis and once 
their fears were confirmed. There was a good deal of frustration and anger in this 
process as well; directed at the medical establishment’s inability to provide an 
explanation or a cure, and at themselves for their own inability to save their children. All 
of them worried frequently about what their child’s future would hold.
! But the most present and unexpected emotion was guilt, and it is here that the 
parents narratives hold understanding that the research does not. Their guilt was in part 
over imagined inadequacy in caregiving. Josh Greenfeld (1970), for example, found that 
he was somehow unable to perform much of the caregiving for Noah. He alternately 
reported guilt, feeling a failure at fatherhood, resentment toward his wife and Noah, and 
admiration for his wife’s caregiving abilities. Brown (2011) and his wife, though they 
shared some duties, also frequently argued about how much responsibility each was 
taking. Brown (2011), Greenfeld (1970), and Hart (1989) each had a second, typical 
child, and also expressed guilt about the time they spent on caregiving being taken away  
from the well sibling. 
! They also expressed guilt about the nature of their child’s disability. This was 
particularly true for Greenfeld (1970) and Hart (1989), since their children were 
diagnosed during a period of time when autism was felt to be an emotional disturbance 
brought about by bad experiences or poor parenting. As they progressed through a 
series of understandings about the diagnosis and cause of their sons’ problems, they 
alternately accepted and rejected blame. For example, a popular theory of autism at the 
time Noah Greenfeld was diagnosed, was that the problems were caused by maternal 
emotional detachment. The Greenfelds both felt guilty because they had not really 
wanted the pregnancy. But at other times, Greenfeld and his wife adopt other things to 
blame; vitamin deficiency, a mild head injury, and even genetics, arguing about whose 
genes are responsible for Noah’s problems. (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 51-52)
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! Brown (2011) is the most articulate about his feelings of guilt, even as he knows 
he did nothing to cause his son’s CFC syndrome. He speaks about the sadness, envy 
and guilt he feels when he inevitably compares his son to other CFC children, 
particularly if their children are less effected than Walker. Perhaps that other child’s 
parents were better somehow; perhaps they were luckier, or more committed, or 
discovered some rare treatment that Brown did not, or implemented a new treatment in 
some earlier or more effective fashion. He reports that, “Every parent of a compromised 
child knows this secret envy, mines its thick seam of guilt” (Brown, 2011, p. 125). He also 
expresses a surprising amount of guilt that stands against all of the scientific evidence 
he collects about Walker’s condition. He says, “Even a firm diagnosis cannot clear away 
the ancient sense of culpability that has been attributed to these random genetic events 
for literally thousands of years--the lingering swamp notion that there is always a reason 
such a disability occurs, that it is a punishment, and thus deserved” (Brown, 2011, pp. 
122-3). I doubt that he is alone in that lingering, archaic feeling, irrational though it might 
be. 
LACK OF CHOICE
! In a 1992 paper on the ethics of pediatric home care, John Lantos reaffirms the 
central ethical principle of autonomy, however in pediatrics it is the autonomy of the child 
that is conserved, not that of the parent. He states the well-known and common position 
that, “[T]he central ethical principle which guides decision making in pediatrics is that 
decisions should reflect the best interest of the child” (Lantos, 1992, p. 922). It is therefor 
paramount that any decision to discharge a child to home care be clearly in the child’s 
best interest, and any ethical qualms center around establishing the home as the best 
place for the child. “On one hand, if home care is both cheaper and more beneficial for 
the child than long-term hospitalization or institutional care, it would seem to be ethically 
imperative. However, the benefits of home care are uniquely sensitive to the 
voluntariness of parental participation.” (Lantos, 1992, p. 922) The families must then 
understand what they are getting into, meet established competence standards, and 
agree on the goals of home care. However, while Lantos does state that the child’s 
needs must be balanced against the family’s needs and that parents should not be 
judged unacceptable if they are unable or unwilling to carry out home care, he does not 
explore the nature of the “voluntariness” of the parental decision.
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! Not all ethicists agree that the interests of the child (or the patient) always must 
always be paramount. Speaking about both pediatric and adult patients requiring home 
technology, Arras (1994) argues that the interests of other family members should also 
be taken into account. He says, “the systematic exclusion of the interests of family and 
friends who provide care at home is untenable and unjust” (Arras, 1994, p. s24). He 
feels that parents, when asked to provide home care, are not really allowed to refuse, 
lest they be seen as uncaring or bad parents. “When asked by trusted pediatrician 
whether they would like to have their chid go home, parents have no choice but to 
accept the burden of home care” (Arras, 1994, p. s22). Parents also see that there are 
no viable alternatives to home care; few options for long-term hospitalization or long-
term care facilities. Arras states, “Unless families have access to such alternatives, their 
initial acceptance of the home care plan becomes a trap from which there is no practical 
escape” (Arras, 1994, page s25). 
! The ethical dilemma has not been resolved in the years since then. In a 2011 
study of the ethical challenges of home mechanical ventilation, much of the debate was 
still found to rotate around the decision to discharge the child from the hospital to home 
care (Dwybik et al., 2011). Major concerns included who should make the decision to 
provide home mechanical ventilation (HMV), the appropriate medical indications for 
HMV, the cost effectiveness of HMV, and whether HMV was in both the patient’s and 
families’ best interests. There was a particular concern raised by the families of pediatric 
patients, as some of the families interviewed in the study were not sure they had made 
the right decision to have a child on HMV at home. The parents “asked themselves 
whether they made the right decision, but in reality, they did not have other choices if the 
alternative was to let their child die” (Dwybik, 2011, page 240). It is possible that the 
children included in this study, most of whom had a progressive neurological disease, 
were being offered HMV as a life-extending therapy in the face of death. Therefor home 
care would have other ethical aspects not relevant to other disabled children.
! However, in other studies where the children did not necessarily have terminal 
illnesses, parents have expressed similar sentiments. Several of the parents in 
Carnevale’s (2006) study of the families of technology dependent children also 
expressed that they felt they’d really had no choice but to take on the burden of care. 
“Many parents described the strangeness that they experienced with regard to ‘making a 
decision,’ as if there were really a choice when faced with life support decisions. Most 
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parents believed that when the alternative is to let your child die, ‘free choice’ is really a 
virtual choice and not a true choice” (Carnevale et al., 2006, page e53). Here, too, it 
seems that, at least in the parents’ perceptions, the decision was between home care 
and death.
! Once the child is at home, and the true nature and amount of care required is 
finally realized, the parents do not have an opportunity to reverse their decision. With the 
absence of alternative placement and respite care, parents are on their own. Many of the 
parents in Ray’s (2002) study of the parents of chronically ill children reported that they 
were “so busy doing things for their child that they didn’t have time to think about” what 
they were doing (Ray, 2002, p. 432). They became accustomed to the demanding work 
load. Any choice was framed as between “falling apart” or “getting on with the 
show” (Ray, 2002, p. 433). They just kept going, because there was no alternative. 
Parents in Brinchmann’s (1999) study of severely impaired NICU survivors came to a 
similar conclusion. All of them at some point had been offered a chance to stop 
treatment while in the NICU. Several reported that they now regretted their decision, but 
as Brinchmann puts it “One cannot decide against something one already 
has” (Brinchmann, 1999, p. 141). 
! The children of the narrators of parenting biographies are not technology 
dependent, not as critically ill, and (with the exception of Walker Brown) not as disabled 
as the children of the families studied by Dwybik et al. (2011), Carnevale et al. (2006), or 
Brinchmann (1999). Caregiving is not at any point a life or death decision for them. 
Nonetheless, the caregiving that they take on is not fully voluntary. Josh Greenfeld 
(1979), for example, on several occasions associated with events that had been 
particularly trying, considers putting Noah in an institution. At the time this would have 
been understood as putting him into a precarious care situation, both out of sight and out 
of mind. So, after a day of no progress, and some regression in toilet training, he says, 
starkly, “Perhaps we ought to get rid of Noah. No, that would no solve anything. There 
are always demanding madnesses in one’s life. No, that’s a madness too: to make of 
Noah a metaphor. But as Noah gets old . . .” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 107). He does not 
consider institutionalization a reasonable choice, and so sees no way out of doing the 
caregiving that will become more difficult as Noah gets older. 
! Ian Brown (2011) has a similar realization, and a better metaphor. Early in the 
book, when Walker is still an infant, fussy and not eating properly, but not yet diagnosed 
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with CFC, his father takes him to see his pediatrician. Unknown to Brown, the 
pediatrician is aware that Walker has a major syndrome, but has not yet identified it. He 
says to Brown, “We do want this child to live, don’t we?”  Brown’s answer, recounting the 
experience in the writing of the book, is: 
I decided it was a rhetorical question. . . Even if he had asked it outright, I 
can’t imagine my answer would have been anything but yes. All the 
ethical theorizing in the world can’t change the pressures of the moment: 
the squalling baby on the examining table, his distended stomach, the 
doctor’s obvious concern, his father standing gormlessly by. The call of 
the physical child and his need. . . 
! Criminal thoughts, or at least outlandish ones: what if we don’t 
take extraordinary measures? What if he gets sick and we don’t work so 
hard to get him better? Not murder, just nature. But even as I considered 
these grave plans, I knew I could never enact them. I’m not bragging; my 
hesitation wasn’t ethical or moral. It was a more medieval urge, instinctual 
and physical; fear of a particular mode of failure, fear of retribution if I 
ignored the dull call of his flesh and his body and his need. 
! In any event I felt like an ox slipping into its yoke. I could feel the 
heavy tragic years coming on ahead of me, as certain as bad weather 
(Brown, 2011, p. 26). 
Brown likely speaks for all of the parents here. Extreme caregiving is not really a choice, 
but a necessity springing from a sort of instinctual parental duty. It is a combination of an 
ancient response of a parent to a child’s need, and a modern expectation of how parents 
should behave. Though he might be tired and sad, he is mostly willing to take up the 
burden demanded of him, because the care of this particular child has fallen to him and 
no one else is available to respond to the many needs.
AMBIVALENCE
! The same uncertainty expressed above as a lack of choice in taking on the 
burden of care is also found in parents’ ambivalent feelings toward their disabled child. 
Several of the papers on caring for medically complex children at home contain brief 
summaries of the ambiguity of the emotions that parents sometimes reported.
! Brinchmann (1999) described the impossible situation she found in families living 
with a severely disabled child, and believed that ambivalence in the parent’s 
relationships to their children was a major theme in the interviews she conducted. She 
stated, “The children are utterly dependent upon their parents, who both love and hate 
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their children. . . The parents lack relief from the situation. . .  This and their total 
dependence create strong bonds between them, including an experience of love and 
adoration. Every day is full of contrasts, full of both sorrow and sadness, but also of love 
and happiness” (Brinchmann, 1999, p. 141). 
! Some of that ambivalence was expressed as regret, but that too was 
inconsistent. “Even though several of these parents maintained that they would have 
had an abortion or terminated the treatment for their chid if they had known how serious 
the handicap was going to be, they still expressed that their lives with these children had 
given them something positive, something precious, which they would not have 
experienced otherwise” (Brinchmann, 1999, p. 141). Despite the feeling of being trapped 
in the home as in a prison, one mother reported, “losing her would be so much more 
emotionally painful than the burden of having her” (Brinchmann, 1999, p. 141)
! Carnevale et al. (2006) found this same ambivalence in the families of children 
on home ventilators. The title of the paper is, “daily living with distress and enrichment,” 
highlighting the impression that the parents were balancing a complex tension between 
the two emotions. The sources of distress--the worry, fear, isolation, and burden of 
work--have been discussed above. But the parents also reported “deep enrichments and 
rewarding experiences that they could not imagine living without” (Carnevale, et al., 
2006, p. e53) They might regret the life that they find themselves living, but they cannot 
alter it. And that life does hold rewarding moments and love for the child. “Some parents 
said that they sometimes asked themselves whether they made the right decision, but 
this was commonly resolved by realizing that life without their child would be 
unthinkable” (Carnevale et al., 2006, p. e53)
! It should not be surprising to find that parents who find themselves trapped in a 
lifetime of care are at times experiencing conflicting emotions. During the brief times that 
they surface from the daily round of care work, they can realize that there is seemingly 
no end to the burden they have taken on. In the absence of adequate respite care and a 
dire shortage of long term care facilities, the parents of a child who might never become 
independent will realize that the only way out of their burdens is death, either the child’s 
or their own. Both are unthinkable. 
! But they are not un-thought. My father had a fantasy, that he confessed to me on 
several occasions over about twenty years, of a way to solve the problem of my mentally  
retarded brother’s care. He and my mother were finding it increasingly difficult to care for 
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Paul, and they did not want to have to burden anyone else with it. His fantasy was that 
he would go for a drive with Paul and, at a place where it was likely to be fatal, just drive 
off the road. They both would be killed in the fiery wreck. Problem solved! He was quite 
serious, and I was never entirely sure he wouldn’t do it. But as much as he might have 
wanted to release us all from the burden, and himself from the guilt, he never took that 
final drastic solution.
! Charles Hart in Without Reason (1989), has a similar plan when he first learns 
that his child Ted is “brain damaged.” (The diagnosis of autism does not become clear 
until years later.) Hart knows of the life of “humiliation, grief, and frustration” (Hart, 1989, 
p. 44) that can be expected, because his experiences with his own brother, Sumner, who 
likewise suffered from this yet unidentified problem. He says, “Our child had ceased to 
be a source of hope and pride. Instead he had become a source of pain, a burden that 
would grow greater with time. I immediately foresaw the worst, Ted growing 
unmanageable and unkempt, disfigured and rejected by society” (Hart, 1989, p. 44). But 
Hart, like my own father, had a solution. “A plan formed in my mind. We could take a ride 
on one of our state ferries. When the ship cruised into the deep waters of Puget Sound I 
would hold my son close to me and jump overboard. Our suffering wouldn’t last 
long . . .” (Hart, 1989, p. 46). Yet Hart’s love for his son is undeniably present throughout 
his book. 
! Josh Greenfeld, the father of autistic Noah, does not express a murder/suicide 
fantasy in A Child Called Noah (1970), but he does admit, “There’s simply no way out. I 
must confess something: sometimes I hope Noah gets sick and dies 
painlessly” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 139). However, Noah’s brother Karl has recently written 
his own memoir about growing up with Noah. In Boy Alone, Karl Taro Greenfeld (2009) 
reports that his father, in both conversations and interviews, did talk about killing Noah. 
According to Karl, Josh Greenfeld’s scenarios did not include suicide, and mostly 
involved allowing Noah to fall overboard from a boat. Later, as Noah became older and 
more difficult to control, Josh Greenfeld publicly advocated euthanasia for severely 
autistic people. But, Karl points out, “But you see, my mother and father love Noah as 
any parents love their son” (K. Greenfeld, 2009, p. 219). Karl adds later, “My father used 
to tell me that he talked and wrote about killing Noah because that meant he could never 
do it, that the confession and motive were already there, on tape, in his books, so he 
could never get away with the crime” (K. Greenfeld, 2009, p. 338). 
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! Ian Brown (2011) is even more inventive than either Hart or Greenfeld, and 
seemingly willing to confess about almost anything. He has several pages of fantasies 
about a way out for Walker and himself.
On especially difficult nights, or if it rained hard, or most of all after the 
terrible arguments my wife and I sometimes had, strained by 
sleeplessness and ashamed of our failure with this strange boy, I asked 
myself if it might not be braver to take my life, and to take Walker with me. 
Suicide is not my default setting. But the hopelessness of life ahead, 
caring for Walker, could raise the spectre in me. There was chloral 
hydrate; there were pills. There was the car, there were places to drive 
the car off of, there were lakes to walk into (Brown, 2011, p. 223).
 
One of my secret death fantasies was to pack Walker into a baby 
backpack I owned, a kind of Snugli, and take him high up into the 
mountains of western Canada in the winter, one of my favourite places on 
earth, and lie down in a snowbank, and end it there, quietly 
hypothermically. I imagined the venture in complete detail, how I would 
pick a moment when Johanna [his wife] was at a movie and Hayley [his 
daughter] was at school, how I would get him out of the house and to the 
airport, with all his gear and all the ski equipment. Unfortunately that 
alone derailed my death fantasy: if I could get through that fucking 
nightmare, the airport with Walker and skis, I could survive anything, and 
there was no need to kill myself (Brown, 2011, p. 224).
 
The second plan is worrisome in its precision and detail, but, of course, Brown does not 
carry out any of it. I think it is interesting that even his fantasy suicide pact falls apart 
because he is just too tired from the daily round of caregiving. Not only would carrying 
out the plan be too much work, but the ability to carry it out would prove that the 
caregiving can be done after all. Instead, he resigns himself, not just to keep going, but 
to keep trying to make for himself a life outside of Walker’s needs. 
! Yet he finds joy in Walker also. On one of those dark nights, exhausted, he falls 
down the steps while carrying Walker. Walker thinks it’s hilarious. Brown says, “He 
laughed. Loved it. And so, I did too. He took me into darkness but he was often the way 
out as well” (Brown, 2011, p. 226.) His love for Walker is palpable, and wrenching. Early 
in the book, just after the nightmarish night wakening quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, Walker falls asleep in Brown’s arms. Brown says, “I long for the moment when 
he lets his crazy, formless body fall asleep against me. . . Sometimes I think this is his 
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gift to me--parceled out, to show me how rare and valuable it is. Walker, my teacher, my 
sweet, sweet, lost and broken boy” (Brown, 2011, p. 7). 
! That is the ambivalence of daily living with distress and enrichment. 
 ATTENTIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY
! I have said that, in Tronto’s (1993) theories of care, the first two phases of care, 
caring about and taking care of, are associated with the virtues of attentiveness and 
responsibility. We have seen that parents who are extreme caregivers, while likely no 
more attentive or responsible than parents of typical children, do have many more things 
that they must be attentive to and take responsibility for. 
! Having undertaken the task of extreme caregiving, it becomes an expected, if not 
fully accepted, part of life. The many things that require attention become part of the 
daily routine. The responsibility has been, perhaps unknowingly, accepted. Ian Brown 
(2011), in another passage from The Boy in the Moon, talks about the way in which 
Walker’s care has become integrated into his life. 
Gradually, as the endless routine of caring for him and watching him and 
stopping him and stimulating him became familiar, my fear subsided, and 
my grief was transformed into an unusual loneliness. Life with him and life 
without him: both were unthinkable. As much as I tried to consider 
alternatives, I couldn’t imagine not caring for him every day: couldn’t 
imagine a day without the morning wake-up, the cleanup, the dressing, 
the school, the return home, the tired wailing, the sudden change and the 
bursts of sunny happiness, the feeding, the pointless teaching, the hilarity, 
the hospitals and doctors, the steady worry, the night rambles, all 
repeated every day until it ended, however that happened (Brown, 2011, 
p. 68).
Parents everywhere find themselves making similar adaptations to the presence and 
needs of their children. However the parents who are extreme caregivers have so many 
more needs to adapt to. Notice also that Brown has realized, not only that there is no 
good way out of the daily grind of caregiving, but that the task is essentially unending. 
Walker’s death or banishment to an institution are both unthinkable, as is continuing the 
enormous task of caring for him on a daily basis. In the last sentence, he shies away 
from thinking about the future. It is clear that Walker’s needs will not go away, and that 
Brown will not be able to fill them forever, but the conditions upon which the caregiving 
might stop are not imaginable.
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! Josh Greenfeld (1970) has a similar recognition of both the difficulty and 
endlessness of the caregiving. He also shoulders the burden and the unknowable future 
together, out of his enduring love for his son. “July 19, 1969: We will do what we have to 
do. We will take care of him [Noah] as best we can until we can no longer take care of 
him. We will have him in our home and find ways to live in joy with him. And when we 
cannot enjoy him as much as I would like to, I will love him even more.” (Greenfeld, 
1970, p. 60) Taking on the endless burden of care is not really a choice when love or 
duty permits no other course of action.
! The lack of choice in taking on the additional burden of extreme caregiving raises 
a moral question that within principle ethics would be considered by balancing parental 
autonomy and choice, against the civic duty of a parent to protect the vulnerable child. 
These parents are in many ways being forced into caregiving which they neither 
expected nor chose to do. But the existence of the child is undeniable, and the 
vulnerability of his need seems to supersede the desires of the parent. In this model, the 
parents truly are, as the parent/narrators often express, condemned as guilty for the 
child’s problems. It is their fault the child exists, and so they must deal with the 
consequences.
! The question can be considered in a different way with virtue ethics. If, as Tronto 
(1993) has proposed, attentiveness and taking responsibility are virtues associated with 
the first two phases of caring, they can be considered as Aristotlean virtues. These 
qualities, then, can be achieved by aiming for a balance between two extremes. Perhaps 
attentiveness can be balanced between inattentiveness and over-indulgence; 
responsibility between irresponsibility and over-commitment. Clearly these parents are 
taking both virtues to the maximum extreme. They are spending their lives monitoring 
their children’s needs, attentive to too many things. And they have taken responsibility 
for far more than they can accomplish. They have subsumed their own lives and 
concerns in the needs of their children, put aside too many of their own needs and 
desires. 
! Yet their children have needs, many and complex, and no one else will meet 
them. The ethical fault here lies, I think, not with the parents, but with the medical system 
that creates and then ignores all but a few of these children’s needs, and with a society 
that does not value or recognize care. This paper is in part an attempt to, as Lynne Ray 
puts it in the title of her 2002 paper, “make visible the invisible work” of caring for these 
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children. Once the work is made visible, it is apparent that these parent caregivers 
themselves need support and care. 
! Within Tronto’s (1993) phases of care, there is no necessity for all of the phases 
to be carried out by a single individual caregiver, be it nurse or physician or parent. 
There is no reason to make the parents of special needs children compromise 
themselves in order to carry out every part of the task of caring for their children. This is 
not, then, a failure on the parent/caregiver’s part; it is a societal failure of attentiveness. 
Likewise, these parents are not failing in their responsibility; we as a medical system 
have not taken on the responsibilities that we have created. We are not paying sufficient 
attention to the needs of either the child or the caregiver, nor taking sufficient 
responsibility for the care of the children whose existence is made possible by modern 
medicine. 
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CHAPTER SIX
COMPETENCE
! In the previous chapter, I reviewed the ways in which parenting a child who 
requires extreme caregiving differs from typical parenting, considering mostly the first 
two phases of care: ‘caring about’ and ‘taking care of.’ The virtues associated with these 
two phases--attentiveness and responsibility--are similar to what is expected from all 
parents, though the level of attentiveness and number of responsibilities is certainly 
greater. I have already begun to explore the third phase, caregiving, by discussing both 
the overwhelming burden of the caregiving work that must be done and its involuntary 
nature. 
! However I have not considered the implications of the virtue assigned to the third 
phase; competence. Of course, all parents are expected to competently care for their 
children, and the parameters of that competence are fairly well defined. There are 
certainly parents of typical children who do not provide competent care, and the moral 
problems raised by this are much discussed in both pediatric and ethics literature. The 
parents of disabled and medically complex children, however, must be competent 
beyond the realm of typical parenting. They must acquire a new set of skills, crossing 
into areas usually reserved for professionals.   
! Within Tronto’s (1993) theory of care, competence becomes a moral action that 
can be evaluated by its effectiveness at meeting needs. If the actions of caregiving are 
done incompetently, the care provided is inadequate. “Intending to provide care, even 
accepting responsibility for it, but then failing to provide good care, means that in the end 
the need for care is not met” (Tronto, 1993, p. 133). Competence from a professional 
caregiver is, at least in some degree, trainable and measurable. Medical schools and 
nursing programs are all about establishing competence, though they concentrate on 
certain areas over others. The skills and knowledge taught are centered on the science 
of medicine; the tracking and measuring of physical and biological properties, the 
workings of anatomy and physiology, the understanding of biochemistry and 
pharmacology, and the physical skills to perform medical and nursing procedures. These 
things are easily measured by exams and licensing boards, and are the basis upon 
which the practice of medicine, nursing and other medical professions are established.
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! Tronto (1993) goes on to say that “good care becomes impossible” (p. 133) if the 
care is assigned to incompetent caregivers, and places fault for the poor care on both 
the inept caregiver and the organization that assigned the unqualified person to do the 
care. If those organizational ‘carers for’ deliberately assign an inadequate caregiver, they  
have deserted their virtue of taking responsibility.
  ! But how are we to measure of competence in the parent caregiver? And who is 
to take responsibility for the appropriate carrying out of their work? There is of course no 
formal training or preparation even for typical parenting. The majority of parents are not 
trained in medicine or nursing, nor do they need to be. The burden of extreme caregiving 
falls on some parents at random, through accidents of genetics or disease or injury. We 
cannot expect to hold these parents to the same standards as we do trained medical 
providers, and yet we have seen the variety of skills that they are routinely called on to 
perform. They take on these new tasks--handling complicated medical equipment, 
advocacy, educational planning, tracking appointments and medications, and sheer 
persistence in handling persistent physical and behavioral needs--out of necessity, 
because there is no one else to do it. 
! Our expectation that anybody should be able to do this raises questions within 
Tronto’s (1993) phases of care about how we should consider competence as a moral 
issue. In my experience, parents who are for any reason unable to perform complex care 
are treated as inadequate, their failures sometimes taken as evidence for lack of caring 
(if not child abuse). An example is the experience of Lia Lee’s mother, Foua Yang, in The 
Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down (Fadiman, 1997). For Lia’s first few years, doctors 
saw Foua’s initial reluctance to give Lia seizure medications as a sign of lack of 
education and incompetence. When Lia continued having seizures, it was assumed that 
the mother has once again failed in her ability or willingness to administer the 
medications. This assumption caused her doctors to miss other possibilities, ultimately 
with disastrous results. The author of the book, Anne Fadiman (1997), poses this as a 
cultural clash but, while there are indeed cultural barriers, this sort of misunderstanding 
between doctor and patient is not unique to Hmong parents. Unwillingness or inability to 
comply with doctor’s orders, for any reason, is often assumed to be a sign of parental 
incompetence. 
! In his review of the parents of technology dependent children, Kirk (1998) found 
that there were often misunderstandings and disagreements between parents and 
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physicians. Kirk reported that, “ . . . parents experience contradictory expectations as 
they are asked to become sophisticated health care experts and have responsibility for 
their child’s care but at the same time they are still expected to defer to, and comply 
with, the advice they receive from professionals” (Kirk, 1998, p. 111). She reported also 
that, as parents gained knowledge and experience, they became more assertive, and 
professionals often began to either avoid them or try to pressure them into compliance 
with advice. In my experience such disagreement is likely to center on a parental 
misunderstanding of medical science, and non-compliance is often framed as parental 
incompetence. 
! Parental ability is likewise often overlooked. Again, Lia Lee’s mother (Fadiman, 
1997) provides an example, by the way in which her caregiving abilities are ignored. 
Foua took Lia home from the hospital after a complicated course of seizures and 
overwhelming sepsis, still febrile and with medical experts expecting her to die within a 
few days. But under her mother’s care, no longer dictated by experts, Lia’s condition 
stabilized. (Unfortunately neither her modern pediatric specialists nor her Hmong spirit 
doctors had a treatment for the resulting persistent vegetative state.) Later, her doctors 
spoke of Lia in the past tense, as though she were dead (Fadiman, 1997, p. 256) and no 
longer asked her mother adhere to any medical regimen. Foua quietly and desperately 
went on providing care as both she and Lia aged. No one, not even Fadiman, takes the 
mother’s ability to keep Lia alive as evidence of the enormous competence of Foua’s 
caregiving. 
! In news media articles about Lia’s death in August of 2012, after living for 26 
years in the total dependence of a vegetative state, Foua Yang’s care is briefly 
acknowledged. An article in the Washington Post, quotes Anne Fadiman as saying, “It’s 
extraordinary she [Lia] survived so long in a vegetative state. It’s a testimony to the 
exceptional loving care her family gave her” (Magagnini, 2012). An article in the New 
York Times reports Lia as “redefining care,” however the intent of the article is to praise 
Lia and Fadiman for the book that caused many medical programs to reassess their 
training in cultural awareness. It does mention that the usual life span of a person in a 
persistent vegetative state is only a few years, but it does not directly attribute that 
survival to her mother’s caregiving (Fox, 2012). None of these articles questions that 
Lia’s prolonged survival is to be celebrated as a positive outcome, nor considers what 
that loving care might have cost Foua Yang or her other children.  
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! Prior to discharge from the hospital, parents of technology dependent children 
receive instructions in the more technical parts of the care, in the use of medical 
equipment, the performance of CPR, and the administration of medications. We have 
seen that this training is brief and likely to be inadequate, and that it encompasses only a 
small portion of the expertise that parents must acquire. Parents have to discover for 
themselves how to carry out much of the rest of their caregiving duties. They must piece 
together their competence from any source they can find; from special education 
teachers, home health care nurses, psychologists, speech and occupational therapists, 
developmental specialists, other parents, and of course a multitude of physicians (Elias 
& Murphy [AAP], 2012). Neither the ways in which they accomplish this task, nor the 
ways in which they think about newfound abilities, have been studied. 
! We cannot begin to understand, let alone measure, parental competence in 
home health care until we understand the tasks they are performing. We do not know 
whether Foua’s caregiving was exemplary in its competence or just an example of blind 
persistence, though I suspect it was remarkable in its excellence. We don’t know 
whether other extreme caregivers feel they are performing well in a necessary and 
honorable task, or if they are merely getting by with a combination of servitude and lack 
of other options. We can measure caregiver ability to use complex equipment and, to 
some extent, the effect of the caregiving on the family, but there are no answers to such 
questions in the literature. Yet, now that we understand the weight of the burden of 
caregiving, we need to understand the moral implications of the competence that must 
be acquired.   
NARRATIVE AND COMPETENCE: THE QUEST FOR KNOWLEDGE
! If competence is to be a moral value desired in parental caregivers, the best 
place to start might be to determine how the parents themselves frame their 
competence. Again, I believe that published narratives by parents of children who 
require extreme caregiving may be a reliable source of information.  The preceding 
chapter, showing that many of the concerns expressed by those caregiver narratives I 
have chosen correlate with current research on the subject, helps to defend their validity 
as sources of information on extreme caregiving. In this chapter, again, I will be focusing 
primarily on three narratives; A Child Called Noah by Josh Greenfeld (1970); Without 
Reason by Charles Hart (1989); and The Boy in the Moon by Ian Brown (2011). 
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! One of the first things that becomes apparent in the narratives by these three 
extreme caregiver fathers, is how little space is devoted to the act of caregiving itself. In 
The Boy in the Moon (2011), Brown spends the first chapter describing the difficulties 
encountered in a night as primary caregiver for his son Walker, but then rarely mentions 
it again. The endless round of sleepless nights, messy feedings and diaper changes 
thereafter becomes a background thread acknowledged only by infrequent reminders of 
fatigue. Neither Greenfeld in A Child Called Noah (1970) nor Hart in Without Reason 
(1989) ever mention this aspect of care at all, though both of their sons, Noah Greenfeld 
and Ted Hart, surely must have had feeding and diapering issues. Whether this is 
because their wives were doing the majority of this sort of care, or whether this earlier 
generation did not talk about such things, is unclear.
! Instead, the narratives focus on a search for knowledge about their child. None of 
the authors is precisely sure what it is they are searching for, and their ideas change 
over time. The search can be seen as the way in which parents are training themselves, 
after the fact and out of necessity, to be competent caregivers for their child. Unlike 
professional caregivers, they begin their “training” only after the need for it has arrived. 
There is no decision to undertake caregiving as a career, and no prior experience. There 
is also no test at the end, nor, in fact, any defined standard of success or endpoint to the 
learning process. The stakes for success or failure however are high, no less than the 
lives of their children.
! The authors do indeed go on a journey of sorts, a quest in search of 
understanding of a life (or really multiple lives) effected by major disability. In fact, two of 
them use the word “journey” in the subtitles of their books: Greenfeld’s book is A Child 
Called Noah: A Family Journey (1970), and Brown’s full title is The Boy in the Moon: A 
Father’s Journey to Understand His Extraordinary Son (2011). These books are, like 
Brody’s stories of sickness, narratives centered around a quest to find a way through an 
illness (Brody, 2003), though the sick person is the narrator’s child, not the narrator 
himself. Large portions of these illness narratives are centered around this quest for 
knowledge, with the search done specifically to help the child/patient. Any information 
obtained is immediately and directly applied to helping the child. The search for 
knowledge then can be understood as an important part of the caregiving process. The 
ways in which they approach that search, think about their part in the search, and use 
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the information they acquire, can become windows into understanding the moral nature 
of competence in caregiving itself.
! That search starts within the science of medicine, with a dawning recognition that 
the child is not developing normally, leading to a need for medical knowledge. The desire 
to find a medical answer for the problem, in the early stages, is balanced by a hope that 
there really isn’t anything wrong. The acquisition of any diagnosis, even a wrong one, at 
once dashes hopes of normalcy and provides a new avenue for research. Once any 
diagnosis is proposed, it becomes a specific focus for knowledge centered around an 
understanding of that disease and a search for medical treatments or therapy. This 
voyage of discovery is an integral part of the narratives, taking up a good deal of the 
pages and becoming the main narrative arc of the stories.
  ! Both A Child Called Noah (Greenfeld, 1970) and Without Reason (Hart, 1989) 
deal with autism, which was much more of a mystery in 1966 and 1970 (respectively, the 
years Noah Greenfeld and Ted Hart were born) than it is now. Some of the information 
sought so eagerly by Greenfeld and Hart is now readily available, and their two boys 
certainly wouldn’t today have to go through so many wrong diagnoses. However 
advances in medical knowledge, while they have been significant, have still not arrived 
at final answers. Nor have those advances resulted in any more definitive treatments. 
The journey undertaken by the parents of a child diagnosed with autism today might 
involve different concepts and medical jargon; for example, the words “sensory 
integration disorder,”  “hypersensitivity to stimuli,” or “behavior meltdowns,” have 
replaced phrases like “emotionally disturbed” and “childhood psycosis.” This reflects 
subtle but real differences in the way the illness is perceived, but the journey to discover 
what autism means for a modern family will in many ways be similar to that of Greenfeld 
and Hart. 
! The Boy in the Moon, written just a few years ago (2011), deals with a rare 
genetic disease called CFC (Cardiofaciocutaneous Syndrome). Like autism in the sixties 
and seventies, CFC is still going through a phase of research to define the 
characteristics of the disease and determine who, precisely, has CFC, rather than some 
other rarely seen syndrome. The details of this disease and its diagnosis are complex, 
and are not necessary for our understanding here. Though the number of identified 
patients is rising, there will never be the numbers now seen with autism. (There are only 
a few hundred cases of CFC now, whereas autism, according to a widely publicized 
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study done in 2008, effects 1 in 88 children (CDC, 2008)). In this sense of standing 
alone at an unexplored frontier, Brown’s search for information mirrors the earlier 
searches by Greenfeld and Hart. 
! Two of the authors mentioned so far are journalists by profession, and had 
resources not available to every parent. The Greenfelds (1970) used their connections to 
move to California for an extended time in order to bring Noah to an operant conditioning 
program at UCLA, then on the cutting edge of behavioral research into autism. And Ian 
Brown (2011) used his journalistic abilities to gain interviews with researchers in San 
Francisco who had recently identified three genes associated with CFC. But both are 
also primarily the father of a sick child, and their journalistic observations are very much 
filtered through their own personal need for information. Brown also was able to travel 
throughout the US and Canada, meeting other children with CFC and interviewing their 
parents. They are not structured interviews, nor reported in full, but they contribute to 
Brown’s understanding of himself and Walker. They can can also add to our 
understanding of the extreme caregiver. 
! I will first explore the journey itself, both how and why it is conducted. We will see 
that the journey is begun out of need, and guided almost exclusively by a desire to help 
their own child, with no mention of an expectation to advance medical science or even to 
apply their knowledge to other children. Everything learned is immediately applied 
specifically to their own situation, and often requires a change in family life centered 
around caregiving. Several things become apparent when examining these parents’ 
quests for knowledge.  The first is that the extent of scientific knowledge attained is 
unexpectedly large. The second, and more interesting, is that, despite this, none of the 
narrators think of themselves as experts.   
Reason for the Search
! The search begins, as I have said, with the need to establish a diagnosis; to find 
out what, if anything, is wrong with their child. This is a surprisingly gradual process, 
often requiring visits to ever-more-specialized physicians over a period of months or 
years. The fastest diagnosis in any of the narratives was Walker Brown’s diagnosis of 
CFC, made at eight months of age; which still meant many months of uncertainty, 
frequent illnesses, and weekly doctor visits (Brwon, 2011). The longest was Ted Hart, 
who did not receive the appropriate diagnosis of autism until age eight (Hart, 1989). 
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Noah Greenfeld had received autism as a diagnosis at about age three but, because it 
was still relatively unknown in the 1970s, his parents did not find it very helpful and later 
denied it as a diagnosis (Greenfeld, 1970; K. Greenfeld, 2009). 
! The arrival of any diagnosis, even a wrong one, provides an avenue both for 
further specialist involvement and for individual research. Following the diagnosis, 
Walker Brown was immediately referred to a genetics clinic; Ted Hart and Noah 
Greenfeld were referred to a variety of child psychiatrists. The parents also begin their 
own research--reading the latest papers, searching the internet (when available), 
seeking out different specialists, and joining with other parents--hoping to understand the 
illness that has effected their child.  
! However the parents quickly learn that a diagnosis only gives a name to the 
problem; it does not solve it. Nor does it entirely define the extent of the problem. Both 
CFC and autism are chronic conditions, with a large amount of individual variability and 
no known cure. The parent’s search branches out into discovering and exploring the 
options for therapy. This ranges from reading up on the latest genetic theories to finding 
toys which might be beneficial. They must look for the best schools, and choose the right 
doctors. And they must select forms of intervention, often identifying physical and 
behavioral therapy that is intensive and largely carried out at home. 
! The authors’ search for knowledge about their child’s condition is to them an 
essential task for caregiving. Everything they learn effects their lives deeply, as new 
therapies become part of the daily routine of care. Even once they realize that there is 
no cure, they expect that any knowledge they attain can be used to better the child’s life. 
They are hoping to provide the best outcome, the most promising future available for 
their child. 
! However, though the main reason for undertaking the search for knowledge is 
always expressed in the possibility of benefit for their child, the parents are looking not 
just a for an effective treatment, but to understand the child. They wish to know the child 
by understanding his condition, what it means and why it has chosen their child (and 
them). Ian Brown describes his journey into medicine: 
I was always looking for a context in which to make sense of Walker, in 
which his disorganized life (and my unavoidable devotion to it) might 
make take on more meaning and purpose. . . . What I had yet to find out 
was why he was the way he was. And so I turned to science, to see if the 
laboratory could explain my boy Walker (Brown, 2011, p. 157).
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In a sense, Brown’s journey does not start until Walker has left home, finally placed in a 
group home at age eleven. Brown begins traveling extensively in search of information. 
Though he is physically getting further away from Walker, he calls his driving across the 
country  “work[ing] my way closer to Walker” (Brown, 2011, p. 112).
! Hart (1989) gives a different though related explanation for his search. He needs 
to understand his son Ted in order to integrate him with the rest of the world, find him a 
place and value in society, a place that was never obtained by his autistic older brother. 
He studies autism diligently and urgently, knowing that the disease is not well 
understood and that there are no guaranteed treatments, but that Ted would need every 
benefit in order to thrive. 
The mysteries behind autism had fascinated writers and curious 
professionals for over forty years. But the uncertainties of the disorder 
took on a special urgency for us. More than that, it became an unwanted 
mission for Sara and me. We had to understand our child in order to 
make a place for him in the world (Hart, 1989, p. 198).
! Ultimately the fathers find that, even though their understanding of them is 
incomplete, their love for their sons is undeniable. Brown (2011) tells a story about his 
mother’s (Walker’s grandmother) reaction when she learned the likely extent of Walker’s 
disability. According to Brown, she matter-of-factly says, “Well, we’ll just have to love him 
as he is then.” Brown recognizes the triteness of this expression, but also its essential 
truth. He continues, “Its not much of an answer: We’ll just have to love him as he is. But 
it is the only answer that is always there, waiting. My mother has a talent for striking the 
flinty bottom of the truth” (Brown, 2011, p. 93).  
! A diary entry from Greenfeld (1970), made when Noah was almost four, 
summarizes not only this aspect of undeniable love but also reveals that even at this 
early stage, he is beginning to realize the difficult task ahead of him. At the time, Noah’s 
diagnosis is mental retardation, a diagnosis which Greenfeld questions, but feels he 
must come to terms with. There is by then clearly something wrong, and some degree of 
retardation is the explanation he is given. He writes, “No matter how severe Noah’s 
retardation, I refuse to view his condition as a life-searing tragedy. We will do what we 
have to do. We will take care of him as best we can until we can no longer take care of 
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him. We will have him in our home and find ways to live in joy with him. And when we 
cannot enjoy him as much as I would like to, I will love him even more” (Greenfeld, 1970, 
p. 60).
Level of Knowledge Attained
! All of the narrators do extensive research into their child’s illness, launching from 
the most recent professional opinion or diagnosis or therapy. This includes the reading of 
professional journals and books on any topic even seemingly related, finding and then 
arranging visits with a variety of professionals, and obtaining advice from teachers, 
therapists, and even other parents. The quest for knowledge runs as a thread through 
the narratives, as promising new diagnoses or therapies are discovered, attempted and, 
often, discarded.
! Greenfeld’s (1970) son Noah, born in 1966 with autism, goes through a variety of 
diagnoses during his childhood: mental retardation, “atonic diplegia,” emotionally 
disturbed, and childhood schizophrenia. Greenfeld reads books on brain damage, 
emotional disturbances and retardation. He also reads about new forms of treatments 
being proposed: megavitamin therapy, patterning, operant conditioning. He is possibly 
the least informed of the three fathers, but Noah is only three years old when the book 
ends. 
! Ted Hart, born in 1974 with autism, is also initially diagnosed with mental 
retardation, followed by a variety of other diagnoses, and his father Charles Hart (1989) 
is initially willing to rely on professional knowledge. However, when Ted is eight years 
old, Hart makes the diagnosis of autism himself, after being invited by one of Ted’s 
teachers to a conference on autism. He recognizes not only his son, but also his own 
brother Sumner, in an Autism Behavior Checklist available at the conference. The 
possibility of autism, that “unspeakable condition, the leprosy of mental handicaps” (Hart, 
1989, p. 70) is horrifying, but “offered the first clue toward understanding” (Hart, 1989, p. 
71) Embracing the diagnosis, the Harts immediately read everything they can find about 
autism, and join the Autism Society. He quickly becomes a volunteer for the autism 
society, often teaching parents of newly diagnosed autistic children.
! Ian Brown’s (2011) son, Walker, born in 1996, received his diagnosis of CFC 
(Cardiofaciocutaneous Syndrome) at age eight months, an extraordinarily early age. The 
Browns had the advantage of a pediatrician at a major pediatric center in Toronto, who 
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had an interest in unusual syndromes. CFC was first described in 1979, and there were 
still only about 100 reported cases worldwide at the time of Walker’s diagnosis in 1997, 
according to Brown.  A genetic test for CFC was not released until 2007. Walker was 
tested for those genes, plus a few others that had been identified at other labs, a few 
years later. He was negative, but his diagnosis remains CFC, as it is the best fit with his 
symptoms and appearance so far available. Brown (2011) says, “The medical 
profession--at least the handful of doctors who studied cardiofaciocutaneous syndrome, 
or knew what it was--was learning about the syndrome as we did” (p. 8). 
! Brown, like Hart and Greenfeld, researches the syndrome extensively, by reading 
in medical journals about genetics and neurology, by finding and consulting with a wide 
variety of neurology, education and genetics specialists. His descriptions of the 
advances in genetics and behavioral neurology are precisely written and full of up to 
date information, some of which is on a frontier of medicine of which I, as a pediatrician, 
am only vaguely aware. 
! Based on Brown’s (2011) intricate description of CFC, I made contact with the 
mother of Savannah, who had been my patient for a few years before moving out of 
state. Despite seeing numerous specialists at our university hospital after her birth in 
2004, Savannah’s illness had remained a mystery. It seemed to me that CFC might be 
our long-sought diagnosis. Her mother was way ahead of me. Savannah is now 
eighteen, and has a working diagnosis of CFC established through geneticists at her 
current university hospital, though she, like Walker, did not test positive for any of the 
genetic markers so far identified.  
! Brown had another resource, not available to Greenfeld and Hart; the internet. 
He eventually finds internet sites dedicated to CFC and some related syndromes, where 
parents swap information on the latest discoveries, along with parenting advice and 
sympathy. He considers many of these parents experts in the field. Of this CFC network, 
he says, “Some mothers. . . knew more than any doctor, and were widely consulted for 
medical and technical help” (Brown, 2011, p. 135). 
! After Walker is placed in a group home at age 11, Brown (2011) begins traveling 
to meet other children with CFC and speak with their parents. He meets some of the 
people who are active in the on-line CFC network, and reports their stories. Most of 
those parents were not as lucky in early diagnosis as Walker was, and went through 
numerous doctors and specialists in the search. Two of the mothers reported being 
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instrumental in their child’s CFC diagnosis, bringing journal articles and photographs to 
their pediatricians, an act that was not always appreciated. Both of these had received 
an earlier diagnosis of a different obscure syndrome but felt, based on their own 
research, that this syndrome didn’t quite fit their child. They discovered the existence of 
CFC on their own, and had it confirmed through sheer persistence. Both of those 
children are confirmed as CFC by genetic testing. Brown (2011) concludes, after 
interviewing them and a number of other CFC parents, “Most parents of CFC children 
know more about the affliction than their pediatricians” (p. 9). I think he is correct in this 
assessment. 
Depictions of Self Knowledge
! Despite the vast amount of research done and the extensive knowledge 
obtained, these fathers do not claim any real expertise for themselves. Though they 
have become something like experts on their child’s individual illnesses, often 
surpassing the knowledge of general doctors, they don’t ever claim this as a valuable 
skill, or an acquiring of competence. For all three, the words they use to describe their 
own search for an acquisition of knowledge and search are often quite disparaging. 
! Greenfeld (1970), after reading books about brain damage and mental 
retardation, emotional disturbances, and patterning, admits that his “diagnosis of the 
day” for Noah is based on whatever book he just read, and calls his knowledge “my 
amateur diagnostic attempts” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 69). I suspect by this point he actually  
knew as much or more than any of the doctors who saw Noah. He also uses the word 
amateur again later to describe an attempt at giving Noah Vitamin C, which his wife had 
read was a possible cure for schizophrenia, Noah’s current (and still incorrect) 
professional diagnosis (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 85).
! Hart (1989) does not initially trust his own understanding of the professional 
information he receives. After one session during which he has been given expert advice 
about Ted’s problems, he says, “I experienced shock resembling amnesia, periods when 
it was impossible to recall specifics of the doctor’s language. I had to ask Sara [his wife], 
‘Did he say significantly retarded or seriously retarded?’ It was enough to make us 
question our sanity” (Hart, 1989, p. 52). Mental retardation was not even the correct 
diagnosis. Interestingly, after he has correctly diagnosed his son’s and brother’s autism 
from a behavior checklist that had been available since 1943, Hart blames himself for 
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the oversight. “[H]ow could I, with my education and community contacts, have remained 
ignorant for so long, never knowing that my brother’s and son’s problems could be 
explained by a disorder others had named and studied?” (Hart, 1989, p 71).
! Eventually, Hart resigns from his job “as training administrator for two local 
hospitals to become the primary homemaker, chauffeur, and resident child development 
specialist” (Hart, 1989, p. 158). He calls himself a “house husband,” which does not 
seem to be something he is proud of. He attends conferences on autism and at one 
point accepts a grant to study programs for autistic children across the country. But in 
the midst of all this newly acquired expertise, He hears on the news about a person who 
must be autistic, and calls his assessment an “amateur diagnosis of autism” (Hart, 1989, 
p. 229). 
! As the only author whose child is technology dependent, Brown (2011) does not 
seem to recognize any special skill in his management of his son’s feeding tube. In the 
first chapter, where he describes a grueling night-time feeding, his description mostly 
centers on his own feelings of incompetence at the task. The technology is just there, 
and using it is a complicated but necessary ingredient in the goal of getting through the 
night. Brown also belittles his extensive research into CFC saying, “I worked at home on 
the dining room table, plowing my way through incomprehensible papers on genetics or 
neurology” (Brown, 2011, p. 51). He then provides a brief but precise description of one 
of the papers he’s been reading, a complicated theory about the connection between 
nerve myelinization and out-of-control behavior. Brown continues throughout the book to 
provide summaries of the ongoing research into CFC; theories of possible treatments, 
accurate descriptions used for diagnosis, and finally the theory behind the genetic 
mutations now thought to cause the syndrome, all accurate and well written. Yet, while 
he describes other parents as experts, he never claims this for himself. 
! None of the authors ever claim their considerable knowledge as any kind of 
professional expertise or clinical competence. Those things they do learn, they 
immediately apply to their own child, often making huge changes in their own lives to 
accommodate those lessons. Anything they learn that might help their child becomes a 
part of their day-to-day existence, a necessity for just getting by. Probably the strongest 
praise any of them gives their own abilities is from Greenfeld (1970), after returning from 
California where he went to pursue therapy for Noah; “ And, most important, we now 
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have more confidence in our ability to cope with him--something we must never again let 
anybody or any ideology take away from is” (p.173).
Depictions of Professional Competence
! The words all three authors use to describe doctors’ and other professionals’ 
knowledge are quite different from the way they describe their own. All of the families, of 
course, have frequent encounters with doctors, starting with their pediatricians and 
progressing on through neurologists, geneticists, psychiatrists, and researchers. The 
words they use to describe these people, while not always complimentary, retain a 
certain degree of admiration and reverence. They reveal an ambivalence, a combination 
of hope placed in science and awe toward the doctors who seem to have expertise in 
that science, tempered by disappointment as it becomes clear that none of them can 
cure their child. 
! Greenfeld (1970) is particularly disparaging of doctors at times. He says things 
like, “Parents will find themselves getting little in the way of help and much in the way of 
confusion from the medical profession” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 5) and, “we never should 
have gotten involved with neurologists” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 84). After he makes an 
appointment for Noah with “an analyst friend’s analyst friend,” he muses that the 
appointment is not likely to be very helpful. “I mean,” he says, “they don’t seem to know 
what to do with Noah after they’ve played their little note taking games, 
anyway” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 86).
! But he contacts new professionals with such hope and respect. There is a 
“Viennese child psychoanalyst” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 80), and an “analyst-type 
psychiatrist” who “specializes in children” (Greenfeld, 1970, pp. 86-7). Of a psychiatrist 
that he hears about who specializes in megavitamin therapy, he says, “More and more I 
like the idea of a psychiatrist who is a man of science with an understanding and respect 
for the workings of biochemistry. Wasn’t it Freud himself who said the cures for mental 
illness will most likely be uncovered in the field of biochemistry” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 89). 
The Greenfelds also take Noah to an “operant conditioning program developed at UCLA 
by Dr. Ivar Lovass” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 92). Greenfeld describes Dr Lovass as “a 
virtuoso therapist,” who can “ ‘play the patient’ with the skill of a classically trained 
musician hip to all the joys of jazz improvisation” (Greenfeld, 1970, p. 145).
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! Hart (1989) does not make any judgements about doctors as a group, and 
though he has his misgivings about specific doctors and their recommendations, he 
does not criticize them. He is haunted by the fact that his similarly effected older brother 
never received any treatment for his condition, and expresses his urgency in seeking out 
professional opinions; “Fifty years of hope had failed my mother and Sumner. I didn’t 
want to see the mistakes of the past repeated” (Hart, 1989, p. 53). So he and his wife 
“accepted the recommendations of the clinic and threw ourselves into a frantic search for 
help” (Hart, 1989, p. 54). One evaluation, performed at a pediatric specialty center, is 
particularly impressive; “For two days physicians and therapists measured, weighed, 
tested, analyzed, and discussed our child.” (Hart, 1989, p. 59) The diagnosis arrived at is 
equally impressive, pervasive developmental disorder with an emphasis on 
communication problems. This opens up a new realm of professional activity, specialty 
physicians, and a “special kindergarden designed as a communication classroom” (Hart, 
1989, p. 59). 
! Brown’s (2011) descriptions of his interactions with doctors are particularly 
descriptive. Where Brown himself “plows his way through incomprehensible papers” (p. 
51), Walker’s pediatrician, who “had a long-standing interest in rare afflictions and their 
human consequences” (p. 29), was “leafing through the medical literature on rare 
afflictions” (p. 30) trying to find a syndrome that matched Walker’s problems. He was, as 
Brown puts it, “trying to find a particular plant in a vast garden of exotic flowers, each 
one more bizarre than the next.” (p. 30) 
! His descriptions of the researchers he later meets alternate between 
bemusement and awe. His initial impression on meeting the researchers in a lab that 
has identified some CFC genes is less than complimentary; “The geneticists themselves 
bore the slightly startled air of soldiers who had just emerged from the deep jungle, only 
to be told that the war they had been fighting had been over for twenty years” (Brown, 
2011, p. 161). Yet he describes one particular researcher glowingly: “Her area of 
expertise was the effects of genetic mutation on cognition--an explorer at the far edge of 
not one but two frontiers of medical research, the barely known genes and the still 
unknown brain” (Brown, 2011, p. 175). A different researcher, a geneticist, admits to Hart 
that she has only ever seen one child with CFC, the disease she has been studying in 
her lab. She had been horrified by its severity, evidence for Hart that she is out of touch 
with the reality of CFC. However he goes on to praise her abilities; “She saw the entire 
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[research] process from a scientific height, as evidence of the elegance of human 
biology” (Brown, 2011, p. 161).
! It seems that these parents deny their own competence and knowledge while, for 
the most part, raising up the abilities and knowledge of doctors and researchers. They 
consider themselves incompetent or barely competent amateurs, while praising 
professional knowledge. Even professionals whom they suspect to be somewhat 
deficient are given, at the very least, respectful attention. 
! As we shall see, however, professional contributions to parents’ knowledge are 
often disappointing, in that they do not ultimately provide the answer parents are looking 
for. Even a firm, correct diagnosis does not lead to the understanding that parents 
desire. In addition, the recommendations of specialists rarely provide a benefit for their 
children, and never lead to a cure. There are hints of the ambiguity this causes in these 
parents’ relationships with doctors, which I will go into later. First, I’d like to look at what 
the narratives indicate are the causes of the differences between professional and 
parent knowledge. 
FRAMING COMPETENCE
! In a care ethic that defines good caregiving in terms of competence, it is 
disturbing that such expertise is discounted by the person acquiring it as a part of 
caregiving. There are three reasons supported by the narratives why caregivers might 
think negatively of their own abilities. The first is that they receive very little 
encouragement in it from some of the professionals they meet. The second is that their 
expertise is solely applied to their own child; they do not have the broad scientific 
background or experience to claim professional expertise. This is demonstrated in the 
texts mostly by the authors’ discomfort with the language of science and medicine. 
! The third, and I think most significant, reason is that, simply, they are not able to 
cure their child. Their complex journey, which is undertaken specifically to help their 
child, fails to end in a cure, or even a reliable long-term benefit, for their sons’ problems. 
Even the secondary goal, of understanding the disease in order to understand the child, 
fails when they remain unable to communicate with him. 
! Yet, I do not believe that any of these authors can be considered incompetent. 
They seem to me to be ideal extreme caregivers. If competence is to be used as a moral 
virtue on which to base the adequacy of caregiving, this suggests that we must find a 
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different expectation or definition of competence for the parent caregiver (and quite 
possibly for any family caregiver). It also suggests that we are sorely lacking a proper 
definition of what constitutes success in this extreme caregiving situation. 
! I will review first relate what the extreme caregiving narrators, Greenfeld (1970), 
Hart (1989), and Brown (2011), have to say about each of the factors above.  Then I will 
review the ways in which current goals of parenting, medical care, and pediatric home 
health care might be contributing to these parent’s feeling of failure. 
Lack of Professional Support
! While the professional world does not actively encourage these three authors in 
their search for understanding, there were relatively few examples of actual 
discouragement from professionals. In fact, the access all three were offered to 
professional expertise was quite remarkable. The two journalists, Greenfeld (1970) and 
Brown (2011), enjoyed a particularly high amount of personal attention from a variety of 
professionals, however they perhaps also enjoyed a high level of privilege. It is likely, for 
example, that a genetics laboratory that has just announced the discovery of genetic 
markers for an obscure disease would welcome a visit from a journalist such as Brown. 
That same welcome might not be extended to every parent of a child with the disease. 
! Only one parent, Hart (1989), encountered any trouble with his son’s doctors. 
When Ted was five, the Harts approached their primary physician with a request for a 
second opinion, on the advice of one of Ted’s preschool teachers, who didn’t feel 
comfortable with his current diagnosis of mental retardation. Hart tells the story, “Our 
pediatrician scoffed at getting a second opinion. He implied that we were emotionally 
immature for failing to accept the first opinion and threatened that he would no longer 
see Ted as a patient if we continued to discuss his condition with ‘people on the street’ 
” (Hart, 1989, p. 58). The physician’s disparagement, not just of Hart, but of all non-
physician expertise is plain. Hart switched doctors, though not without some anxiety and 
uncertainty. 
! Later Harts had to petition their school district for proper therapy for Ted. At the 
hearing, the district representatives listened only to the experts who had come to plead 
Ted’s case. Hart, reasonably, was not surprised by this, but was disappointed to find that 
his knowledge of Ted’s needs was not seen as even a little bit important. He blamed 
himself for not speaking out well enough for his son (Hart, 1989).  
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! Brown (2011), who had the benefit over Hart of some advances in doctor-patient 
relationships, did not encounter any problems personally, though he does at times 
express impatience with physicians. He did report an experience similar to Hart’s which 
was told to him by another CFC parent. This parent was convinced that her son’s 
diagnosis of Costello syndrome, based on information she had found on the internet, 
was incorrect. She discovered a description of CFC in a magazine, and took it to her 
pediatrician to get his opinion. Her pediatrician, she told Brown, “couldn’t have cared 
less” (Brown, 2011, p. 153). She had the same reaction as Hart. She also switched 
doctors. 
! Further discussion of the complexities of the doctor patient relationship, and how 
a professional should walk the line between permissiveness and paternalism in patient’s 
requests for verification of information, are not in the scope of this paper. Neither are 
ramblings about the relative number of times information acquired by patients is actually 
useful. My point is only that perhaps one of the reasons why these authors discounted 
their own knowledge is that their abilities were not recognized or encouraged by 
professionals. However I believe this to be a relatively small contributor. 
The Distance Created by Language
!  There is another aspect of professional expertise that is commented on by 
several of the authors; the words used by professionals to describe medical conditions. 
With their seeming importance and almost deliberate incomprehensibility, these words 
inspire confidence in the scientific ability and professionalism of the person who can use 
them easily. However they also serve, by emphasizing a basis of knowledge not 
ordinarily accessible, to humble the lay person and point out how little he knows. 
! Hart (1989), for example, seemed impressed and comforted by some of the 
labels eventually attached to his son Ted. Part of Ted’s strangeness was a tendency to 
repeat things he’d heard, without seeming to be aware of their meanings. After seeing an 
expert in communication disorders, Hart says, “The doctor never seemed surprised by 
Ted’s strange speech patterns. He taught us the technical terms for the senseless 
language we heard so often: echolalia for the repeated phrases of other’s speech and 
idioglossia, meaning language of idiots, for Ted’s original but nonsensical phrases” (Hart, 
1989, p. 66). Even though Hart realizes that the Latin word is merely descriptive of the 
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problem, and not terribly complimentary to Ted, the use of the word idioglossia made it 
into an identifiable symptom, and therefor somehow more impressive and accurate. 
! Brown (2011) is a bit more skeptical about the usefulness of the words, but is still 
sometimes overwhelmed by them. To him, they embody a science fictional attitude that 
is at once impressive and unrealistic. He says, of the names of Walker’s medications, 
after casually listing thirteen of them, “They sounded like the names of ambassadors to 
an intergalactic conference of aliens” (Brown, 2011, p. 45), and of the words used in 
genetics research, “The genes and their complicated acronyms (most of which related to 
their chemical composition) sounded like newly discovered planets to me, as baffling 
and rarefied as genetics itself” (Brown, 2011, p. 166). He is also impressed by the 
exactitude they imply, but ultimately disappointed in them. Talking about an early visit to 
his pediatrician, he notices the multitude of unfamiliar words used on his son’s chart. 
They are mostly Latin descriptions of Walker’s facial features, as he finds out later, but 
the doctor’s knowledge of them is both comforting and daunting. He says, of his 
pediatrician, “[He] always used the scientific terms on the boy’s chart--it made for more 
accurate communication with other doctors. They were serious words, embodying a 
professional standard of exactitude. But Walker Brown was a hard boy to be exact 
about” (Brown, 2011, p. 28). Even as he is praising them, Brown is beginning to realize 
that they are not terribly helpful.   
! The words used as diagnostic labels are particularly difficult, as they create both 
hope and anxiety in the parents. A diagnosis means that a problem has been identified 
and pinpointed, which leads to possibility of a cure. But it also means that a problem 
exists. During the phase where Noah’s diagnosis is still uncertain, Greenfeld (1970) 
expresses his reluctance at times to visit specialists; “I’m afraid to go to a doctor 
because I know that we’ll then find out whatever the specialist knows. Expertise 
discovers itself in its subjects” (p. 51). As long as Noah remains without an exact 
diagnosis, Greenfeld can hope that he will just outgrow his problems. 
! Brown (2011) echoes this sentiment with his feelings about his first referral to a 
genetics specialist; “Any parent of a child with a syndrome remembers the day he or she 
is told to see the genetics department. It is the second circle of diagnostic hell. What has 
been, to that point, a matter of health, something you could fix, is suddenly a matter of 
science, carved in genetic stone” (p. 31). The diagnosis can nail down the problem, and 
make it true and real, in a way that physical descriptions, even in Latin, do not.
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! The words of a diagnosis sound very scientific and precise, and can confer a 
certainty that sometimes is not actually present. Those words also can be used both to 
recognize and obscure problems. An example of this is Ted Hart’s diagnosis of pervasive 
developmental disorder, which he was given at age five. Reading this as a pediatrician 
and knowing that this was the current way of describing autism, I thought that the 
doctors had finally (at last!) arrived at the correct diagnosis, which was clear to me from 
Hart’s descriptions of Ted’s problems. But Hart did not know this. He learned the true 
meaning of those words two years later, when he recognized his son’s and brother’s 
symptoms on an autism checklist. When confronted with this, Hart’s doctor admitted to 
using the new term deliberately to obscure the more well-known, and therefor more 
horrifying, diagnosis of autism (Hart, 1989, pp. 75-76).
! Another author of a narrative about a special needs child, Priscilla Gilman, in The 
Anti-Romantic Child (2011), uses the language of medicine to disguise her child’s 
diagnosis from both the reader and herself. She is repelled by it, saying, “There is 
nothing less romantic, literary, or lyrical than the language of pathology, diagnosis, 
symptom checklists” (p. 100). Her son Benjamin’s diagnosis, she reports, is hyperlexia 
with sensory integration dysfunction. This is a modern description of autism, much like 
Ted Hart’s diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder, though Benjamin is not as 
severely effected as Ted. His mother prefers this lyrical collection of words over the 
simpler diagnosis of autism, in part because it clouds the extent of her son’s problems. 
Toward the end of the book, she does admit to sometimes using the term Asperger’s 
Syndrome to simplify explanations, but she does not accept even that milder form of 
autism as Benjamin’s true diagnosis. 
! So the medical words inspire both confidence and humility, and a parent who has 
been through the diagnostic process learns to both hope for and distrust them. Ian 
Brown (2011), summarizes the complexity of this in his own beautifully complex 
language. He has listed, in italics and without defining, some thirty medical terms that 
have been applied to Walker in association with his diagnosis of CFC. He goes on to 
say; 
The language of Walker’s strangeness held me captive. New words had 
been invented for a new creation, infused with the pretend exactitude of 
scientific nomenclature, as if all the labels said something helpful and 
useful, which of course in any comparative sense they did. The alluring 
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multisyllabic complexity necessary to describe a simpleton, to use the old, 
once-scientific word for such a boy (Brown, 2011, p. 158). 
He is held captive by the brilliant words, but at the same time recognizes their essential 
meaninglessness. Years of high-sounding scientific progress is relegated to nothing 
except different words to describe a child whose problems can’t be solved. And yet 
perhaps there is still a tiny hope that, in a comparative sense, some progress has been, 
and yet will be, made. 
! The language of medicine creates a distance between parent and professional, 
and emphasizes to the lay person that they are not trained in all the intricacies of 
science, that their knowledge is limited. But it does not seem to me to be the major 
source of these authors’ sense of failure. The disappointment expressed in these 
examples is directed mostly at the broken promise of science, but it seems to me that 
their feelings of incompetence are directed toward themselves, as a form of personal 
failure. All three eventually learn enough to become at least suspicious of professional 
expertise, yet they never stop pursuing it, as though they continue to believe that there is 
something outside of their knowledge that will eventually help their sons, if they can only 
find it. 
!
Inability to Help their Child
! The most significant reason why these parents consider their knowledge and 
competence insufficient, I believe, is that it is very specifically obtained and applied, with 
only their own child in mind. The parents do not have the foundations of science, or a 
general interest in medicine, on which to develop a broader expertise. They want to help 
their own child. But they eventually discover that, no matter how much they have 
learned, they have not been able to solve their child’s problems. 
! Their goal, which is at all stages, to find help for their child and to know their 
child, is never reached. First they seek a diagnosis that is expected to lead to a cure. 
When that fails they seek to understand the disease, both in order to obtain the best 
form of therapy and to understand why their child has been targeted. They search to 
understand their son by understanding his condition.
! In all of the narratives, the parents are frustrated by their inability to understand 
their child. Noah Greenfeld and Walker Brown are unable to communicate verbally, and 
Ted Hart’s speech is inconsistent and often doesn’t make sense. The authors’ quests for 
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competence are often expressed as an attempt to find their child, to connect with him 
despite the limited communication. But their sons remain unable to communicate despite 
multiple therapies. In part, the narrators don’t claim expertise, and with it competence, 
because they feel they have failed in this quest for understanding. 
! Charles Hart (1989), after spending the bulk of his book musing about and trying 
to comprehend and respond appropriately to what he thinks is his autistic son’s 
desperate attempts at communication, expresses this failure directly. He says, “We also 
felt a sense of failure. In spite of the years of family counseling and our growing 
expertise in autism, we felt incompetent that we couldn’t apply this knowledge more 
effectively. Understanding Ted’s disability didn’t enable us to direct his behavior a 
positive way” (p. 215). He has sought understanding of the science of autism through 
conferences and diagnostic centers, but Ted has remained beyond his reach. All this 
knowledge, this medical competence, while it was helpful at times, was never sufficient 
to meet this goal of helping his son. 
! When Brown (2011) finds out that three genes associated with CFC have been 
found, the feelings he reports reveal his growing conflict with medical discoveries. He 
worries that the discovery will change Walker for him, change the private and odd 
relationship they have developed. But in spite of the fact that he has already 
experienced the disappointment of the inability of a genetic diagnoses to provide a cure, 
he is excited by the discovery. He says, “Not to say there wasn’t huge hope in the 
discovery. If I knew what genetic misstep had caused Walker’s troubles, I would have a 
hook to hang those troubles on. I might even have a cure for them. There would be a 
firm and unassailable cause, something to blame and something to fix . . .” (Brown, page 
160).  
! Yet reality sets in eventually. It takes over a year for the test to become available, 
and for the Canadian medical system to agree to do it. By the time the test is done, 
Brown is aware that it will change nothing for him or for Walker, that in fact the test itself 
might be an intrusion: 
To test, or not to test: that is the question. Whether ‘tis calmer in the mind 
to ignore the touts and dreams of genetic research, or to scan each 
cracked gene known to man, and by testing think we have an answer. To 
test and test and test some more, and by this test pretend it ends the 
heartache and the thousand natural shocks his small flesh is heir to. ‘Tis a 
consummation devoutly to be wished (Brown, 2011, p. 169).
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! The disappointment in themselves and their abilities expressed by all three 
writers extends, unavoidably, to the science of medicine on which they had pinned (and 
often continue to pin) so many of their hopes. Their frustration with doctors and hospitals 
and researchers is a strong thread through their narratives, yet the failure of medicine 
does not seem to negate any of their own failure. Instead it seems to wind together, 
reinforcing a feeling that something that could have been done at some point might have 
been overlooked.  
! The hope and broken promise of all this expertise is related best, I think, in an 
extended description by Brown (2011) of Walker’s toys. The Browns have amassed quite 
a collection of special toys that were supposed to stimulate Walker’s development, 
brought in over the years by a variety of developmental experts. Many of them were lent 
or rented from now forgotten sources, left behind in the hope that Walker might learn 
something from them, though it is never clear exactly what that lesson might have been. 
They are bright with hope, stamped with mysterious instructions that hint at success, and 
Walker never responded to any of them. They lie in abandoned heaps around his house, 
a reminder of all the expertise that has been invested in Walker. But at the same time, 
they are just toys, ridiculous objects to expect so much from. 
! Yet, even while he is making fun of their essential silliness and inexplicable 
purpose, Brown seems to accept that it was his own inabilities--not understanding the 
toys, or not using them often enough, or not forcing them on Walker--that caused 
Walker’s lack of response. He also takes their continued presence in his home as a sign 
of a different sort of incompetence. Most of them were supposedly loans, to be returned 
some day to the company or program that provided them. That he has never had the 
time or energy to accomplish this clearly bothers Brown, as does the fact that he has 
now forgotten where most of them came from. He will never be able to return them and, 
since they are not his, he will never be able to throw them out. So they persist as a 
reminder of both failures, the incompetence of disorganization and the larger failure to 
reach his son (Brown, 2011, pp. 18-23).
! All three authors express their frustration and disappointment with medicine, but 
it is not consistent throughout the narrative. It does not form an arc leading in a 
progression from hope to disillusionment. Instead there are periods of criticism, often still 
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mixed with hope, as new therapies are discovered and tried. It is as though, while they 
can express bitterness at times, they can never quite abandon the institution that has 
failed them. In part this is because they must continue to rely on the medicines and 
therapies they have been doing, and because they require intervention for illnesses. But 
it is also because to do so, to finally admit that medicine has failed them, is to give up 
hope entirely.
! Greenfeld (1970) expresses his disappointment near the beginning of the book, 
as a way to inform us of the complexity of the journey he is about to relate to the reader. 
He writes,  
What’s the matter with Noah? For the longest time it seemed to depend 
upon what diagnosis we were willing to shop around for.  .  . .  But we 
finally discovered that the diagnosis didn’t seem to matter, it was all so 
sadly academic. The medical profession was merely playing Aristotelian 
nomenclature and classification games at our expense. For though we 
live in one of the richest states in the nation, there was no single viable 
treatment immediately available for Noah, no matter what category he 
could eventually be assigned to (Greenfeld,1970, p. 4-5).
 
Yet even at the end of the narrative, he continues to seek medical answers, writing about 
his efforts in two more books about Noah.
! Brown (2011) likewise scatters his disillusionment in between an ongoing search 
for help for Walker. He sums up his many visits to the children’s hospital, each one 
holding hope and frustration and despair, in this way: 
All those stuffed animals in the hospital store in the lobby of the brilliant 
children’s hospital in the middle of the downtown of the brilliant genius 
city. And yet the place was filled with doctors who couldn’t help my boy. I 
developed a degree of skepticism toward the medical profession that 
tended to show itself after the fourth doctor in a row told me something I 
already knew. Sometimes they saw my skepticism and agreed with it, 
quietly admitting their own helplessness, which made me like them again. 
Sometimes they spotted my frustration, and stayed away. . . I learned an 
almost geological patience (Brown, 2011, p. 63).
 
! Later, after a visit to a series of therapists who are unable to stop Walker from 
hitting himself, or even add to his understanding of why Walker is doing this, he says, 
simply, “That’s when I thought, boy, they don’t know anything. I see now: no one’s been 
helping us, because no one can” (Brown, 2011, p. 95). He learns this lesson, over and 
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over, but never quite convinces himself of its essential truth. No one holds a key to 
Walker; there is no cure, no effective treatment. No one understands Walker better than 
he himself does, and he has not been able to reach him. Despite the inability of medical 
science to provide answers, or even much help, Brown always takes the weight of that 
failure back on himself.
THE GOALS OF CARE
! I have suggested that the reason these very competent experts--in both medical 
understanding and providing care--do not recognize their own competence is because 
they lack a realistic definition for success. None of the understood goals of medical care, 
even those set specifically for pediatric home care, really apply to the situation of 
extreme caregiving. None of the goals of medical care--cure, restoring function, 
prolonging life, or palliation--provide a reachable definition for success. The parents 
have failed to find a cure or even a treatment with a reliable long-term benefits. While 
their children do make some slow developmental progress, functioning at the level 
expected at any age is not achieved. Success is measured instead sometimes only by 
getting through the day. 
! Yet these narrators are not failures. They merely have not lived up to their own 
expectation, or perhaps hope, that they would be able to cure their son’s illness. They 
have not been able to restore their son to a normal life, or even to communicate 
effectively with him. The standard of competence that they have set for themselves is too 
high, their goals are unachievable. !
 ! The goals of pediatric home care are more helpful in defining successful 
caregiving, but do not take into account all of the problems. In the recent AAP paper 
outlining the goals of home care for children, the stated overall goal is “to ensure that 
each child remains healthy, thrives, and obtains optimal medical home and 
developmental supports that promote ongoing care at home and minimize recurrent 
hospitalizations” (Elias & Murphy [AAP], 2012, p. 996). These goals are all in the realm 
of science, measurable by need for medical encounters, vital signs, and developmental 
assessments. The parents’ abilities to recognize illnesses before they become severe, 
keep the child clean and well fed, and use medical equipment and medications properly 
can be demonstrated. By these standards, Greenfeld (1970), Hart (1989), and Brown 
(2011), have succeeded admirably. There were no deaths, no accusations of neglect, no 
124
chains of unnecessary hospitalizations, no unexplained illnesses. The parent/narrators 
have reached a level of ability, grounded in their own child’s physical needs, yet do not 
seem to be satisfied with it.
! But these goals take into account only the child’s survival. By their dissatisfaction 
with their abilities, the narrators imply that caregiving means more than meeting bodily 
needs. There is one clue to this in the AAP guidelines above: the word ‘thrives.” In the 
context of the paper, this translates to ‘grows,’ measured by the plotting of height and 
weight on an appropriate growth chart. However the word does have another meaning 
that is more in line with what I believe our parent/caregivers would consider important. 
They want their sons to thrive in more than bodily health and size. They want their sons 
to grow into persons who can make their desires and personalities clear. They want to 
know who their sons are; and who they might become. It is in their inability to do this, in 
their inability to communicate with their sons, that they consider themselves 
incompetent. 
! The goals for pediatric home health care also miss another important factor; they 
set no time limit on care. Successful parents are supposed to not only keep their child 
healthy, but also help him grow to independence, at which point their job is more or less 
done. However, none of these children ever reached a point where they could live 
independently. Thus the caregiving task could never be completed or discontinued. 
! This endlessness is another contributor to parental feelings of incompetence. 
None of the narrators were ultimately able to continue their home care. Their children 
stayed out of the hospital when younger, but all three eventually became too much to 
handle at home and were placed in group homes. Both Brown and Hart discuss this 
decision in detail as part of their narratives. Greenfeld included the search for a home for 
Noah in a subsequent book. This decision is a complex subject, not in the scope of this 
paper, except to say that there is a great deal of guilt and rationalization in the choice. 
Though they are able to defend their decisions, and are able to conclude that it benefited 
their sons as well as themselves, both Hart and Brown clearly continue to consider their 
need for placement as another failure.
 ! I spoke in the beginning of this chapter about the relative ease of recognizing 
competence in medical providers, using standards that have already been established. 
Those standards may, at least for some professions, be rigorous, but they are attainable 
and measurable. They are also grounded completely in a knowledge of science, and 
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tested for effectiveness largely in the impersonal data retrieved from the patient’s body. 
Extreme caregivers have no such measure for success. Medical knowledge is not their 
primary goal, nor is the continued survival or lack of acute illnesses for the child. There is 
no gauge to measure the developmental progress that is made, one difficult day at a 
time, nor will there be, since there is no way to predict each child’s developmental 
potential in advance. So these parents have no choice but to keep learning, working with 
their child, and completing the daily round of caregiving, for as long as they can. It is 
certainly possible that the task they have been set is so vast that no one can possibly 
succeed at it. They have undertaken a heavy burden of care, alone, and the only 
endpoint to their care is either in giving up the child to the care of others or in the 
ultimate failure of death.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
! As part of the caregiving process, many parents launch themselves into a search 
for knowledge pertaining to their child’s condition. The knowledge they acquire is 
sometimes extensive, with some becoming near experts on that condition. This is not 
something they would have considered undertaking or, indeed, even known about, if 
their children had not been affected. The knowledge attained is not supported, or often 
even recognized, by professionals. Nor is it likely to be claimed by themselves. Yet the 
search for knowledge is integral in the process; it is the basis for their illness quest 
narrative. 
! These parents do not randomly choose to become experts on some rare 
disease; they do so in order to provide the best care possible for their child. The reason 
for the search is solely to help their child, and involves finding a way to understand or 
reach their child. In time, the search for knowledge becomes oriented toward the future, 
as parents learn that the child’s condition will persist and that the burden of care will be 
permanent. The relationship with medicine and science thus begins full of promise, with 
the ideal that a cure exists and help will be found, but ends with a good deal of 
disillusionment. This ambiguity runs through all three narratives, and leads to a difficult 
relationship between the parent, who is presumed to be a non-expert, and professional 
experts.
! The caregiving narrators did not recognize their expertise in part because it was 
ultimately inadequate for reaching the goals they set for themselves in caring for their 
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children. Both cure and effective therapy eluded them. More importantly, they did not 
learn, in their search for knowledge, what was for them the most important thing; who 
their children were or how to communicate with them. They performed the difficult and 
thankless task of physical caregiving well and, I think, realized that the lack of a cure is 
not ultimately their fault. But clearly the professional goal of keeping the child as 
physically well as possible is not enough for them. They feel that they have failed at the 
larger goal of helping sons to reach their potential as human beings in the world. 
! Within an ethic of care, this search for knowledge can be considered as an 
attempt to become a competent caregiver. If we assign competence as a moral virtue 
required for the act of caregiving, as Tronto (1993) has done, the acquisition of 
competence becomes a moral act that can be judged as part of a range of possible 
actions. Incompetent caregiving leads to the incomplete or inadequate meeting of needs. 
I believe that the three narrators, Greenfeld (1970), Hart 91989), and Brown (2011), are 
in fact exemplary caregivers, and not in any way incompetent. We cannot know for sure, 
but I doubt anyone could have done a better job raising their sons to their maximal 
potential. That they continued to consider themselves incompetent, despite attaining 
extensive medical knowledge and success in keeping their sons healthy, implies that the 
goals of caregiving set by medical providers are inadequate. However, the goals these 
parent set for themselves--curing their child, reaching their child, or being able to care for 
the child forever--are impossibly stringent.  
! Having claimed competence as a moral virtue, we must start at the beginning 
and learn from them what is truly involved in competently performing the job which has 
fallen upon them.  The importance of understanding the way in which these parent 
caregivers acquire competence and think about their own abilities becomes clear. In this 
way we can begin to set a standard for competent caregiving behavior.
! The first thing we must recognize is that competence in parent caregiving cannot 
be defined by medical knowledge. A search for this degree of competence is admirable, 
but cannot be a mandatory requirement for either parents of a disabled child or family 
caregivers. Very few parents have the resources available to these authors; access to 
medical journals and the ability to understand them even minimally, access to 
professionals gained by a career in journalism, ability to travel across the country for 
new programs or information. However, we do need to encourage this scientific 
competence, promote it, and recognize it when it happens. With the internet available to 
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almost everyone, parents are likely to attempt this search to the best of their abilities. In 
my experience this is very common, and can often lead to the exceptional understanding 
demonstrated by Greenfeld, Hart, and Brown.  
! The second thing we must recognize is that success in caregiving cannot be 
defined as an expectation that the child will remain in the home forever. Extreme 
caregiving is an enormous task, and there is very little support available. There is really 
no way to fully prepare a family for the task, and most of them acquire the competence 
needed along the way and amidst a great deal of insecurity. Being unable at any point to 
care for the child at home cannot be labeled as failure.
! The last, and most important, thing is that professionals and parents have very 
different goals of care. Medicine may concentrate on physical and bodily needs, but 
families expect their children to thrive in other ways. They want them not just to grow, but 
grow up; to learn, to become the best person they can be, and to claim the future that is 
theirs. Promoting this form of growth is arguably the biggest task of parenting, and 
fulfilling this need may be the most complex aspect of caregiving for the medically 
complex or disabled child. The increased level of dependency and delay in expected 
developmental stages makes this a different, unexpected path for each individual child. 
! The communication barriers make each child’s unique needs and desires difficult 
to determine. The reading of needs required in order to meet them falls within the last 
phase of caregiving; responsiveness.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RESPONSIVENESS
ON RESPONSIVENESS
! Joan Tronto (1993) has identified responsiveness as the most important 
characteristic or necessary virtue of her fourth phase of care. This phase is care-
receiving, and it seems to be the care-receiver, not the caregiver, from whom 
responsiveness is desired. In giving this task to the care receiver, Tronto insures that 
care does not become unwanted or unnecessary. This completes a cycle of care, 
beginning with paying attention to needs, proceeding to taking a responsibility for 
meeting them, and finally leading to the performance of the hands-on tasks of 
caregiving. In this final phase, the recipient is encouraged and expected to report back 
on both the quality and desirability of the care given, making it possible to alter the first 
three phases so that care does not become paternalistic.
! The assignment of a potential virtue to dependency suggests that receiving care 
is itself an action that can be done morally; that being cared for might carry its own 
responsibilities and duties. A recent essay by Park McArthur (2012), a young woman 
with a degenerative neurologic disease who requires “significant physical help” in all 
activities of daily living, speaks to this directly. She recognizes a form of trust between 
herself and her caregivers which requires input from both parties. She says, “As a 
dependent adult who can communicate with her caregivers, I possess a particular 
authority: I am able to articulate how I want and need to be cared for” (McArthur, 2012, 
p. 167). She also tries to be part of her caregivers’ lives, paying attention to their needs 
as well as her own. She calls this responsiveness, “a continual process of learning how 
to ask for, and how to receive, help” (McArthur, 2012, p. 167). This suggests that being 
responsive to care is a skill, the possession of which might ease the burden of care for 
both caregiver and care receiver. This effectively creates a feedback loop between 
caregiver and care receiver, with the act of care becoming a cooperative effort between 
them. Perhaps the most advanced level of caregiving might occur when the caregiver 
receives care in some form back from the care receiver, as Park is able to provide for 
her own caregivers. I will return to this later. 
! However, in wider practice, demanding virtuous behavior from the most 
vulnerable participant in the caring cycle is problematic. Not everyone who needs care 
will be able to immediately identify their exact needs. Nor will everyone be aware that a 
response is desirable or even possible. It might take time for a care-receiver to develop 
the  skill or virtue of responsiveness to care, or that ability might not always emerge. In 
such cases, the caregiver must then assume some of the burden of responsiveness, in 
order to interpret needs as they are expressed and alter care as indicated. It would then 
would be up to the caregiver to teach and encourage responsiveness. This produces an 
new requirement for the caregiver, a new virtue in addition to competence.  
! Tronto, in defining responsiveness, notes its similarity to the earlier concept of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity as a concept was developed as a part of the acquisition of moral 
skills. Kohlberg, in his six stages of moral development, defined it as “the ability of 
[moral] reasoners to put themselves in the place of the other person in the 
dilemma” (Tronto, 1993, p. 67). Responsiveness in caregiving, according to Tronto, goes 
beyond that, asking the responsive caregiver not merely to imagine the care-receiver’s 
feelings but to actually inquire about them. “Responsiveness suggests a different way to 
understand the needs of others rather than to put ourselves into their position. Instead, it 
suggests that we consider the other’s position as that other expresses it.” (Tronto, 
1993,p. 136) The expressed needs revealed would in turn create a new level of 
awareness, and the ability to return to the first phase of care, with a deeper level of 
attentiveness.  
! An example of competent caregiving that is lacking in responsiveness comes 
from the memoir Bed Number Ten by Sue Baier and Mary Zimmeth Schomaker (1995). 
In it, the narrator is temporarily rendered almost completely unresponsive by a rare 
paralytic illness called Guillain Barre Syndrome. She is intubated, tube fed, and unable 
to move anything except her eyelids. She is also uncomfortably warm. Her husband, 
during one of the short visits he is permitted, through a laborious (and responsive) 
process of ‘yes/no’ blinks, manages to understand this, and removes her blankets. For a 
short time, she is comfortable. However, after her husband leaves, her nurse, 
competently noticing the missing blankets and reciprocally assuming that she must be 
cold without them, promptly replaces them.   
! The crucial involvement of the caregiver in the responsiveness cycle, suggests to 
me that caregiving as a moral act requires two parallel virtues, competence and 
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responsiveness. Competence can be acquired and understood (and measured) in terms 
of caring for physical needs. Responsiveness implies a different sort of connection, one 
that will be much harder to train and quantify. Responsiveness, if it is to be different from 
reciprocity, requires not merely an imagining of how the caregiver would feel in the care-
receiver’s position, but an actual assessment of the care-receiver’s emotional state, and 
a real understanding of the situation of his needs within his life.  
! This addition of responsiveness as well as competence to the caregiver’s virtues, 
adds a new dimension to caregiving. Francine Wynn (2002), in a paper enlarging the 
role of nurses, brings in the concepts, advanced initially by Agamben, of zoe and bios. 
Zoe is “mere life” or “bare life;” the physical and biological life of the body. The 
maintenance of bodily health is the clear object of medicine and nursing, a goal toward 
which most of the science is aimed. Bios has the same root as biography, the story of a 
life lived. This is the life particular to an individual, his past history and hopes for the 
future. Perhaps it is the source of the personhood which is so important in bioethics and 
philosophy. It If zoe is bodily life, bios is the narrative of a life. Competence is a virtue for 
zoe, considering the needs of the physical body. Responsiveness requires the discovery 
or understanding or telling of a story.
! For the caregiver, being responsive requires maintaining a bios, and that requires 
a proficiency at narration. Maintaining a bios might require keeping a patient’s story 
intact when memory fails, as in Hilde Lindemann’s (2009) concept of “holding well” the 
elderly demented person. Perhaps a contrast between our images of poor nursing home 
care, where bodies are fed and cleaned and maintained, can be contrasted with a home 
that provides “memory care,” where part of the daily routine is to review and remember 
stories of the elderly person’s life. Additionally, maintaining a bios might require being a 
witness to the suffering written on the body of the ill patient, as suggested by Frank’s 
Wounded Storyteller, or helping an ill person write a new life story changed by the 
unexpected presence of illness, as in Brody’s (2003) Stories of Sickness. 
! In the cases above, the care-receiver is the author and protagonist of their own 
story, and the virtuous caregiver must (merely) elicit and promote it. A responsive 
caregiver for an adult can, in most situations, elicit a response to care and/or relate to a 
story already at least partly told. But this is not the case for infants and children for whom 
there is no life story to act upon. Maintaining a bios for an infant might require, as it did 
for the nurses Wynn (2002) studied, who held dying infants who others had abandoned, 
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providing testimony to the presence of a life, however brief. For those dying infants, the 
nurse was the only teller of the short story that she has called into existence. But for 
most infants, even very sick ones, their bios is longer and more complicated. They are 
stories that are constantly developing, though, as Wynn states, “All infants, even at the 
beginning, hold within themselves the possibility of bios” (Wynn, 2002, p. 124). The 
infant’s story is perhaps only a potential story, but it is no less important.  
! A careful parent will guard that story along with guarding the child’s future, so that 
the story eventually told is the child’s own authentic story. However, in many of the 
children requiring extreme caregiving, that story is delayed along with the child’s 
development. In some, there is never a coherent or reliable response. The parent 
extreme caregiver must then become responsible for both parts of the responsiveness 
cycle, as the parent is called upon to both interpret and meet the unresponsive (or 
unreliably responsive) child’s needs. In order to meet physical and medical needs, the 
parent must learn to read the child’s body for clues to discomfort or illness. In order to be 
responsive to the child’s bios, the parent might have to become the only coherent 
narrator of the child’s life.
! Emily Rapp (2013), whose son Ronan had a fatal neurodegenerative disease 
called Tay Sachs, writes in her memoir that she considered finding her son’s story one of 
her main tasks of caregiving. The disease causes progressive neurological destruction, 
so Ronan barely reaches a development level of 6 months before regressing into 
unresponsiveness. She says, “My other task beyond physical care, I began to realize, 
was to find Ronan’s quiet, gap-ridden myth, his idiosyncratic narrative--to interpret it, 
share it, and learn from it” (Rapp, 2013, p. 48.) She spends a book in trying to make 
sense of his limited world, looking to poetry, myth, and philosophy, to try to discover 
Ronan’s place in the world and understand his experience of life. She knows that the 
story she tells for him will be the only one he will ever have.  
! The authors of three of the extreme caregiving narratives (Greenfeld, 1970; Hart, 
1989; Brown, 2011) have as a goal to understand their son’s stories, understand who 
their sons are. They often speak directly about the lack of responsiveness from their 
non-communicative sons. Ted Hart and Noah Greenfeld, both with autism, were very 
delayed in language acquisition, and never became able to clearly express themselves 
verbally. Walker Brown, with the more severe CFC Syndrome never developed an ability  
to communicate verbally at all. All three had unusual behaviors which their fathers 
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assumed to have meaning, and often interpreted as a frustrated attempt to express their 
needs or desires. All three narratives contain a struggle to understand the meaning 
behind their sons’ attempts at communication, and thus are stories about attempts to 
establish responsiveness with an unreliably responsive care receiver.
! The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which these three 
caregivers meet the challenge of responsiveness. It is clearly of paramount importance 
to them; as mentioned in the previous chapter, the main purpose of their narrative quests 
is a search for their child, seeking to know and understand who their child is. This 
chapter will analyze the ways in which they look for a response, the ways in which they 
frame the child’s needs despite adequate response, and the ways in which they 
acknowledge the incompleteness of their understanding.  
THE CHILD AS DISEASE
! The first place these three parent/narrators look for understanding is in the child’s 
body; they attempt to find the child through understanding their disease. Of course this is 
also an attempt to help their child, hoping that medical knowledge will provide, or at least 
facilitate, a treatment. This activity is not abandoned even once it becomes clear that 
there is no easy cure available, and continues despite the resulting disillusionment with 
medicine.  As we have seen in Chapter Five, parents acquire a good amount of medical 
knowledge in this pursuit, becoming unacknowledged experts in the diagnosis and 
treatment of their sons’ disorders.
! Seeking to understand the child by learning as much as possible about the bodily 
consequences of their disability, is not unreasonable. For the sons of the three narrators, 
as with many special needs children, it is inevitable that their illness or disability 
becomes some part of the definition of who they are. Its presence has unavoidably re-
written the narrative of their lives. I once asked the mother of a child with a different 
syndrome, Cornelia DeLange Syndrome (CDLS), if she ever wished that Samuel had 
been born without all of the problems that disease has brought him. Samuel is 
developmentally delayed, still a toddler at age nine years, and has a variety of medical 
problems that make his long-term life expectancy uncertain. Her answer surprised me. 
She said that she could have no regrets, because Samuel has CDLS, and a child 
without CDLS would be a different child. The child that she has, and loves, is Samuel. 
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Samuel’s story is inextricable from CDLS; to have a different body would mean being a 
different child.
! Emily Rapp (2013), author of a memoir about the death of her son from Tay 
Sachs, a relentless, incurable neuro-degenerative disease, agrees with Samuel’s mother 
somewhat. Remembering the experience of an ordinary day with Ronan, she says, “I 
rolled through the grocery store with my floppy, beautiful boy and some days I wouldn’t 
have had it any other way because to wish otherwise would be to wish for another baby, 
which I did not” (p. 184). She is a bit more ambivalent, however, going on to state that at 
other times she “railed against [the] fact” (p. 184) of his illness and impending death, 
wishing for the ability to cure him. Yet she knows that this is impossible, both because 
there is no cure and because a different body would make him a different child.   
! Eva Kittay (2011) makes a similar point, though not quite the same, in a paper 
discussing the procedure that has become known as the Ashley Treatment, a surgical 
intervention to stop growth and sexual development in severely delayed pre-pubertal 
girls by removing breast buds, ovaries, and uterus. Where some see this treatment as a 
way to keep Ashley physically small enough to remain in a care situation where she is 
seemingly happy, Kittay sees this as a violation of her bodily integrity, done for the 
convenience of her caregivers. I can see her point, though I do not entirely agree, as I 
believe that it is essential to take into account the caregiver’s point of view. However 
Kittay’s reasoning supports an argument that the child’s body is part of the child’s bios. 
Ashley’s story certainly has been changed by the surgical alterations of her body which 
will prevent her from reaching physical maturity as a woman. It was also irrevocably 
changed by the disability with which she was born, and which caused her intellectual 
delay. Like Samuel and Ronan, Ashley cannot escape the confines defined for her by 
her body.
! However, the story witnessed in their bodies cannot be the whole story for these 
children. Samuel is a unique individual whose bios, like that of any toddler, is filled with 
wonder at the strange things that happen around him and joy in small (sometimes very 
small) triumphs. Ashley’s story, though she may be largely unaware of it, now includes 
ethicists such as Kittay (2011), who are guarding and reinforcing what individuality she 
has. The sons of the three narrators also have stories outside that told by their bodies 
and, as their father search for knowledge about their bodies, they become more 
interested in discovering those unique stories. 
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! For Greenfeld (1970) and Hart (1989), whose sons Noah and Ted are autistic, 
the quest for medical knowledge overlaps with and becomes a quest for connection with 
their sons. In part this is because their early search is frustrated by wrong diagnoses, 
leading to a continuous reassessment of their son’s potential. But when they arrive at the 
diagnosis of autism they find a misunderstood disorder that primarily effects 
communication. Many of the treatments which have evolved under the science of 
medicine are aimed toward improvement of speech and communication. The goal of 
understanding who their sons are as unique individuals requires a pursuit of medical 
treatments that will break through the communication barrier. Understanding the disease 
becomes a literal attempt to understand the child, the only way to discover who their 
child is. 
! Ian Brown (2011) has a harder task, because Walker’s CFC is a much more 
complicated syndrome, involving genetic defects, medical fragility, and multiple disability 
in addition to communication problems. When Brown goes on his “journey to understand 
his extraordinary son” (from the subtitle), he has avenues of exploration, such as genetic 
DNA sequencing, that are not available to (and not needed by) Greenfeld and Hart. But 
he also ultimately wants knowledge not just of his son’s body, but of who he is. 
! The search for medical information undertaken by all three narrators, is not a 
search for medical expertise. They seek only to know their own child. And while all three 
eventually find a diagnosis, they do not find the child’s identity there. At some point, they 
learn instead to fight this medical identity, to avoid seeing their child as a disease. They 
all develop a resentment toward the clinical aspects of medicine and those practitioners 
who see only the disability and not the child. I am reminded of a phrase frequently used 
during my pediatric training: “The child is not the disease.” This is a reminder aimed at 
professional caregivers to pay attention to more than the child’s medical chart, to see the 
child as a whole person beyond the illness or disability, and to consider the needs of the 
child situated within a family.  
! Though Ian Brown (2011) studies CFC in detail, he comes to resent the picture of 
Walker as merely a genetic defect. He realizes that Walker’s body might be part of the 
bios, but it is not his whole story. Even describing his body, as he does near the 
beginning of The Boy in the Moon, it is evident that Brown knows this. He describes his 
son’s body in unusual and poetic terms: “His shoulder blades and the bones of his back 
are oddly soft, plastic, bendable, as if covered by some miracle upholstery. The skin of 
135
his arms and thighs feels almost manufactured too, too much matte and not enough 
flow, the cells rampaging, overbuilding, one of the more direct results of the genetic 
miscues that made him this way” (p. 12). Despite the use of mechanical and clinical 
words, something individual and beautiful shines through. He calls Walker “my sweet, 
sweet, lost and broken boy” (p. 7). 
! Not all parents are as accepting of the child’s disabilities as part of their true 
selves, however. Ian Brown’s wife Johanna does not think of Walker’s CFC as being a 
part of him. Brown (2011) quotes her as saying:
  
I hear parents of other handicapped kids saying all the time, “I wouldn’t 
change my child,’’Johanna said one night as we were lying in bed, talking 
as we fell asleep. “They say, ‘I wouldn’t trade him for any;thing.’ But I 
would. I would trade Walker, if I could push a button, for the most ordinary 
kid who got C’s in school. I would trade him in an instant. I wouldn’t trade 
him for my sake, for our sake. But I would trade for his sake. I think 
Walker has a very, very hard life.” (Brown, 2011, p. 80)
She is also not interested in meeting other children with CFC, an experience which for 
her husband is part of understanding Walker. She wants to see Walker only as himself, 
and is afraid that the knowledge of others will make him into “a kid with a syndrome” (p. 
113). But for Brown, the experience of meeting other children with CFC is monumental. 
He says, “Even the briefest meeting with another CFC child felt like the discovery of a 
new element” (p. 120). 
!  Walker is more than his disease, more even than his genetic makeup, and those 
medical professionals whose job it is to elucidate Walker’s problems are often not able to 
hear his whole story. In this quote from The Boy in the Moon, Brown (2011) describes 
both the realization that Walker’s disease is not his whole identity, and the disconnect 
that often occurs between parent and professional. It also is a testimony to the sorrow 
that results from the “broken” body that sets Walker apart from other children. Brown 
says, 
[T]o a laboratory geneticist who studied CFC as a genetic disorder, the 
syndrome was always only that: a disorder, an unfixable spelling mistake 
in the grammar of humanness. I understood that stance, and also hated 
it. Seeing Walker only as a genetic disorder was a guaranteed way for me 
to remember that there is such a thing as genetic order, that for each 
Walker, there are millions of genetically complete children. In a genetics 
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lab, Walker would always be a deleterious effect of nature and evolution, 
and little more. (Brown, 2011, p.177).
To Brown, Walker must be more than the genetic mutation that produced his syndrome. 
Brown must become the one who recognizes the “more” that Walker is, and the one on 
whom the burden of discovering what that “more” might be falls. He must find and 
nurture Walker’s true self, his story, his bios.
THE UNRELIABILITY OF INTERPRETING NEEDS
! Even in the parenting of typical infants, as most parents could attest, the 
determination of physical needs is not always easy. One of the most frustrating medial 
problems in the neonate, for parent and pediatrician alike, is colic. This is marked by 
inconsolable and unexplainable crying, and occurs in infants from age two weeks to 
about four months. The parent of course has a mental list of things that might cause a 
baby to cry so much; hunger, cold, dirty diapers, pain, heat, constipation. One by one, 
those possibilities are checked, and remedied if possible, and the baby’s crying 
continues. Some babies respond to being held close, some to being left alone. Many 
seem to like noise, or motion. They will finally fall asleep during a long car ride, only to 
resume crying again as they are carefully being carried back inside. The parent cannot 
help but imagine some horrible pain, with terrible consequences if its source is 
overlooked. But the baby can’t describe what, if anything, is hurting. The pediatrician 
also has a long mental list of possibilities, most of which can be discarded as diagnoses 
because of a lack of corroborating symptoms or lab abnormalities. There are formulas to 
try, advice to be given. But the pediatrician knows no more than the parent. The baby 
can’t tell anyone what is wrong. 
! Infants “outgrow” this problem eventually, of course. And sooner or later, when 
something does hurt, children become able to at least point to the “owie.” But many 
special needs children are not able to reliably report on their needs until much later, if at 
all. This leaves the parent/caregiver in much the same situation as the parent of a 
colicky infant; if the child seems distressed, they often have to guess not just about what 
the problem might be, but whether or not there is actually a problem. Yet most 
pediatricians learn to pay attention to those parents’ concerns. If the mother of a multiply 
impaired, medically fragile child says that she thinks her child is becoming very sick and 
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should be in the hospital, I have found it best to hospitalize that child, because she is 
very likely to be right. She is not always right, of course, but often enough. 
! In their studies of mothers of children with severe chronic illness or disabilities, 
McKeever and Miller (2004) report briefly on this ability of parents to interpret needs. 
They do not have statistics for how often mothers are correct about their child’s needs, 
but they do report on the bond that forms between maternal caregiver and the child 
cared for in the home. They provide several narratives from parents whose concerns 
were ignored, some resulting in inadequate care. They state that the mothers learned to 
“accurately determine, respond to, and compensate for children’s physical needs and 
multiple vulnerabilities,” and as a result, “their need for vigilant attention to subtle 
physiological, behavioural and emotional cues led to extremely close relationships. 
Mothers ‘knew’ the children in a way few others did and were uniquely attuned to 
them”  (McKeever and Miller, 2004, p. 1182). 
! But the virtue of responsiveness, I have already indicated, requires more than a 
maintenance of physical needs, no matter how difficult they are to establish. For many of 
the special needs parents in McKeever and Miller’s (2004) study, the task of mothering 
such children involved seeking social value (or “cultural capital”) for their children. By this 
McKeever means that the mothers reported taking many actions that could be 
interpreted as placing their child in a position where others were able to value their 
children as much as the mothers themselves did. This included everything from insisting 
on proper medical care, to pushing for services that otherwise would have been denied, 
to dressing the child in fashionable clothes. McKeever did not study the ways mothers 
valued their children, nor the ways the relationship with the child were established. 
However, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the “vigilant attention” to the 
child’s care carries with it a form of responsiveness that attempts to interpret the child as 
a person as well as a body with certain medical needs.
! This interpretation is sometimes fairly uncomplicated. For example, autistic Ted, 
the subject of Charles Hart’s (1989) book Without Reason, responds differently in 
different environments. In one scene in the book, Hart is told by a teacher at at day 
program that they are working hard to teach Ted to tie his shoes. But Ted has already 
learned to do this at home. His parents realize that they must intervene and become the 
primary interpreter of their son’s limited communications. “[Ted] still needed us to 
interpret the rest of the world and we had to translate his behaviors to others. If we didn’t 
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have the conferences with teachers or explain his abilities to others at the YMCA, they 
would expect too little and allow him to underachieve” (Hart, 1989, p. 165). His parents 
take on the role of interpreting and explaining Ted’s needs and abilities to outsiders. 
! However, the possibility of underachieving is not even on the horizon for some 
parents whose children cannot speak for themselves at all. Care ethicist Eva Kittay is 
also the mother of a severely disabled “child” (she is a dependent adult now). Kittay 
describes her daughter, Sesha, in an essay in Love’s Labors, titled “Not My Way, Sesha. 
Your Way. Slowly.”  Sesha “has no measurable IQ” and Kittay states that “many 
capacities she will not develop at all” (Kittay, 1999, p. 151). Yet to Kittay, and apparently 
also to Peggy, her paid caregiver for over two decades (and who provided the quote 
which became the title of the essay), Sesha is a unique individual full of boundless joy 
and love and a certain amount of stubbornness. In a later paper, Kittay describes her as 
having “her own personality, her own mature beauty,” and as becoming “increasingly 
mature emotionally” (Kittay, 2011, p. 614). Yet Sesha does not talk, or walk, or even eat. 
Kittay admits that her understanding of her daughter is incomplete, but so is our 
understanding of others who can communicate fully: 
I have come to grow increasingly more humble in what I think I know 
about my daughter . . . The quality of containment, of mystery that we 
each present to each other, regardless of ability, is increasingly clear to 
me. We always see each other through a glass darkly, but when viewing a 
child with cognitive disabilities, the glass is darker still (Kittay, 2011, p.
614).
Kittay and Peggy, while likely Sesha’s best and only interpreters, have very little 
information to work from. Their responsiveness in caregiving must include a large 
amount of uncertainty. 
! In Loves’ Labors, Kittay (1999) describes a happy day for Sesha, in which she 
gives her caregiver, Peggy, a kiss. Sesha’s kisses are “legendary” and “distinctive.” 
Kittay describes them, “mouth open, top teeth lightly (and sometimes not so lightly) 
pressing on your cheek, her breath full of excitement and happiness, her arms around 
your neck (if you’re lucky; if not, arms up, hands on hair, which caveman-like, she uses 
to pull your fact to her mouth)” (Kittay, 1999, pp. 150-151). This could describe other 
things, as Sesha tangles her fingers in someone’s hair and pulls them into her bared 
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teeth, but Kittay says it is a kiss. Kittay and apparently also Peggy interpret this as an 
expression of Sesha’s boundless love and joy. They are probably right. 
! Noah Greenfeld, at age three, has a perhaps similar kiss, described by Greenfeld 
(1970). His wife, Foumi, he says, “claims that [Noah] sometimes comes over to her and 
presses his lips against hers. And at times he does the same thing to me. But I’m 
convinced he’s considering more a bite than a kiss on those occasions--and sometimes I 
have the tooth nibble marks to prove it” (p. 183). Noah’s two primary caregivers, 
witnessing the same action, disagree on its meaning. There is no way to determine 
which of them is correct. 
! Another example of a potential misunderstanding comes from Charles Hart 
(1989), and involved his autistic brother Sumner. Unlike Sesha or Noah, Sumner can 
speak, but he does not always understand the meaning of his words. Their father had 
been absent for much of their lives, and had been abusive at times. After his death, 
Sumner says to his mother, “Daddy went to heaven.” Their mother puts several 
meanings on this. The first is that Sumner understands that his father is dead. The 
second is that Sumner loved his father enough to assume that he would go to heaven. 
However later Hart overhears Sumner saying to himself, “I’m going to beat up Daddy. 
Daddy went to Hell” (Hart, 1989, p. 18). No one ever tells this to his mother. Neither Hart 
nor his mother could truly interpret the meaning of those two statements, but in their 
caring for him, they cannot help but try. 
! Looking for the true self of the non-communicative or unreliably communicative 
child is not easy. These parents may be searching diligently and honestly to discover 
who their child is, but there are very few clues to go on. This is the source of the title of 
Ian Brown’s (2011) book, the Boy in the Moon. Walker is able to give Brown very few 
clues about himself. “Sometimes,” Brown says, “watching Walker is like looking at the 
moon: you see the face of the man in the moon, yet you know there’s actually no man 
there” (p. 3).
! The Boy in the Moon (2011) is full of attempts to put meaning or understanding 
on Walker’s unusual behaviors, and Brown is fully aware of the limitations of his 
interpretations.  For example, Walker likes to play with plastic bags full of pop can tabs 
or, rather, this specific “toy” focuses Walker’s attention repeatedly. Brown fills several 
paragraphs with musings as to what Walker might be enjoying about the sensation of 
kneading a bag of pop can tabs, if indeed he can enjoy anything. The section becomes a 
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flight of fantasy as to what this means to his son, or what anything might mean to his 
son. He says at the end, “Or maybe I am reaching. He gives me no choice but to reach 
this way. He and I invent our world together every moment I am with him” (Brown, 2011, 
p. 15).
! At age three Walker begins hurting himself, hitting himself and banging his head 
hard enough to cause injury. Unsurprisingly, the source of this self-injurious behavior is a 
mystery that requires an urgent answer. However Brown (2011) never finds one. He 
says, 
Sometimes Walker was in agony as he smacked himself and screamed 
with pain. At other times he seemed to do it more expressively, as a way 
to clear his head, or to let us know he would be saying something if he 
could talk. Sometimes--and this was unbearably sad--he laughed 
immediately afterwards. He couldn’t tell us anything and we had to 
imagine everything (p. 77). 
Walker sometimes laughs in response to self injury, when he must be in pain. Yet at 
other points in the book, Brown delights in his son’s laughter, assuming that it means he 
is happy. He has, really, no choice but to do so. If Brown is to be a responsive caregiver, 
caring for his son’s bios as well as his body, he must construct a story from the few facts 
he is given, inconsistent though they may be.  
! I have observed the attempts of another child with CFC, Savannah, to 
communicate. Savannah at age 19 has no words, but she does use some sign 
language. Over the years, she has had many caregivers, and each one has received 
their own name sign, a specific area of the body to which Savvy points.  Her mother’s 
days are filled with responding to a ceaseless, and to me seemingly random, pointing. At 
each gesture, her mother says the caregiver’s name, and gives an often detailed report 
about where they might be and what they might be doing at the moment. Savannah 
sometimes laughs, or nods, or cries, and then immediately points somewhere else. Her 
mother takes this as evidence that Savvy is very loving, and cares deeply for all the 
people she knows. I am often convinced that the real point for Savvy is to draw her 
mother’s attention back to herself, and away from any distractions. Both of us could be 
wrong.
! Angie Lydicksen, mother of Luke, another child with CFC, who was interviewed 
by Ian Brown (2011), told him:
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I think Luke, for the most part, he’s happy. When he does cry, he usually 
cries for a reason. I think his quality of life is good, for the most part--I 
think he’s happy in his own little world. And for the most part I’m happy 
that he’s happy. Sometimes it breaks your heart, because he’s stuck in 
his own little world. But sometimes I wonder if it’s not better there. 
Sometimes--because he goes to bed with a smile and wakes up with a 
smile--I like to think he’s happy all the time. I like to think he is (p. 155).
!
She thinks he is happy. But she does not know, and will never know, for sure. So she 
monitors his body for signs of pain or illness, and monitors his moods as best she can, 
and hopes that he is happy when nothing seems to be wrong.
! Emily Rapp (2013), who knows that her son Ronan with Tay Sachs Disease will 
never advance developmentally past 6 to 8 months of age and then will regress into a 
vegetative state and death, also wonders about his happiness, but is less convinced. 
Was Ronan unhappy? No. He had no label for that.
! Are we any happier when we know (or think we know) the 
difference between unhappy and happy? I doubt it. Life is really lived 
within those parentheticals, in what we don’t know or expect, in what has 
already disappeared, in what is already gone. When Ronan’s sensory 
faculties disappeared, did that mean that his narrative went with it, or did 
he simply exist in that gap, a place we could not access without 
relinquishing the desire to understand its parameters, to make sense of 
it? (Rapp, 2013, p. 46)
She finds his story by living in the brief moments of joy and connectedness she has with 
him, but simultaneously unable to forget the dismal future ahead. Ronan’s story is in 
those moments, described in glorious detail. His bios, while informed by death, is not a 
story about dying. The inevitable death looms, but is never described in the book.
! All of these parents, Emily Rapp, Ian Brown, Savannah’s mother, and Angie 
Lydicksen are creating stories from their children’s limited actions. They are at least 
partly aware that there is very little evidence for their interpretations. Perhaps it is 
unavoidable that they make stories in which they, themselves find comfort. Through their 
constant caregiving they become uniquely attuned, not only to their child’s bodily needs, 
but to their child’s bios. And if there is no obvious story, they must perhaps invent one. 
! They also realize their limitations, at least some of the time. Hart (1989) admits 
that sometime he could not always “trust trust our own judgment when it came to making 
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decisions about Ted’s future. . . We had lost a sense of proportion and couldn’t gauge 
whether our efforts were enough, too much, or too little” (p. 183). And Brown (2011) 
asks, “I often wondered if we were imagining Walker’s progress, inventing the 
connections we thought he was making. . . He made people feel things. But did he feel 
anything?” (p. 38) This uncertainty is probably best expressed by Brown in this 
statement: 
To hear him speak his own name? . . . To hear him say, Ma, I love you? 
My heart is banging at the thought. Fuck you, Dada! would be the 
Gettysburg Address. . . I don’t need to Walker to say I love you to know 
he does. But if he spoke a word, it would be proof that he had something 
to say and that he wanted to say it, that there was a point to his saying it 
(Brown, 2011, pp. 124-125). 
He knows Walker’s limitations, that Walker cannot speak. He also acknowledges his own 
limitations, that any words he attributes to Walker must be created by himself. Yet says 
that he knows that Walker loves him, a reflection perhaps of his own love for Walker. And 
he knows that this is a bit of a fantasy, adding, “In my mind, we [Walker and Brown] chat 
nonstop. But in actual life, my son can’t speak” (Brown, 2011, p. 125). 
! As extreme caregivers, these parents become the primary interpreters of their 
children to the outside world, particularly to the medical system, which expects and 
requires from them an accurate assessment of bodily needs.. They must translate and 
communicate the physical signs of possible illness, and often simultaneously promote 
their child as a person of value to the world. As responsive caregivers, they become the 
best, and often only, interpreter of the child’s needs. And it seems that they either expect 
themselves as morally responsive caregivers to create a bios for their child, or that they 
become storytellers as an inevitable part of the act of caregiving.  
! The question raised here is, Whose story is this? Is it Walker’s or his father’s? 
Ronan’s or his mother’s? Since neither cannot be cheated of his own story any more 
thoroughly than he has already been cheated of life by his disease, perhaps it does not 
matter? Yet Brown and Rapp remain the uncontested storytellers, and Walker’s and 
Ronan’s inner lives remain a mystery. I think that Walker and Brown share their story, 
and that Ronan’s story and his mother’s are one and the same. Their lives, looped 
through the responsiveness needed for interpretation of needs, become a tangled 
thread, their stories inseparable.
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THE CHILD AS TEACHER
! There is a common narrative within the stories of severely ill or dying children, 
that the child has been a teacher to everyone with whom they have had close contact. It 
is not unusual to hear that the child has taught parents and other adults lessons, often 
ones requiring a mature and complex wisdom. Very young children, and even infants, 
have been credited with teaching such uplifting things as dealing with adversity, bearing 
up under pain, or even the relating the meaning of life. I understand that the parent has 
really learned these things by being a witness to the child’s illness, but that experience is 
related as a lesson, with the child placed in the position of teacher. I believe this is 
another example of a possibly misplaced sense of responsiveness, giving to the child a 
story which is at least partly created by the parent. 
! There is some precedent for considering the person in need of care as a teacher. 
Arthur Frank (1995) discusses something he calls the “pedagogy of suffering,” an idea 
that “one who suffers has something to teach” (p. 150). The caregiver, as witness to the 
suffering, learns important lessons from the wounded body. This can be perceived, as 
Frank does, as a benefit received in return for the work of caregiving, thus equalizing the 
dependency of the relationship. Frank sees this return in part as an assuaging of 
loneliness and the opportunity for communion with others provided by the caregiving 
relationship. I agree that this could be true in some circumstances, but it is hard for me 
to see the life lessons learned by the endless unpleasant chore that is much of 
caregiving as an opportunity for community. It is harder for me to imagine this coming 
from an incommunicative or unresponsive child. 
! However, Christine Montross (2007) reports in a book of meditations on the 
anatomy lab encountered in her first year of medical school, that a sort of learning 
relationship can be formed with even a dead body. She reports in her book Body of Work 
that, in some Thai Buddhist medical schools, the body to be dissected is given the title of 
“great teacher,” held in high esteem, and honored in several ceremonies (pp. 78-80). 
This is of course not standard practice in American medical schools, where measures 
are take to distance the student from the humanity of the body. Certainly, however, there 
is a fair amount of emotional work which must be done by the student of anatomy in 
order to reconcile the knowledge received from this source with previously held notions 
144
of life and personhood. It may matter very much to the student whether the body in 
question is seen as a passive provider of cells and parts or an active teacher of life 
lessons. But the inert body obviously cannot actively participate in this. 
! The narrators of extreme caregiving stories are no exception to the idea that 
lessons learned can be taught by the most incommunicative of teachers. From Charles 
Hart (1989), it is reported that:
They [autistic people] have taught me to ask what it means to be human, 
what it means to live in this baffling world of sights and sounds and 
messages. Although their misunderstandings appear more obvious than 
my own, they have taught me never to underestimate the capacity of my 
fellow human beings to misunderstand or fail in communication. Most of 
all they have taught me that I can’t assume that any two people think alike 
or that works will mean the same to the reader that they meant to the 
writer (Hart, 1989, p. 258).
He goes on to profusely thank both his autistic brother and son for this teaching. Clearly 
however, any learning had to have been derived from from himself, and his own careful 
observations. Such ideas could never have been communicated by his either his brother 
or son. These two supposed teachers, because of their autism, are not equipped to ever 
reach such an understanding themselves, let alone communicate it.
! Shelly Greenhaw, mother of another child with CFC, Kinley, reports in an 
interview with Ian Brown (2011):
Right now, I think Kinley has--oh boy--without trying, taught me how to 
live with joy, despite tough circumstances. And to use my time wisely. Not 
to worry about tomorrow too much, but to enjoy today. She’s taught me to 
laugh at the little things. She’s helped me with my vision of life. Boy, she’s 
helped me see that each person has something to contribute, and to learn 
from as many people as we can. . . I think I’ve learned, too, that we’re 
very interdependent (Brown, 2011, pp. 144-145).
Kinley is no more able to communicate than is Brown’s son, Walker. And even Brown, 
the most cynical and clear-eyed of the parent narrators, frequently refers to Walker as 
his teacher. “Sometimes I think this is his gift to me--parceled out, to show me how rare 
and valuable it is. Walker, my teacher, my sweet, sweet, lost and broken boy” (Brown, 
2011, p. 7).
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! The doctors in the genetics lab learn a somewhat different lesson from children 
with CFC, worth mentioning because the recipient of this sort of teaching is not a close 
family member who would find gratification in imagining the child as more abled. One of 
the geneticists studying CFC who was interviewed by Brown (2011) make the claim that, 
“We are going to learn so much from these kids” (p. 165). The lessons learned involve a 
complicated connection between certain genetic defects in CFC which overlap with 
genes being studied as markers for cancer. These lessons will of course be learned from 
observations of the child’s body; blood and bone marrow and DNA, and not from the 
child himself. However the child is given credit. “We are going to learn how to treat them 
better from knowing their genes. . . . We are going to learn so much about cancer 
treatment from these children . . .” (Brown, 2011, p. 165). In fact, identification of genes 
associated with CFC has not led to a cure for cancer. It does not even lead to a genetic 
test that confirms Walker’s diagnosis, since after testing it is demonstrated that Walker 
does not carry any of the identified genes. (This is true for many other CFC children as 
well.) The connection is, however, an effective way to receive funding for research in this 
very rare syndrome.
! The lesson more often taught by these children is deeper even that a cancer cure 
however. It is no less that a demonstration of the meaning of life. They provide lessons 
in personal growth, as in this statement by Gilman (20110, whose son is mildly autistic, 
“But the blessings of being his mother far outweigh the worry and stress and fatigue. 
Truly he has made me an infinitely stronger, more patient and compassionate 
person”  (pp. 196-197). They provide lessons in compassion and understanding of 
disability, as in this statement from Ian Brown (2011), “The disabled are a challenge to 
everyone’s established sense of order: they frighten us, if not with their faces, then with 
their obvious need. They call us to be more than we ever thought we would have to 
be. . .  We all wanted to free ourselves from having to face the darker truth that each 
disability is personal, unique, and possibly unsolvable” (p.150). Or they can provide a 
recognition that something once thought important for life is not so critical after all, such 
as this statement from Kittay (1999): “We didn’t yet realize how much she would teach 
us, but we already knew that we had learned something. That which we believed we 
valued, what we--I--thought was at the center of humanity, the capacity for thought, for 
reason, was not it, not it at all” (p. 150). 
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 ! But perhaps the most important lesson taught (or demonstrated or learned) is in 
how, simply, to just “be,” or “to live in the moment.” Ian Brown (2011) reports that a 
developmental pediatrician, who had just diagnosed significant delays in his son Walker, 
told him this: “The Buddhists say the way to enlightenment, to pure being, is by getting 
your mind out of the way. I’m not trying to be trite, but Walker already knows how to do 
that He is pure being. He may be developmentally delayed, or moderately retarded, but 
in that way, he’s already miles ahead of most of us” (p. 68). Presumably this specialist 
had knowledge of many children with delays. Possibly he had told many parents this in 
the past. Brown, whose responses to trite platitudes is usually edged with cynicism, 
accepts this completely, saying only, “That was the first time someone suggested Walker 
had a gift the rest of us didn’t” (p. 68).
! Brown (2011) expounds on this “gift” later in the book; “[O]n his good days, 
Walker is proof of what the imperfect and the fragile have to offer; a reminder that there 
are many ways to be human; a concentrator of joy; an insistent nudge to pay attention to 
every passing mote of daily life that otherwise slips by uncounted” (p. 180). But his wife 
disagrees with him, resenting the well-worn concept that his disability might supply 
others with some special understanding. She is quite bitter about it, saying, “I’m not sure 
that I agree that his lasting value is to have touched people. That his whole life has to be 
this fucking Gandhi thing, making people feel better about themselves” (p. 182).
! Emily Rapp (2013) stands with Brown’s wife. She is not only the mother of a 
dying child, she has a congenital disability herself, and is the author of an earlier book 
called Poster Child: A Memoir. She too has heard the platitudes that the disabled have 
lessons to teach us all, and clearly disagrees with them. 
The meaning of Ronan’s life was not to teach me; we often say this about 
people who defy our notions of normal and I find it pathetic, patronizing, 
and a way of distancing ourselves from our own fragile bodies and 
tenuous lives. I don’t believe that disabled people exist to teach people 
life stories--that is not their purpose; it isn’t anyone’s purpose. We are not 
“the disabled,” some shapeless, teeming mass of nonnormative bodies 
designed for teaching purposes, like some kind of specially designed 
pedagogical barbarian horde (Rapp, 2013, p. 114). 
I support Emily Rapp’s and Joanna Walker’s position. If there are lessons to be learned 
from stories of sickness, we must learn them for ourselves, and not expect the disabled 
and ill to provide them. With careful observation we can bear witness and perhaps add 
147
something to our own stories. But, though we might learn something from Walker and 
Ronan and Ted and Sumner, they are not, and should not be expected to be, our 
teachers. 
IMPLICATIONS
! I have maintained that moral caregiving requires responsiveness to care, 
provided by the care-receiver but elicited and supported by the caregiver. This 
responsiveness, at its best, is a form of mutual storytelling, in which feedback between 
caregiver and cared-for creates a relationship between them. This allows the care-
receiver dignity and personhood despite dependency, and the caregiver a sense of 
connection and, possibly, self worth. This is not, however, without problems. The 
caregiving feedback loop breaks down when the care-receiver is unable to provide a 
reliable response. This occurs largely in multiply impaired, intellectually challenged or 
autistic children, where communication is limited or non-existent. This leaves the 
caregiver, usually the parent, in a position of uncertainty. 
! I have shown that extreme caregivers spend a good deal of emotional effort in 
attempting to read the child’s limited response. They become finely tuned to the 
messages of discomfort or wellness read sometimes only from their children’s bodies. 
Indeed, they are expected by the medical system to do this as an adjunct to providing 
competent home care. But they also interpret their children’s moods as well as their 
physical bodily needs. They attempt to create larger meaning from their child’s 
responses. And they transfer some of their own longing for a response to the child, by 
envisioning him as the active teacher of the life lessons they have learned from the 
experience of caregiving. The result is the creation of a story of a life that might be at 
least partly imaginary.
! I do not know if this is a reaction to the tragedy of illness or disability, an attempt 
to create hope from meaninglessness, or a a necessary buffer against the endless 
tedium of providing bodily care. It does seem to arise, however, from the responsiveness 
that I believe is required for moral caregiving. I believe that it is an unavoidable element 
of good caregiving, and is therefor commendable and desirable. It should be encouraged 
and nurtured. However, someone must remain aware that the narrative created is not 
entirely based on reality. The caregiver, who is the creator of the story, likely cannot be 
expected to maintain objectivity.
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! For the most part, however, I think the story created is mutually beneficial, 
creating a bond between caregiver and cared-for that acknowledges both of them as 
persons of importance in the world, despite inadequate levels of responsiveness. Ian 
Brown (2011), for example, speaks to his son by clicking his tongue. Or, rather, when 
Brown clicks at Walker, sometimes Walker clicks back. It is their only verbal 
communication;   
 
My relationship with Walker, after all, had been personal, and private; we 
operated by our own standards, by what worked between us. I ‘spoke’ to 
him and he ‘spoke’ to me, clicking our tongues back and forth to one 
another to let each other know that we were paying attention, that we 
knew the other was there, and listening (Brown, 2011, p. 159).
It seems a good standard to set for responsiveness; to know that someone is paying 
attention; that someone else is there, and listening. 
! In most situations, the creation of a bios by the caregiver fills this function. It is a 
form of being there and paying attention, even if the story told cannot be proven to be 
true. The minimally responsive child will likely not be harmed by it, or even aware of it, 
and the resulting caregiving is excellent. But there might be circumstances where the 
caregiver’s insistence on a fulfilling or uplifting story can be detrimental or at least 
problematic. The possibility exists that the story can become a somewhat selfish form of 
disillusionment, provided only for the benefit of the parent. And the inseparability of their 
stories may result in lack of objectivity that could interfere with the parent’s ability to 
determine the best interests of the child. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
! I have estimated that there are at least a half a million children with long-term, 
complex medical problems or moderate to severe intellectual delays, who are being 
cared for by their parents at home. Some of them require medical technology; others will 
remain stuck in difficult developmental stages requiring round the clock attention for 
years. All of them require a variety of medical interventions, therapies, and monitoring. 
Many of those children, particularly those with severe developmental delay or autism, 
will require this care for their entire lives. 
! In a 2001 book exploring new topics in bioethics and public policy, Carol Levine 
reports that family caregiving is an emerging problem with numerous unexplored ethical 
aspects. She estimates that as many as 27 million caregivers are providing long term 
home health care. Much of the burden of caregiving falls to family members, who 
traditionally are called upon to take responsibility for the care of their loved ones when 
they are in need. Medicine, by its success in staving off death, has extended the time 
period over which care must be provided, and thus has increased the burden of care, 
sometimes placing it on families for whom there is very little support. Levine speaks of 
an enormous burden of care placed on “wives or husbands, sisters or brothers, 
daughters or sons, lovers or companions” (Levine, 2011, p. 175). Parents, and the 
existence of medically complex children requiring long term care, are not considered. Yet 
the existence of these children is undeniable. 
! On a spectrum of caregiving difficulty, caring for these children seems to me to 
be one of the most burdensome and emotionally charged of caregiving tasks. I have 
therefor called the care these parents are providing “extreme caregiving.” Extreme 
caregiving involves fulfilling complex medical needs, often in the absence of expected 
cure or even significant long-term improvement. It involves “parenting plus,” the long-
term necessity to meet needs that are usually confined to the first few months or years of 
life (Ray, 2002). It is a round the clock duty, usually with no relief in sight, as it cannot be 
easily passed to someone else. And it is complicated by the intimate relationship 
between the child and the parents who are also medical caregivers.  
! This group has not been recognized in part because the survival of such complex 
children is a recent phenomenon. These children also cross borders of diagnostic 
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categories and pediatric sub-specialties. Children requiring extreme care are found at 
the most severe end of multiple pediatric diagnoses and syndromes. Their medical care 
is usually provided by several specialists, each of whom is dealing with only a small part 
of the child’s problems. It is only when they are hospitalized, an event everyone wishes 
to avoid, that the full extent of their needs might become apparent. Like other types of 
home caregiving, extreme caregiving is largely invisible, even to those who prescribe 
and monitor it. Just as with home care for adults, the number of people requiring care 
and providing that care can be expected to increase as advances in medicine make 
more home care possible and necessary.
! It is critical, therefor, to understand how these children are being cared for; why 
parents take on complex caregiving, how they become competent at it, and what they 
must do emotionally to endure the task. We need to know more than occasional statistic 
about, for example, the percentage increase in maternal depression or sibling behavior 
problems. We need instead to fully evaluate the burden, both physical and emotional, 
that such care imposes on parents and families. In our evaluations of the cost of home 
health care, we must include more than the savings from keeping a child out of the 
hospital. We need to understand the full cost to the family of becoming competent 
caregivers for a medically complex child. Asking families to take this on without true 
understanding of the consequences is, I believe, ethically unsupportable.
! Yet our understanding of care itself is rudimentary. Proponents of an ethic of care 
have pointed repeatedly to the invisibility of the work being done, and the lack of respect 
shown to those who do it. To further complicate analysis, the lines between the emotion 
of caring and the work of caregiving are not often made clear. Part of our understanding 
must include an analysis of the sort of work that is being done. 
! I have therefor chosen to use the phases of care proposed by Joan Tronto 
(1993), which break “caring” down into actionable concepts, which can be ethically 
evaluated by the virtues she has assigned to them. These phases are, again: 1) caring 
about, with its virtue of attentiveness, 2) caring for, with its virtue of (taking) 
responsibility, 3) the hands on work of caregiving, which must be done competently, and 
4) care-receiving, whose virtue of responsiveness forms a bond between caregiver and 
cared-for which strengthens the necessity and appropriateness of the care that is given.   
! Because there are so few studies which look deeply into the lives of these 
families, I believe the only way to evaluate them is by hearing their stories. Those stories 
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are not often told, however. The people who most need to be heard are spending their 
days and nights doing the care they have been assigned. Often, the only stories that are 
told are the ones we want to hear, the ones about miracle babies and blessings. We 
need to hear also the uncomfortable stories. We need to understand that at least some 
of the parents who take on this care feel that they were given no choice, doubt their 
capability to perform their tasks, and can recognize the endlessness of their burden. 
! For this reason I chose narratives that do not always accentuate the positive. 
These parent/narrators are honest, occasionally brutally so, about the ambivalence they 
feel toward their children, the uncertainty they feel about their own abilities, and the 
complex relationship formed when a parent is also a medical caregiver.  The three main 
narratives span several decades, but have much in common. All of the children are 
intellectually disabled; one with severe autism (Greenfeld, 1970), one with moderate 
autism (Hart, 1989), and one with a syndrome called CFC which has components of 
medical fragility, severe intellectual disability, and autism (Brown 2011). Though these 
children are not, for the most part, dependent on medical technology, the issues the 
parent/narrators raise are similar to those reported by ethicists studying the families of 
technology dependent children. They also share concerns that I have witnessed both in 
pediatric practice and in my own personal life, growing up with an intellectually disabled 
brother. 
! I evaluated these, and several other, narratives within the framework suggested 
by Tronto’s (1993) phases of care. I looked for the ways in which extreme caregiving 
differs from typical parenting in levels of attentiveness and responsibility. I looked for 
clues about parental formation of competence in the physical tasks involved with 
caregiving, including the level of medical knowledge acquired and the parent’s 
conceptualization of that knowledge. And I paid particular attention to descriptions of the 
ways in which parents who must also become medical caregivers construct their 
understanding of their children’s needs, since none of these children were ever able to 
be more than minimally responsive. By evaluating this particularly difficult form of 
caregiving using Tronto’s phases of care, I hope also to expand on current theories of 
care, particularly in my analysis of the relationship that forms between a caregiver and a 
minimally responsive or unresponsive care-receiver.
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ATTENTIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY
! Attentiveness and responsibility of course are the virtues associated with Tronto’s 
first two phases of care; caring about and caring for. In these two phases, it seems likely 
that typical parents and parents who are doing extreme caregiving have a similar sort of 
caring activity. Both types of parents are to the same degree caring about their children 
by being attentive to their needs, and caring for their children by taking on the 
responsibilities that come with having a child. What differs is the amount of needs that 
must be met for medically complex and intellectually disabled children. 
! A parent with a special needs child must be attentive to and take responsibility for 
more things than the parents of a typical child. The often overwhelming burden of care 
associated with infancy, such as feeding, diapering, attending round the clock to crying, 
can be extended over decades. Several academic studies of parents of technology 
dependent children confirm the sheer physical burden of work that special needs 
parenting requires. The narratives I have found support this also. 
! The number of new responsibilities that parents doing extreme caregiving must 
take on, is also clear. Parents all report numerous and varied unexpected duties such as 
learning to maintain home medical equipment, responding to alarms, and dealing with 
frequent illnesses. They must become advocates for their child’s care, coordinate visits 
to multiple specialists, administer medications and therapies, and keep track of 
enormous amounts of information for insurance purposes. In addition, when their child 
reaches school age, they must become adept at seeking out and often coordinating an 
appropriate education.
! The financial burden is also clear. Insurance and insurance supplements cover 
much of the hospital care, but many of the simple things required for home health care 
are not covered by insurance. In addition, the time required for caregiving usually 
prevents at least one parent from working outside the home. Families find that things like 
the cost of diapers, the cost of special formulas or food, and the cost of travel add up to 
large numbers over time. Even the narrators, all of whom seemed to be highly 
successful journalists, mentioned the financial burdens at times. My experience from my 
pediatric practice is more telling; with several families needing to declare bankruptcy to 
deal with the increased costs and decreased income.
! The emotional burden is also recognized in numerous studies documenting 
parental, particularly maternal, psychological problems such as depression and stress 
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levels. Often referral for therapy is recommended, though the reasons for these 
difficulties are rarely explored. Studying the families of technology dependent children, 
as well as the narratives by extreme caregivers, the source of these problems becomes 
clear. Constant work and sleeplessness, together with the fear and anxiety of dealing 
with a sick child, will understandably cause the most stable of parents to feel stress. The 
many varieties of guilt available--for bringing the child into the world, causing or being 
unable to heal the child’s problems, for doing too much, or too little, for providing the 
genes that created a child with so many problems--only add to the problem. It should be 
no surprise that marriages falter and mental health deteriorates under such 
circumstances. These parents need help, physical assistance, not another appointment 
for therapy.
! Carnevale et al. (2006) have interestingly described the lives of the parents of 
technology dependent children as “daily living with distress and enrichment.” 
Interviewing the parents of ventilator dependent children, they did indeed uncover a 
good deal of ambivalence. However it is in the parents’ narratives where the level of 
ambivalence becomes clear. These parents obviously love their children, and state often 
that their child’s death would be unthinkable. At the same time, several narrators confess 
to sometimes elaborate murder or murder/suicide fantasies as a way of dealing with the 
awful present and uncertain future. It is true that all of the confessors of such feelings 
are men; I found no circumstances where mothers expressed such feelings.
! Ethically problematic also is the lack of choice these parents feel in taking on the 
burden of care. They have chosen to be parents, of course, but the level of involvement 
required for extreme caregiving multiplies the expected burden. They are attentive and 
responsible people who find themselves swamped by their unexpected duties. They give 
up sleep, promising careers, and financial security, one small step at a time, and by the 
time the realize the enormity of the task it is too late to give it up. Friends and relatives 
disappear. Respite care is hard to find, and the presence of a home health care nurse or 
aid carries its own difficulties in lack of privacy, scheduling problems, and financial 
outlay. They end up at home and isolated, with the growing certainty that their child’s 
needs will outlive their energy, if not themselves. Death is both the worst thing that could 
happen, and the only way out. 
! If attentiveness and responsibility are considered as moral virtues, where the 
proper level of each is balanced between too little and too much, it becomes apparent 
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that these parents are providing an amount of both virtues that exceeds the usual 
expectations. They are investing so much in their caregiving that they have put their own 
desires and selves aside. However, they have few other options. Someone must care for 
the child, and the child happens to, as Ian Brown (2011) puts it, “require superhuman 
care” (p. 96). The providers of the medical technology that creates these children are, I 
believe, largely unaware of this hidden cost of home care. By failing to recognize the 
existence of such difficult care, they are essentially abandoning both the parents who 
are carrying out their directions, and the children who are their patients.  
COMPETENCE
! It is in the third phase of caring, caregiving, where the differences between 
extreme caregiving and typical parenting become wide. While typical parents do need to 
acquire some forms of competence in order to do a good job of raising their children, 
extreme caregivers must learn a whole new type of competencies. With very little 
training or guidance, they must become medical caregivers. Their goal of becoming 
good parents suddenly and unexpectedly requires the taking on of, essentially, a new 
career, one that was neither desired nor anticipated, and that does not have any 
possibility of financial benefit. While many parents rise to the task admirably, they do so 
at a high cost. Very little consideration is given to their ability to provide such care; it is 
just assumed that they will do it.  
! I believe that this expectation that anyone--parent or spouse or sibling--can and 
should take on the duties of caregiver for an ailing family member, is common to many 
home caregiving situations. The idea that everyone is able, and should be willing, to 
provide home health care, has become a driving force behind the movement of ever 
more complex health care into the home. Our insistence that the patient’s desire to stay 
at home takes precedence over any other concern, also contributes to a growing number 
of overworked and unprepared caregivers. In the case of extreme caregiving, it is 
evident that parents never truly become comfortable with their caregiving abilities. And 
while they are willing to do anything for their child, and want their child to live at home, 
they find themselves terribly unprepared for the reality. 
! In the caregiving narratives and in my pediatric experience, many parents 
become exceedingly knowledgeable about their child’s disease. It is not unusual for a 
parent to be more up to date on the current research than their pediatrician. This was 
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demonstrated by detailed descriptions of medical advances cited by all of the narrators. 
These parents took on a personal search for any information they could find that might 
lead to a treatment or cure. Yet they are never acknowledged as experts, even by 
themselves. Lack of professional support and the distance created by the language of 
medicine both lead them to doubt their competence. 
! In addition, all their knowledge seems to lead to a sense of disappointment and 
failure. Parents come to blame themselves and their inabilities for their child’s ongoing 
problems. There is a certain amount of resentment toward and disappointment in the 
medical system as well. But, in narratives about extreme caregiving, the sense of failure 
is evident. 
! I have speculated that the reason for this feeling of failure is that the goals of 
care as currently expressed do not account for long-term disability. The usual goals of 
medical care (Fins, 2006), curing illness or restoring function, do not really apply to a 
child who will spend years in a state of infantile dependence, or whose developmental 
progress is measured in tiny steps that each require months or years of intensive 
therapy to accomplish. No more relevant are Fins’ (2006) recently added goals of 
medical care; prolonging life or palliation to ease death. The majority of these children do 
not have a life limiting problem. While some of the most effected children do have 
illnesses that in the past were expected to be fatal, that is not likely to be acknowledged. 
The child’s survival is framed as a miracle that can be extended indefinitely. There is an 
expectation that the child will always improve and grow, and that death is unexpected 
and possibly another sign of failure. And so, extreme parenting requires far more than 
prolonging life.    
! Nor are the goals of pediatric home health care, established recently by the AAP 
(Elias & Murphy [AAP], 2012), particularly helpful. The intent to ensure that a child 
remains healthy and thrives, is difficult to carry out when, in fact, the child will never 
reach a “normal” state of health. And the hope that the child will remain at home and out 
of the hospital merely insures that the extent of need for medical and developmental 
home support remains invisible. The expectation of progress to normalcy, I believe, 
leads parents to feel that their caregiving is lacking. They take on themselves the fault 
for our inability to cure or find effective treatment for their children. 
! The expectation that the child will remain in the home indefinitely also contributes 
to the sense of failure. Children are expected to grow up and have their own lives, not 
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forever remain dependent. All of the parents realize, with growing despair, that they will 
not be able to meet their child’s needs forever. Since they know that their home is the 
best, if not the only, place where there is adequate caregiving, they feel acutely their 
failure at being unable to provide it forever.  
RESPONSIVENESS
! It is in the fourth phase of caring, care-receiving, with its associated virtue of 
responsiveness, that extreme caregiving begins to raise ethical issues that center 
around the care-receiver rather than the caregiver. The earlier phases are all to be 
carried out by the caregiver, and any ethical issues raised by the virtues of attentiveness, 
responsibility, and competence can be analyzed by considering the actions of the 
caregiver. Responsiveness, however, requires cooperation. The caregiver is charged to 
elicit a response, spending whatever time and effort is needed to insure that it is 
genuine. Ethical problems arise when the care receiver is unresponsive or unable to 
provide a consistent response. This is not an unusual circumstance in extreme 
caregiving.  
! I have theorized responsiveness as a narrative process that occurs between 
caregiver and care-receiver, an active process of refining care to match the needs 
present. In order for this to work effectively, it must become a sort of feedback loop, as 
care is given by the caregiver, responded to by the cared-for, and then altered in 
response. In an ideal situation, both participants must be able to connect on an intimate 
level, changing the narrative of their lives to accept and meet the needs of the cared-for. 
In reality, I believe it often falls to the caregiver to both elicit and interpret the response 
from the care-receiver. A virtuously responsive caregiver, therefor, will become an 
interpreter and promoter of her charge’s life story. 
! For parents doing extreme caregiving, this often means becoming a sometimes 
lifelong interpreter, not only of the child’s physical needs, but of who the child is. They 
find themselves attempting to imbue meaning to their children’s lives, with very little to 
go on. Typical parents do this work as well, forming an idea of who their child is from 
their expectations, and attempting to mold the child productively. As a child gets older, he 
will inevitably inform the parents of all the ways in which they have erred in their 
impressions. The unreliably communicative child does not have an opportunity to do this, 
and remains forever the product of his parent’s interpretations.
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! I have demonstrated that several narrators of extreme caregiving are desperately 
trying to be responsive to their children. Greenfeld (1970) and Hart (1989) journey to find 
out everything they can about autism in hopes of discovering who their sons are. Brown 
(2011) tries to connect with his son by learning everything he can about his syndrome, 
and even traveling to meet other children similarly affected. Rapp (2013) feels the need 
to provide a life narrative for a son who will never develop beyond age six months, and 
will gradually lose all awareness of his own existence. All four are clearly aware that their 
attempts are inadequate; that they will never be able to truly hear their son’s voices. 
Brown and Rapp are additionally aware that the only voice that their child has, is the 
story that they have constructed for him, and may not in fact be authentic. 
! Yet I believe that constructing and maintaining a life story is a part of moral 
caregiving. Responsiveness as a virtue is a act of mutual creation of narrative. For the 
elderly demented patient, this can mean maintaining as much as possible the memory of 
a life lived, as recommended by Hilde Lindemann (2009). For a sick patient, this can 
mean working together on piecing together a new meaning for a life disrupted by illness, 
as suggested by Frank Brody (2003). For the parents of chronically disabled children, as 
reported by Park McArthur (2012), who depends on her parent’s care for advancing 
muscular dystrophy, responsiveness means participating in the caregiving process in 
such a way as to engender trust, acknowledge independence, and maintain dignity. But 
for children with intellectual disability, the narrative remains the creation of the parent. 
The child’s life story is unverifiable, and may exist only in the mind of the caregiver. 
! This could have several unrecognized consequences, apart from the obvious 
possibility of infringement on the child’s autonomy and authenticity. For example, most 
children have more than one caregiver; there are two parents, and often an array of 
home health care workers, teachers, and therapists. Problems can arise when 
caregivers disagree on how much care the child needs, how to handle behavior 
problems, or how aggressively to pursue medical treatment. Perhaps the source of these 
disagreements is rooted in each caregiver telling themselves a different story for the 
child. Perhaps divorce, family stress, and other problems are partly caused by 
dissonance in their narratives. This is unknown territory.  
! Another example is in end of life discussions, when the miracle cures for a no-
longer-fatal syndrome are no longer effective. Medical providers and parents are almost 
certainly telling themselves different stories about who these gravely ill children are. 
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Where a nurse or physician may see a nearly completely unresponsive child body 
suffering at every new procedure, the parents may have imbued that child with an inner 
life that is not visible to an outsider. A parent’s insistence that “everything” must be done 
for their child might be driven by guilt. Or it might be that the parent is fighting to maintain 
a life whose inner richness only they can see. Or it might be that the parent has become 
so involved in caregiving and the construction of the child’s life that they see the child’s 
death as a loss of part of themselves. Again, this is unknown. 
! Arthur Frank (2002) has stated that patients and doctors must understand each 
others’ stories in order to truly communicate. Each patient, and each doctor, arrives at an 
encounter with preconceived ideas about themselves, and the place that an illness might 
have in their lives. Certainly, there is almost no way to conduct a dialog about withdrawal 
of care as long as each side is unaware of the other’s stories. Yet we have very little 
understanding still of the stories of parents who are extreme caregivers.  
FUTURE WORK
! Perhaps the most difficult part of extreme parenting is its seeming endlessness. 
The parents are trapped in a responsibility that far exceeds what is expected of parents. 
The need for respite care comes up reasonably often in discussions of home caregiving, 
but there is almost no recognition of the fact that, for children, this sort of care can 
extend for decades. It has been suggested recently that there are limits to family 
responsibility for caregiving (Levine, 2001). However, none of the studies on home 
health care and family caregiving that I am aware of, mention the existence of the 
prolonged child caregiving that these parents perform.  
! Judging from the frequent comments in these narratives, and from personal 
experiences and communications, the realization that there will never be relief from 
caregiving is one of the hardest things to deal with in extreme caregiving. In part this is 
because it requires an acknowledgement of failure; the child will never be cured, or grow 
into full independence. But it is mostly a practical realization, that, no matter how hard 
the parent might work, the work will never be done.  
! The final stage in typical parenting is the launching of the grown child into an 
independent life. For many of these children, this expectation is impossible to fulfill; the 
child’s ongoing level of dependence will never allow it. Adolescence for these children 
involves a growing realization that the need for caregiving might continue past the point 
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where the parent is physically able to do it. This leads to ambiguous feelings as the 
parents come to simultaneously hope and fear, that the child will outlive the parent. It is 
likely that the caregiving task might be less of a burden if there were some endpoint 
other than death. 
! It is less clear, but possible, that the child might also benefit from a different care 
situation. Even an intellectually impaired child might benefit from a new environment, 
possibly growing up in new ways by moving away from home. If the parents are 
constructing a life story for the child, as I believe they are, that story might become fuller 
or more authentic if other caregivers are able to contribute to it in potentially new ways. 
This is suggested in the final chapters of both Ian Brown’s (2011) The Boy in the Moon 
and by Charles Hart’s (1989) Without Reason. I have also observed this benefit in my 
brother after placement at age 47 in an excellent group home. The possibility that 
increased authenticity and fuller personhood can be attained in a new care situation 
should be more fully explored. 
! If this is so; if even intellectually impaired people can benefit from moving out of 
parental home care, this might add to a mandate for increasing long-term care 
opportunities outside the home. The injustice of the long-term burden of work placed on 
these parents also provides an ethical mandate. At this point, parents continue extreme 
caregiving well past what should be asked of them, simply because there is no one else 
who will do it, or perhaps no one else who will do it as well as they can. It seems that 
alternate care situations outside the home are needed to benefit both parent/caregiver 
and grown child. 
! I have estimated that there are at least five hundred thousand children living at 
home with long-term complex needs, which means that 500,000 new places for grown-
ups who cannot live independently need to be made for them. Yet our current system 
has barely begun to offer adequate places for those dependent adults who already exist. 
We need to expand the number of group homes and other care facilities enormously. We 
also must develop innovative ways to care for people; ways that provide attentive, 
responsible, competent and responsive care. This too is a relatively unexplored area. 
While it is possible to find competent care outside the home, very few of the existing 
models of care are actually capable of taking the place of family or expanding their 
clients’ worlds. I suspect that the most important aspect of any form of alternative care 
will be the responsiveness of the new caregivers. 
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! Extreme caregiving is, I believe, a new form of caregiving, characterized by its 
difficult, prolonged, and intimate nature. While theories of home care are emerging, there 
is little understanding of this combination of medical caregiving and parenting. The goals 
of both are confused and rendered inadequate. Conceptualizing extreme caregiving by 
analyzing it via Tronto’s (1993) phases of care has, I hope, provided a start in evaluating 
the ethical consequences of this form of caregiving, as well as broadened our 
understanding of what care is. 
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